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INTRODUCTION 
What is most apparent to anyone who has participated in, analyzed , or 
sat through a public international negotiation are the often lengthy , 
seemingly haphazard , meandering of the debates, and the positioning 
and posturing that appears to skirt the issues at stake . It certainly bears 
the image of a most unsystematic process. While some of this 
conspicuously roundabout behavior may be driven by conscious 
strategies and tactics , it would seem reasonable to assume that the 
efficiency of the joint decision making process of negotiation can be 
enhanced significantly by the judicious application of logical and 
quantitative methodologies from the management sciences , psychol-
ogy, economics, statistics, and computer sciences. 
This special issue of Theory and Decision explores the extent to 
which such quantitative approaches, typically employed to analyze and 
explain past negotiation processes , are appropriate or can be trans-
formed into effective tools that can support international negotiators 
and their staffs during the process itself. The central question asked of 
our authors is: can methodologies typically used to understand and 
explain historical negotiation processes be used as normative and 
prescriptive tools to assist negotiators as well? To be sure , many 
problems and issues will be encountered in attempting to introduce 
scientific methodologies that are essentially alien to negotiation prac-
titioners who largely view their profession as more art than science. 
The papers published in this issue each begin to address the major 
obstacles - and possible solutions - to effective implementation of eight 
quantitative approaches in international negotiation settings. The 
methods assessed include those that can help negotiators assess 
alternate strategies and estimate likely outcomes , namely, decision 
analysis (Spector) , multi-criteria optimization (Wierzbicki, Krus and 
Makowski) , statistical analysis (Druckman), and game theory (Munier 
and Rulliere), and those methods that help diagnose the negotiation 
process itself, for example , cognitive theory (Bonham) , simulation 
modeling (Samarasan), rule-based systems (Kersten) , and information 
management (Andriole) . The benefits of each method for enhancing 
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joint decision processes and the difficulties inherent in reasonably 
implementing each are compared and contrasted by the presentations. 
The concept for this issue emanated from a workshop on systems 
analysis techniques for international negotiation sponsored by the 
Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Project at the Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, 
Austria in October 1991. Fifteen methodologists, negotiation research-
ers, and practitioners dialogued in that workshop, seeking to find 
answers that could bridge the gaps and identify realistic opportunities 
between practical negotiation needs and methodological approaches. 
A subset of the papers developed for that workshop are collected in 
this issue, hopefully, to guide the research agendas of negot1at1on 
researchers interested in policy outreach and applied negotiation 
support. 
There has been relatively little research accomplished on how 
analytical methodologies can be engineered to assist international 
negotiators in a practical way, either to diagnose, plan and develop 
strategies independently or bargain interactively. Several critical chal-
lenges must be addressed by collaborative efforts between the negotia-
tion and methodological research communities: 
1. The transformation of descriptive and explanatory approaches into 
normative and prescriptive approaches. Researchers have focused 
primarily on developing methods that can describe and explain the 
negotiation process in a post hoc fashion, not on normative or 
prescriptive tools that can assist in a practical way in the negotiation 
itself. Existing approaches need to be examined to assess whether they 
can be transformed into meaningful and useable tools. 
2. The synthesis of process and substantive models. Issue-specific 
research has resulted in models that can help negotiators analyze the 
substance of disputes being debated. One excellent example is the 
Regional Acidification Information System (RAINS) (Alcamo et al., 
1990) developed by IIASA. This complex meteorological model is 
employed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) to simulate and test alternate negotiation formulas or 
solutions concerning N02 and S02 emission and deposition targets in 
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Europe. Such substantive models provide negotiators with an in depth 
understanding of an issue, the capacity to examine it from all sides, 
and importantly, the ability to test various assumptions. Essentially, 
these substantive tools assist negotiators in defining and framing the 
problem, as well as testing what-if scenarios that can help them 
generate alternate proposals and formulas for agreement. Decision 
making research, on the other hand, has resulted in many analytical 
approaches that can help explain the processes of convergence and 
divergence in negotiation. Such process techniques can help 
negotiators analyze proposals, construct strategies, test strategies, 
evaluate strategies of other actors, and assess possible outcomes. 
These process tools can take the proposals and formulas developed 
using the substantive models and evaluate them in the light of what is 
politically possible , given the realities of the negotiation situation and 
the negotiators' interests, values, and goals. 
Substantive models without their processual counterparts may be 
perceived by practical negotiators as yielding ideal solutions that are 
unrealistic, while process models alone can be viewed as overly 
abstract. Researchers need to evaluate the possibilities of integrating 
these two types of models to support both the practical issue and 
behavioral requirements of negotiators to develop mutually beneficial 
agreements. 
3. Application of end user-focused strategies rather than technique-
focused approaches . Methodologists know the benefits and capabilities 
that their techniques can provide to negotiators. Negotiation prac-
titioners, however , are usually traditional in their approach, have no 
quantitative training, and know little about research conducted on 
negotiation processes. The typical result of technique-focused activities 
is practitioner resistance to using the available tools. An alternative 
approach to introducing analytical methods into the negotiation 
workplace is to take an end user perspective. Using this strategy, 
researchers seek to understand the negotiators' requirements for 
information and analysis during the course of negotiations (from 
prenegotiation through to the endgame). Given this understanding, 
researchers can apply the appropriate techniques to satisfy information 
needs. The following questions need to be answered to implement this 
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end user approach: What are the informational and analytical needs of 
the negotiators? How do these needs change as the negotiation 
progresses through its stages? Under what conditions is this informa-
tion and analysis needed most? When is there likely to be a need for 
urgent responsiveness? 
4. Design of effective presentation and delivery. It is important to find 
the right approach to present and deliver analytical tools to the 
negotiator. Central is the question of whom such negotiation tools are 
for. At least initially, these techniques will likely support the negotia-
tion and policy making staffs, not the negotiators directly. The staff's 
role is to assess data and read signals from the various involved actors 
to diagnose the situation, analyze the problem , and evaluate alternate 
strategies. Are the tools to be used by individuals or by groups? Are 
they needed by parties to the negotiation who will use them in-
dependently or as part of a joint problem solving exercise? Are they 
needed by staff back home or at the negotiation site? How can the 
results be stated in jargon-free terms? What form or package would 
deliver the information and analysis most effectively to the end user? 
These are the challenges with which we confronted our workshop 
participants and which are addressed in the papers in this issue. Each 
paper provides the perspective of a major methodological family that 
has been applied to the study of negotiation processes. Decision 
analysis, for example, is considered to be a family that includes specific 
techniques such as multiattribute utility analysis, decision trees, cross-
impact analysis, and cost-benefit analysis. Each family of related 
techniques has a solid foundation of negotiation research results that 
can serve as a springboard to stimulate further investigation, refine-
ment, and design of analytical approaches and suggest how they might 
best be implemented to support international negotiators in a practical 
way. 
Each paper briefly reviews the current state of the method, describes 
its technical underpinnings, and offers an illustration or two of how 
this approach has been used in a descriptive, explanatory or prescrip-
tive way in negotiations. While the principal focus of the papers is on 
supporting complex negotiations at an international level , examples 
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are drawn from many types of negot1at10ns in which the specific 
techniques have been applied. The papers address the four challenges 
described above, identifying necessary modifications to the techniques 
to facilitate practical implementation in negotiation settings. Finally , 
each paper focuses on the anticipated benefits to negotiators of using 
the method , how it can help, and under what circumstances. Addition-
al development of the techniques , testing , validation, data collection 
methods, and generalizability issues are discussed. 
These eight methodological perspectives are compared in two 
concluding papers written by Hafner, a negotiation practitioner , and 
Zartman , a negotiation researcher , who reflect on the applicability and 
limitations of the range of analytical methods. The practitioner paper 
assesses the feasibility, practicality, and utility of negotiation support 
systems from a user's viewpoint. The researcher paper places the 
discussion within a larger theoretical context, suggesting ways by which 
systems approaches can enrich the mainstream descriptive and ex-
planatory frameworks of negotiation and how negotiation concepts 
and theories can stimulate continued methodological research on 
systems support. 
This issue brings together, for the first time, critical evaluations of 
major methodological approaches targeted at negotiation support and 
challenges their proponents to examine a common set of issues 
confronting practical implementation that can be compared systemati-
cally. The concluding chapters synthesize the findings , begin the 
needed process of dialogue between the methodologist and research 
communities , and provide a blueprint for future research and applica-
tion based upon practical and conceptual considerations. 
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BERTRAM I. SPECTOR 
DECISION ANALYSIS FOR PRACTICAL 
NEGOTIATION APPLICATION 
ABSTRACT. The family of decision analysis techniques can be applied effectively to 
support practical negotiators in international settings. These techniques are most 
appropriate in support of the prenegotiation phase, when parties are diagnosing the 
situation , assessing their own plans and strategies, and evaluating likely reactions and 
outcomes. The paper identifies how these approaches have and can be used to assist 
negotiation practitioners, offers a rationale for the application of decision analytic 
approaches in terms of the particular analytical requirements of the prenegotiation 
period , suggests how these process-oriented tools can be integrated with substantive 
tools, and discusses ways in which these tools can be presented and delivered to 
practitioners in a practical and confidence-building manner. 
Keywords: Decision analysis , prenegotiation, multi-attribute utility analysis. 
1. INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL REQUIREMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 
International negotiat10n is a process which inherently depends on 
information. For example, negotiators require information about their 
own country's goals and resistance points. They need reciprocal 
information about their counterparts. They require sufficient informa-
tion to develop tactical and strategic approaches to joint problem 
solving, that is, effective ways of persuading other interested parties to 
come to the table and reach a mutually acceptable accord. Negotiators 
also need to have adequate knowledge to design innovative, but 
realistic options for solution and the ability to evaluate the costs and 
benefits involved in striving for each. That means that they need to 
understand in detail the substantive issues which they are debating; in 
this age, that often means a sophisticated knowledge of science, 
technology, and economics . 
Negotiators and their staffs need the tools to adequately analyze this 
information to produce assessments that will help them make good 
decisions . For example, they need the analytical resources and skills to 
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diagnose the situation, evaluate the cost-benefit of their own strategy 
options, assess the impact of other party strategies, and trade off the 
efficacy of alternative negotiated outcomes. 
Despite these information dependencies and analytical require-
ments, international negotiators usually confront their counterparts 
only with their wits, instructions from their home government, and 
minimal background information developed by their staffs . Interna-
tional negotiation is still viewed by practitioners as an art form, not a 
science. Unfortunately, much of the information required is either 
unavailable when needed or costly to obtain. Moreover, most nations 
can little afford the in depth analyses of issues, strategies, and 
outcomes that are required to understand the implications of one 
negotiation proposal over another. It is often the case that delegations 
arrive at complicated multilateral negotiations having performed 
minimal assessments of their own interests and positions, let alone that 
of other key nations and coalitions. In addition, negotiators lack the 
tools and techniques for effective joint problem-solving that have been 
developed in the management sciences and are already being widely 
used in industry . International negotiation has clearly not entered the 
modern information era. 
If the power of information and analysis can be harnessed to support 
international negotiation , will it help and how? More significant, 
perhaps, is the answer to the question, 'What will it take to be used? ' 
This paper focuses on one family of analytical methodologies, decision 
analytic techniques , which is central to understanding, and possibly 
recommending, the decision structure and logic employed by 
negotiators. The discussion examines the type of information needed 
to implement these techniques and what they can do to support the 
negotiation process, the prenegotiation phase, in particular. 
2. DECISION ANALYSIS: KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND 
APPLICATIONS 
Decision analysis is a methodology typically used to support decision 
makers actively in assessing alternative courses of action. Generated 
from statistical decision theory, decision analysis was developed in the 
field of business administration as a practical approach to assist 
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corporate managers in weighing their options and designing logical 
solutions in a systematic fashion. It is usually applied in a consultative, 
prescriptive mode with decision makers, helping them work through 
immediate decision problems (Ulvila and Brown, 1982). 
Decision analysis tools have been applied along these same lines 
with negotiators and policy makers to assist, for example, in pre-
negotiation strategy development over U.S. military bases in the 
Philippines (1978), the Panama Canal (1974), and international oil 
tanker standards (1978) (Raiffa, 1982; Ulvila and Snider, 1980; Ulvila, 
1990). In these cases, decision analysts supported negotiating teams by 
eliciting practitioner preferences and values, generating models based 
on these subjective judgments, calculating the decision analytic results, 
and feeding these results back to the negotiators to help them evaluate 
alternative strategies . 
Decision analysis targets one critical element in the decision making 
process that is a key driver in making and understanding effective 
choices, personal preferences. The decision maker's subjective judg-
ment is incorporated into decision analysis models along with objective 
inputs. If these personal preferences can be defined and elicited 
directly from involved negotiators concerning particular negotiating 
interests, then the technique can be applied prescriptively as a 
supportive tool. 
These models, applied to the negotiation process, can be most 
helpful in understanding strategy and outcome. The methodology is 
geared to evaluating alternate strategy options based on tradeoff 
analyses that take into account the expected value of the projected 
outcomes. Evaluation of strategy decisions is accomplished in decision 
analysis primarily in terms of negotiator preferences. 
Decision analytic models offer the capability of disaggregating the 
decision rationale for selecting one strategy over another by evaluating 
negotiator preferences, criterion by criterion. In doing so, it is possible 
to understand not only the genesis of a country's bargaining interests 
and why certain outcomes are seen as attractive, but also the genesis of 
compromise solutions that provide a better distribution of benefits to 
all parties. 
Two of the most commonly used forms of decision analytic models 
are decision tree analysis and multi-attribute utility (MAU) analysis; 
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other variants in the decision analysis family are described later in this 
paper. In decision tree analysis, the decision options and calculations 
can be displayed graphically as a network, indicating sequentially the 
decision choices that can be made , the actions of other negotiating 
parties, and the occurrence of uncontrollable and situational events . 
This network can be designed in an iterative offer-counteroffer 
pattern between negotiating parties. It can present a dynamic picture 
of the probable future progress of the negotiation process. Along with 
the specification of this network , decision trees also present the 
probability of occurrence of future events , the value of the alternate 
final outcomes, and intermediate expected values at each node in the 
tree. Overall, decision tree analysis offers an assessment of probable 
outcomes given choices made and the probabilities of occurrence of 
other party actions or events. 
While person variables (negotiator preferences) are clearly central to 
this decision analysis methodology , situation variables also play an 
important role in the approach . Nodes in the decision tree can 
represent changes in the negotiation situation - changes in the other 
side's position or strategy , changes in home government instructions, 
changes in deadlines, introduction of new issues - with associated 
probabilities of occurrence and revisions to the expected outcomes. 
Multi-attribute utility analysis provides a structure to tradeoff mul-
tiple decision objectives across alternate decision options , resulting in a 
prioritization of those options. It requires the development of a model 
that replicates the decision maker's set of evaluation criteria applied to 
the decision problem. This model includes not only the criteria , but 
also the relative importance of each criterion. Decision options are 
rated against each criterion and calculations performed. MAU usually 
results in a prioritization of strategy choices , one party at a time . 
Unlike decision tree analysis, MAU provides a static snapshot of the 
negotiation process. 
Ulvila 's (1990) Philippine base negotiations case is a good example 
of the use of decision analysis to support strategy development in the 
prenegotiation phase of a bilateral situation. The U .S. negotiating 
team used a facilitator to elicit their own preferences as well as the 
likely preferences of the other side 's negotiators. Two MAU models 
were developed - one for each actor - by weighing the multiple issues 
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in the negohat1on and rating the perceived attractiveness of actor 
positions on each issue. A compromise position that fell within the 
range of negotiating positions was also rated in terms of relative 
attractiveness. Using these quantified models, Ulvila was able to do 
the following. 
• Identify the attractiveness of alternative packages of agreements 
across all of the key negotiating issues for each negotiating party . 
Many alternate packages were simulated across the issue areas and 
attempts were made to analyze their overall attractiveness to each 
party. 
• Identify an agreement space in which both sides could maximize 
their gains in the negotiation. The points along the optimal frontier 
were explainable in terms of the actors' issue weights and position 
preferences. 
Raiffa (1982) describes a very similar application of decision analysis 
concerning the bilateral Panama Canal negotiations. Spector (1991a) 
applies MAU models to analyze two multilateral negotiations - the 
Uruguay Round of the GA TT talks and the Single Europe Act of the 
European Communities. Using sensitivity testing, he conducts a 
preference adjustment analysis to determine the extent of divergence in 
national interests and the degree of modification required by all parties 
to achieve a compromise agreement. 
Ulvila and Snider (1980) provide an interesting case of the use of 
decision analytic models not only to support a particular negotiating 
team in an upcoming multilateral negotiation, but also to explain some 
elements of process . They used a MAU model in consultative mode 
with the U.S . negotiating team to the 1978 International Conference 
on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention to prepare alternate 
strategies and consider tradeoffs among them during the prenegotia-
tion phase. In building the decision analytic model, U.S. negotiation 
interests had to be compared in relation to the interests of the other 
countries that would participate in the conference. This was accom-
plished by having the U.S. team role play their counterpart teams in 21 
other countries. 
A common set of criteria and negotiation proposals was identified 
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for the MAU model structure and a common set of scores was elicited 
from the U.S. team to rate each proposal package against each 
criterion. In building the model, the authors assumed that this basic 
structure of the negotiations was essentially equivalent across particip-
ants. However, the relative importances given to the various criteria 
were conceived as different across participants; that is, each country's 
interests , while comprised of the same set of issues , are prioritized 
differently. 
By analyzing the model and examining its component elements, the 
researchers and U.S. negotiating team were able to highlight some 
issues which were likely to be contentious in the negotiations and 
develop compromise solutions. They were able to explain, in terms of 
the differential interests of various countries on particular issues , why a 
specific U.S. strategy would not likely be successful in yielding 
agreement in the upcoming multilateral conference . 
As illustrated by the Ulvila and Snider case described above, 
multiple decision analytic models can be built in the context of 
multilateral negotiations , each attempting to replicate the perspective 
of each negotiating party. One can assume that the model structures 
(the inventory of interests and outcomes) are the same, but actor 
preferences and priorities for the interests vary across participants. 
Players that are closely aligned with each other - with high interest 
commonality - have very similar interest preferences. That is , they 
perceive and address the negotiating problem in a very similar manner 
and their model weights are highly correlated. On the other hand, 
players with strong interest divergence likely have very different 
perspectives on the criteria weights and hierarchy by which courses of 
action are evaluated; their decision calculus is very different and thus is 
represented very differently when modeled . 
When model structures are very similar, it is possible to compare 
directly both the assumptions of the analysis (i.e. weights, scores, and 
probabilities) and the decision results directly . When model structures 
are dissimilar, it is still possible to compare the results of the decision 
analysis , that is, the prioritization of decision alternatives across actors . 
Negotiation processes are dynamic, meaning that many decisions are 
made and modified by each negotiating party over time on multiple 
issues. For each issue area, different decision analysis models may be 
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required . However, if countries practice a consistent policy concerning 
their national objectives and interests within a particular negotiation , 
one may assume that the evaluation criteria and weighting schemes will 
be similar across decision episodes. 
While decision analytic models have been applied successfully in a 
limited number of instances , the methodology has come under some 
criticism. First , the mathematics of the technique assume that the 
evaluation criteria are mutually exclusive and independent. This 
assumption is very difficult to satisfy in application , especially when 
attempting to model the logic of negotiators and policy makers. It 
essentially rests with the good judgment of the model developer to 
assess that the independence assumption is approximated as well as 
possible. Second , it is very difficult to avoid cultural biases when 
estimating the preferences of the other side , thus yielding possibly 
misleading results . Third, the calculus of decision analysis models is 
linear and additive; this is usually an inappropriate assumption when 
dealing with decision makers whose reasoning processes often incorpo-
rate extensive feedback . 
All of these technical criticisms can be refuted by the argument that 
decision analysis was never intended to yield precise, engineering 
results ; after all , the technique attempts to model a subjective region 
of human behavior. Although the method does produce quantitative 
results concerning the priorities of possible strategies for outcomes , 
these should be treated in a relative , not an absolute manner, given the 
admitted imprecision of the model's inputs, decision maker pref-
erences. Hopple (1986) categorizes the decision analytic family under 
the rubric of 'structured qualitative', thus downplaying its quantitative 
aspects. Based on the model 's calculations , it is sufficient for the 
decision analyst to present the negotiator with a rank ordering of 
options. 
One of the greatest benefits of decision analysis is its capacity to 
present decision makers with a systematic way of structuring and 
restructuring a problem ; the model-building exercise sometimes 
provides more insight to the decision makers than the model's 
calculations . It is the process of logically thinking through, represent-
ing, and reevaluating relationships and preferences that decision 
makers often find most valuable in the method . 
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3 . APPLYING DECISION ANALYSIS TO THE PRENEGOTIATION 
PROCESS 
The application of decision analytic techniques to the prenegotiation 
process is particularly appropriate . This is the phase of negotiation in 
which the need for information, planning , and tradeoff assessment is 
instrumental in determining whether conflicting parties will in fact 
decide to come to the negotiating table or settle their disputes by 
unilateral means. It is a suitable time for each party to conduct a 
diagnosis of the situation: generating alternate formulas, defining its 
own interests clearly , inferring the motives and interests of the other 
parties, identifying opportunities for tradeoffs and compromises be-
tween opposing perspectives, and developing expectations for the final 
outcome of the negotiations. Decision analysis methods are relevant to 
supporting these activities. 
3.1. Satisfying User Needs in the Prenegotiation 
Saunders (1985) describes the prenegotiation process as one of 
defining the problem both unilaterally and with the other parties to the 
conflict. It is a testing or experimental phase before commitments are 
made to use the negotiation table as the accepted venue to resolve the 
dispute. Zartman (1989) expands upon this description by specifying 
the functions served by the prenegotiation process in transforming 
conflictual into mixed-motive perceptions. Performance of each of 
these functions serves a purpose in the transition from unilateral to 
multilateral perspectives on solution options . They include: 
1. Risks. Prenegotiation helps nations identify and assess the risks 
involved in future negotiation within a low risk environment. 
2. Costs and Benefits. In the prenegotiation phase, nations can 
estimate the costs and benefits of concessions and agreement, 
thereby sorting out their motives for negotiating . 
3. Requitement. This is the period during which each side can persuade 
the other that concessions will be responded to in a positive 
manner. 
4. Domestic Support. Prenegotiation can serve to build and consoli-
date domestic support for a negotiated outcome. 
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5. Problem Solving. This phase offers the opportunity to define the 
problem and search for options - ways out of the conflict. The 
identification of negotiable issues begins and parameters are defined 
that help evaluate and eliminate alternatives. 
6. Coalition Building. The prenegotiation period presents the oppor-
tunity to evaluate the benefits of building minimum winning or 
blocking coalitions. 
7. Confidence Building. This is the phase in which trust-building 
measures can be evaluated and implemented to develop bridges 
from conflict to cooperation. 
Each of these prenegotiation functions has its informational 
counterpart - information and analysis are required to conduct them 
effectively. As an experimental or testing period, prenegotiation is 
particularly useful if it helps parties evaluate , estimate, and simulate 
'what would happen if' scenarios. The analytical requirements implied 
by each function and the specific types of decision analytic approaches 
that can provide meaningful support to each function are described in 
Table I. 
This table suggests that the family of decision analytic tools are 
likely to be useful to negotiation practitioners in managing prenegotia-
tion functions. Each of these tools has similar methodological founda-
tions in decision theory , but provides different results that are tailored 
to prenegotiation analytical requirements. Specifically , 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis models (Raiffa, 1982) evaluate tradeoffs in 
cost-benefit terms of alternative proposal packages. They are 
appropriate, therefore, to aid in the assessment of alternative 
negotiation formulas, each comprised of different combinations of 
approaches and principles to achieve a mutually acceptable out-
come. 
2. Cross-Impact Analysis (Institute for the Future, 1983) is a method-
ology that facilitates the modeling of complex situations with the 
purpose of simulating the impact of particular policy decisions that 
may affect that situation. It is appropriate to conduct a risk analysis, 
examining the many internal and external factors that can impact 
upon achieving a convergence of interests. 
3. Decision Tree Analysis (Raiffa , 1968), as described earlier in this 
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TABLE I 
Prenegotiation functions, analytical requirements , and decision analytic approaches. 
Prenegoti ation 
Functio ns 
Risks 
Costs and Benefit s 
Requitement 
Domestic Support 
Problem Solving 
Coa lition Building 
Confidence Building 
Analytical Requirements 
Examine range of national 
interests; evaluate extent 
of preference adjustment 
required ; evaluate impacts 
of reaching a negotiated 
agreement 
Tradeoff costs and benefits 
of potenti al concessions 
Evaluate likely extern al 
responses to concessions 
Evaluate likely reactio ns of 
interna l interest groups to 
alternate outcomes 
Generate alternative fo rmulas; 
evaluate alternatives 
Tradeoff costs and benefit s of 
alternate coalitions; evaluate 
extent of preference adjustment 
required to fo rm coalitions 
Generate altern ate trust-building 
measures; tradeoff costs and 
benefits of alternatives 
Decision Analysis 
Techniques 
Cross-Impact Analysis 
Multi-Attribute Utility 
Analysis 
Decision Tree 
Analysis 
Stakeho lde r Analysis 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Multi-Attribute Utility 
Analysis 
Multi-Att ribute Utility 
Analysis 
paper, creates a sequential network of events and decision points , 
with probabilities attached to each node , that can help in an 
assessment of response behavior to earlier concessions. 
4. Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis models (Raiffa, 1982) structure 
decision problems so as to facilitate selection among alternate 
decision options based on multiple criteria and objectives. It is an 
appropriate technique to assess tradeoffs and examine the extent of 
adjustment required in preferences to achieve compromise solu-
tions . 
5. Stakeholder Analysis (Weiner and Brown, 1986) uses information 
on the positions , interests , priorities and preferences of various 
stakeholders on a particular issue to facilitate analysis of the range 
DECISION ANALYSIS FOR NEGOTIATION APPLICATION 193 
of differences among stakeholders and the potential for coalition 
formation. 
Frei and Ruloff (1989) and Mitchell et al. (1977) provide good 
explanations, illustrations, and step-by-step guidance on how to apply 
most of these decision analytic methods . One illustration of the use of 
decision analytic methods to support ongoing prenegotiations can be 
found in Spector (1991b) , who describes the application of multiple 
MAU models to evaluate coalition building and preference adjustment 
in the context of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED). Two central negotiation issues were ad-
dressed by the modeling effort: developing a viable funding mechanism 
for future environment-development projects and agreeing on accept-
able funding target levels. Two months before the formal negotiation 
conference was held , a handful of proposals had been tabled on these 
two issues ; these were defined as options in the MAU model. A 
content analysis of statements presented by most of the key national 
participants on financial issues yielded a hierarchy of criteria upon 
which policy decisions would be made affecting negotiation choices 
and strategies. These criteria formed the basis of the MAU model (see 
Figure 1) . The relative importance of each decision criterion for the 
three nations /coalitions of interest (the United States, the European 
Community, and the Group of 77) were coded on the basis of their 
public statements on a five-point scale and transformed into numerical 
values . Finally , an assessment of how well each option satisfied each 
lowest level criterion was also conducted and quantified into scores 
based on the national statements and proposal descriptions. 
Exercise of the models revealed the comparative preferences of the 
Financial Resource Issues 
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Fig. 1. Criteria for financial resource decisions at UNCED. 
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three actors for each option . As a mirror of reality in the prenegotia-
tion period , the preference space across the parties for the available 
options was rather large. Sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess 
the extent of adjustment required of each actor to achieve a comprom-
ise proposal. This sensitivity analysis identified the specific preferences, 
in terms of decision criteria, that must be modified by each negotiator 
to make a compromise proposal feasible. 
The model structuring itself yielded useful insight for the UNCED 
Secretariat at a point when it was developing the content for a 
proposed global action plan for future environment-development 
activities. The sensitivity analysis results were highly suggestive of the 
feasibility of various compromises. Although the analysis was con-
ducted after the actual negotiation was completed, it could have served 
as an important decision support tool during the course of the 
prenegotiation to identify where the gaps in preference lie and the 
extent of flexibility required to achieve compromise. In particular, the 
results indicated that the United States position on financial issues 
required the greatest modification to achieve a compromise formula ; 
movement in the bargaining space appeared much less stressful for the 
Group of 77. The United States had to give way on some of its key 
interests and demands in the negotiation , in particular , the demand to 
postpone serious negotiation until there is greater scientific certainty 
on the issues . For the Group of 77, the strong demand for preferential 
treatment and concessions on future financial and technological assist-
ance had to be dispensed with somewhat. Overall, the preference 
adjustments required of all parties, when viewed together, suggested 
the precarious balance of negotiating tradeoffs to achieve compromise 
outcomes. 
A toolkit comprising the entire methodological family of decision 
analytic techniques could enhance the effectiveness of early negotia-
tion phases by supporting the array of prenegotiation functions 
described earlier. 
3.2. Presentation and Confidence-Building in the Approach 
How can these techniques best be incorporated into the prenegotiation 
process? Software packages are now available to make the design and 
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exercise of this family of models extremely accessible. However, 
without formal training and dedicated staff analysts, it is unlikely that 
such decision analytic modeling packages can become integrated fully 
in supporting prenegotiation diagnoses . Moreover, the use of decision 
analytic models involves more than just operating computer-based 
software; the meaningfulness and validity of such models depends 
largely on the way in which the models are structured, and pref-
erences, priorities, and values of the negotiators and policy makers are 
elicited. In this regard , the use of independent facilitators of group 
workshops involving the key decision makers has proved to be 
effective (as described in Raiffa , 1982; and Ulvila and Snider, 1980). 
Facilitated group policy exercises enable participants to analyze, 
evaluate, and explore important decision opportunities in a controlled 
environment (Spector, 1990). Trained external facilitators help par-
ticipants work their way through the systematic processes of assessing 
likely scenarios , effective decisions, and the logical implications of 
these futures using decision analytic methodologies. 
Structured policy exercises seek to identify key issues, uncover 
problem areas, define opportunities for important breakthroughs , 
generate alternate solution paths, evaluate options, and project future 
implications. A successful policy exercise may sometimes be measured 
by the consensus that is achieved on key issues by the participants. 
Success , though, can also be measured merely by the degree to which 
the group facilitator helps to open communication channels among 
various parties within the session. 
It is the facilitator 's responsibility to create a situation in which 
participants can freely communicate their preferences and points of 
view. The facilitator must foster and focus discussion to uncover points 
of difference and disagreement , determine the range of positions, and 
find opportunities for convergence of opinions. During the course of 
the exercise, the facilitator will use several approaches to elicit valid 
preferences , priorities, and judgments from the participants. Facilita-
tion techniques such as paired comparisons (for example , do the 
probabilities assigned to Events X and Y appear proper in relation to 
one another?), option anchoring (given Event X has a probability of n , 
how are Events Y and Z likely to fare?), and in-context assessments 
(given a described negotiation environment, how would you assess the 
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probability of Event X?) will be used to ensure logical and consistent 
data collection. 
The facilitator uses decision analytic models to structure the policy 
exercise. These models provide the systematic and logical basis for 
representing the decision environment and help the participants to test 
the implications of alternate decisions before they are selected. As an 
experienced methodologist, the facilitator seeks to satisfy the technical 
assumptions of decision analysis described earlier. Exercises are often 
preceded by in depth interviews of key participants that result in 
strawman models to get the exercise off to a fast start. 
Ultimately, the policy exercise provides a forum that allows partici-
pants to debate issues, communicate preferences, and find common 
ground. There are two principal products of a facilitated policy 
exercise. First, decision analytic models are built, values and pref-
erences elicited, the models exercised, results presented, and sensitivi-
ty analyses conducted. Second, improved communication among the 
participating decision makers yields a mutually developed, examined, 
and understood conclusion in which all share ownership. 
3.3. Integrating Process and Substance 
The family of decision analytic models discussed in this paper are 
process-oriented models, focused on enhancing the process by which 
prenegotiation is conducted. Policy maker preferences, priorities, and 
values on substantive issues constitute the content of these models. But 
these judgments are not resident in the models to begin with; they 
must be elicited for the models to be applied. In one sense, this 
substance-free state makes decision analysis models highly mobile and 
independent - capable of being applied to almost any negotiation 
issue. On the other hand, it handicaps their application; other, more 
substantive, approaches are required prior to their use to identify the 
issue parameters and limitations and generate alternative formulas for 
possible negotiated agreement. 
Integration of these process and substance models should yield 
effective support to prenegotiation teams. Perhaps the linkage can be 
fostered in the following way. Substantive models can help identify 
alternate formulas of the outcome and can simulate their implications. 
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Based on these parameters, decision analytic process models can be 
structured to reflect on and examine the political acceptability of the 
components of specific formulas that are viewed as reasonable and 
negotiable. 
Attempts to foster such a collaboration between substance and 
process has been made at the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in connection with its project in support of 
the UNCED secretariat. One research team was focused on develop-
ing a systems model that explained the substantive linkages between 
the issues , in this case, among economic development , agricultural 
production, lifestyle, population dynamics, and environmental issues 
(Shaw et al. , 1991). The results of exercising this model point to the 
factors that need to be modified for environmental constraints and 
developmental drives to be in harmony. Together, these factors 
suggest alternative solutions that are the subject of negotiation. Such 
packages were presented to a second research team focused on 
supporting the negotiation process. As indicated earlier, decision 
analytic methods were used to evaluate the policy implications and the 
political feasibility of these packages given the interaction of a range of 
national interests and objectives in the negotiation (Spector, 199lb). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Decision analytic methods are suitable for practical implementation in 
international negotiation settings. This methodological family can be 
engineered to satisfy the four challenges to application posed in the 
introductory paper of this issue. 
• Conceived of as a practitioner's tool from the outset , decision 
analysis is designed inherently to provide normative and prescriptive 
advice. 
• While innately a highly transportable process tool , decision analysis 
can be integrated with substantive models. The range of possible 
negotiation outcomes, often produced by subtantive models, can be 
fed into decision analytic models to assess tradeoffs on political 
feasibility. 
• From an end-users' perspective , the need for diagnosis, analysis and 
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planning for negotiation is significant in the prenegotiation period. 
This is when the capabilities of decision analytic methodologies 
appear most suitable. 
• The presentation and delivery of decision analytic tools for use by 
practical negotiators is best accomplished through the assistance of a 
facilitator who can serve both as a methodologist, ensuring a valid 
model development process, and as an effective independent third 
party, stimulating communication, understanding, and group accept-
ance of the structural and logical, if not quantitative, results of the 
modeling exercise. 
Several issues still need to be addressed in preparing decision 
analytic methods for practical implementation. 
• Alternate data collection methods to calibrate the other parties' 
preferences should be developed to cross-check for possible cultural 
and perceptual biases that might be introduced by the first party. 
• Alternate facilitation protocols should be generated and tested to 
design an effective third party interface. 
• Fuzzy measurement approaches, such as those designed by White 
and Eldeib (1986) and others at the Systems Engineering Depart-
ment of the University of Virginia, should be examined to reduce 
the criticism of false precision in decision analytic findings. 
Overall, decision analytic approaches can make a practical contribu-
tion in supporting negotiators and their staffs at points in the process 
when the assessment of options and tradeoffs is significant. 
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THE ROLE OF MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION 
IN NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION SUPPORT 
ABSTRACT. The paper reviews the methodology of multi-objective modeling and 
optimization used in decision support based on computerized analytical models (as 
opposed to logical models used in expert systems) that represent expert knowledge in a 
given field. The essential aspects of this methodology relate to its flexibility: modeling 
and optimization methods are treated not as goals in themselves but as tools that help a 
sovereign user (an analyst or a decision maker) to interact with the model , to generate 
and analyze various decision options, to learn about possible outcomes of these 
decisions. Although the applications of such methods in negotiation and mediation 
support is scarce yet , their flexibility increases essentially the chances of such applica-
tions. Various aspects of negotiation and mediation methods related to multi-objective 
optimization and game theory are also reviewed. A possible application of the 
MCBARG system for supporting negotiation related to the acid rain problem is briefly 
summarized . 
Keywords: Negotiation , multi-objective modeling, optimization , mediation. 
There are various approaches to the theme of how to use analytical 
techniques in negotiation and mediation support. In the 'off the shelf' 
approach, established techniques such as result from multi-attribute 
utility (MAU) analysis, simulation modeling, optimization, or game 
theory are examined to see show they might support some aspect of 
the international negotiation process. Another, which is highlighted in 
this paper, is a more deliberate approach to match methodological 
capabilities to the difficult analytical requirements of real negotiation 
situations. For example, how might a simulation model that represents 
the key decisions and outcomes of a negotiation be applied to support 
an actual negotiation? Is an optimization of an aggregated objective 
function useful? Should this function be related to the relevant 
outcomes simulated by the model or to the decisions? Is it possible to 
represent the interests of all parties in the negotiation by one 
aggregated function? There are no easy answers to such questions. 
Multi-objective modeling and optimization approaches possess 
unique methodological characteristics that are likely to be extremely 
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meaningful in satisfying the analytical needs of practical negotiators. 
These approaches integrate the benefits of substantive models that 
represent knowledge concerning actual negotiation issues and 
procedural models that highlight process dynamics. While models that 
focus on the interests of the negotiation actors, preference models, are 
important, substantive and procedural models are more likely to 
stimulate the creativity of practical negotiators by offering new 
perspectives and ways of testing alternative solutions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A decision support system should never replace a human decision 
maker. Even in operational, repetitive decision situations, computer-
ized decision support can at most relieve decision makers from 
standard calculation and fill in the details of a suggested decision . In 
strategic decision situations, typical for negotiations, decision support 
systems can play a different role: they can represent the knowledge of 
specialized analysts about the substantive aspects of a decision situa-
tion and thus provide a laboratory ground, a proxy of the real world, 
for studying various impacts of selected decisions as well as possible 
developments in the negotiation process. The value of these systems 
depends crucially on the validity of their knowledge representation, as 
logical, analytical or procedural models. 
However, models that represent knowledge in a given field have two 
important limitations. One of them is that the model always must be 
simplified to some extent and can never represent all pertinent aspects 
of a given decision situation. Such models cannot be made more 
adequate by increasing their complexity, because this might increase 
their sensitivity, make parameter estimation less reliable, or introduce 
unintended chaotic effects . In strategic decision situations, the intui-
tion of a human decision maker is irreplaceable and knowledge 
representation in a computerized model can help to enhance this 
intuition by allowing the decision maker to learn about possible 
consequences of various hypothetical actions. 
Another important limitation of computerized models is, paradoxi-
cally, that they are constructed by experts in a given substantive field 
of knowledge. Such experts often understand the art and science of 
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model building , but seldom the relatively new methodology of using 
such models in decision support , which in turn influences significantly 
the way the models should be formulated , validated , and used. A 
cooperative team of substantive and decision support modelers is 
necessary to construct good decision support systems. Even such 
cooperation may not be sufficient: the ultimate value of a decision 
support system is in the eyes of its users. Thus , the ultimate user must 
also cooperate in the development of the system. 
With the above reservations , this paper concentrates on decision 
support using models of an analytical and procedural type. When using 
models of an analytical type , optimization techniques can often be 
exploited for selecting decision options . However , attempts to model 
the preferences of individual decision makers by a single objective 
function (value or utility function) are never fully adequate and must 
be treated as rough approximations only . The flexibility of optimiza-
tion techniques can be increased considerably through multi-objective 
formulation . This paper describes in simple terms the basic concepts of 
multi-objective optimization , some selected results from the corre-
sponding mathematical theory , their relations to representing knowl-
edge by analytical modeling and to decision support , and the possibi-
lities of analyzing multi-objective games , negotiation, and mediation 
processes. 
2. MULTI-OBJECTIV E MODELING AND SIMULATION 
While single-objective mathematical optimization models are, in a 
sense , closed and distinct from simulation models that are typically 
used for analytical representations of knowledge in a given substantive 
field , multi-objective optimization models can be formulated as a 
natural , open extension of simulation models . If we accept that a 
decision maker can have multiple objectives and we simulate a part of 
the decision maker's world in a model , we can represent these 
objectives as variables in the model , and allow the user to modify and 
test the implications of these objectives . The model might not be 
complete in the sense that it does not represent all concerns of the 
user , but then it must be either reformulated for simulation purposes 
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or its incompleteness must be overtly admitted and accounted for in 
the analysis. 
An analytical model of the substantive aspects of a decision situation 
typically contains: 
• actions or decisions represented by decision variables; 
• potential objectives represented by outcome variables ; 
• various intermediate variables (state variables , balance variables , 
etc.) that are essential for flexible model formulation ; 
• parametric variables or parameters that might remain constant 
during model simulations but are essential for model validation and 
alternative model variants; 
• constraining relations (inequalities, equations, etc.) that determine 
the set or admissible decisions and are usually divided into direct 
decision constraints that involve decision variables and indirect 
constraints that involve outcome and intermediate variables; 
• outcome relations that determine how outcome variables depend on 
decision variables (with the help of intermediate variables and state 
equations in dynamic models , and often with the help of recursive or 
even implicit formulae); 
• a representation of model uncertainty (in probabilistic, fuzzy set or 
set-valued terms) ; if such a representation is not explicit, we often 
call such a model 'deterministic' and assume that it represents 
average situations. 
While typical models for single-objective optimization specify only one 
optimized outcome (the objective function) and treat all constraints 
inflexibly, multi-objective modeling and optimization allow a flexible 
choice of objective variables between the outcome variables (if 
necessary , also between decision variables) and a much more elastic 
interpretation of constraints . 
Indirect constraints that are represented in single-objective optimiza-
tion with a standard form , say, of an inequality , model two quite 
different classes of phenomena of the real world. One of these classes 
contains balances that must be satisfied , such as the balance of energy 
in a physical model ; these are so-called 'hard ' constraints. The other 
class contains balances that we would like to satisfy , such as the 
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balance in a budget sheet; these constraints can be violated (at an 
appropriate cost) and are called 'soft' constraints. Soft constraints can 
be modeled even in single-objective optimization by appropriate 
penalty terms in the objective function; but then the question of their 
permissible violation calls for additional judgment. In multi-objective 
modeling and optimization, soft constraints are most naturally inter-
preted as additional objectives and their evaluation is thus included in 
the overall evaluation of a multi-objective solution. 
Having formulated a multi-objective model, one has to estimate its 
parameters and validate it; that is, check whether the model represents 
adequately not only the formal, but also the intuitive , side of expert 
knowledge in a given substantive field. While there are many methods 
of parameter estimation and formal model validation , intuitive model 
validation usually relies on repetitive simulation: the model must be 
run many times by experts in the field of knowledge under changing 
assumptions about decisions (or their scenarios, in the case of dynamic 
models) or parameters , and the obtained outcomes (or their trajec-
tories, in the dynamic case) must be compared against the formal 
knowledge and the intuition of the experts. 
The way that various constraints are treated during the simulation of 
a model is also essential for its validation. Typical approaches to 
simulation and existing simulation languages usually allow only for 
direct decision constraints that can be represented by admissible ranges 
of decision variables; they do not allow for the inclusion of indirect 
constraints nor do they distinguish between hard and soft constraints. 
In addition, expert users of simulation models are often interested in 
inverse simulation, in which desirable trajectories of model outcomes 
are specified by the user and decision variables are chosen during the 
simulation that result in model outcomes close to the specified 
trajectories. Inverse simulation is particularly useful in scenario gener-
ation . Moreover, good simulation techniques should make it possible 
to perform sensitivity analysis of simulated solutions along with 
simulation runs. All these issues of simulation under constraints, 
inverse simulation, scenario generation, and sensitivity analysis can be 
included in sufficiently sophisticated methods of simulation that use 
optimization techniques and multi-objective approaches as tools of 
simulation support. The International Institute for Applied Systems 
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Analysis (IIASA) has contributed considerably to the development of 
such methods , see e.g. Kallio et al. (1980) , Grauer et al. (1982), 
Kurzhanski (1986), and Makowski and Sosnowski (1989). 
Multi-objective analysis and optimization also can be performed to 
help understand the model itself and selection of decision options that 
are interesting for the user. The basic concepts of multi-objective 
optimization are well described in several monographs (Sawaragi et al. 
1985; Yu , 1985 ; Steuer , 1986; Seo and Sakawa, 1988). For multi-
objective scenario generation and option selection, the methodology of 
reference point optimization, or resulting from it, the aspiration-led 
approach to multicriteria decision support, is especially useful (Lewan-
dowski and Wierzbicki , 1989). A short review of these concepts in 
relation to negotiation and mediation support is presented by Wierz-
bicki and Makowski (1992). 
3. MULTI-OBJECTIVE GAMES AND BARGAINING : SIMULATING 
MULTI-OBJECTIVE NEGOTIATION PROCESSES 
It is well known (Rapoport, 1989) that normative game theory, while 
well developed theoretically both for noncooperative and cooperative 
solution concepts , does not represent sufficiently the complexity of 
practical observed behavior of decision makers in gaming, bargaining 
or negotiation situations. This has stimulated research on modifications 
and extensions of game theory to obtain more practical tools for 
studying decision situations in which multiple decision makers might 
have conflicting interests. Especially interesting results in this direc-
tion , useful for understanding negotiating behavior, are connected to 
the concept of the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). 
However, the practical use of computerized models of substantive 
aspects of a decision situation with conflicting interests has been until 
now restricted almost entirely to simulated gaming. Users (students , 
analysts, decision makers) participating in such gaming exercises can 
play the roles of decision makers by entering their decisions in the 
simulation model and then observing the simulated results of these 
decisions . While very valuable as a learning exercise, such simulated 
gaming has one essential drawback: users must rely on their individual 
intuition only and are usually denied more advanced decision support; 
in real life , any important strategic decision is based on support 
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provided by analysts or by discussions at executive boards, for 
example . This creates the challenge of introducing decision support 
tools into simulated gaming (Wierzbicki, 1989). Similarly, as more 
advanced model simulation should include multi-objective optimiza-
tion tools , simulated gaming should include game-theoretical tools. 
However , such tools must not be treated as normative prescriptions; 
they should help only in analyzing the simulated game. They must also 
take into account possible multi-objective formulations of the game. 
Unfortunately, while game theory from its very beginning admitted 
multiple objectives of the players, it almost always assumed the 
possibility of aggregating them by value or utility functions. The basic 
solution concepts in game theory- starting with the Nash noncoopera-
tive equilibrium concept - were not sufficiently analyzed after generali-
zation to the multi-objective case ; only recently (Wierzbicki , 1990) 
have such extensions been attempted. 
Multi-objective equilibria in a game are necessarily not uniquely 
defined; there may be many of them . Unilateral selections of such 
equilibria by players can lead to conflict escalation. If one player 
selects an equilibrium that seems rational to him , but another player a 
different equilibrium , and both pursue strategies that should lead to 
the outcomes desired by each , it usually results in non-equilibrium 
outcomes that are much worse - even disastrous - for both the players. 
This fact is well known even in single-objective game theory for cases 
with multiple equilibria, as for example the so-called game of chicken 
(Axelrod , 1984). However, since conflict escalation processes occur in 
real life , the multi-objective formulation of a game can help in 
understanding such processes. For example, during a gaming simula-
tion, appropriate conflict coefficients can be computed to inform the 
participants how far they are from a noncooperative or even coopera-
tive equilibrium. 
Together with game theory, bargaining theory (Roth, 1979) has 
concentrated on certain cooperative solutions to bargaining games 
which could be useful in supporting negotiations, mediation, and 
arbitration. Studies on multi-objective aspects of bargaining have led 
to the development of a prototype multi-objective mediation support 
system, MCBARG. A possible application of MCBARG is briefly 
presented in the next section of this paper. 
Although there are notable methodological reflections on the art and 
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science of negotiations (Raiffa , 1982), the development of multi-
objective methodologies in multi-actor decision situations to support 
negotiations, mediation and arbitration is still in the beginning stages . 
Some applications are known - see for example, the multi-objective 
analysis of multilateral gas trade by Messner (1985)- and some 
conclusions can be drawn. 
(a) Analytical models, combined with role-playing and gaming 
simulation, preferably in multi-objective formulation and sup-
plemented with various decision support tools, can be used by each 
team preparing for negotiations. While such preparation can be 
valuable, extreme caution should be exercised when preparing the 
substantive analytical model and when playing the role of the opposite 
side . The experts and analysts of one side are apt to misperceive the 
concerns and objectives of the opposite side ; thus, the substantive 
model prepared by them might not include objective outcomes of the 
opposite side and might not be adequate for gaming simulation. When 
role playing, ideological indoctrination of one side can lead to serious 
misrepresentation of the behavior of the opposite side . 
(b) Analytical models representing internationally accepted knowl-
edge in a given field, validated by experts from various sides , can be 
very useful in supporting both the preparation for and the actual 
conduct of negotiations. This , however, assumes that all parties to the 
conflict are prepared for 'getting to yes' (Fisher and Ury, 1981), accept 
a mediating role of an impartial institution (in terms of gathering 
relevant knowledge and information), participate in validating the 
model , and are prepared to take seriously the outcomes simulated by 
the model. If these prerequisites are met, then the resulting model can 
have a profound impact on the course of negotiations , as it did in the 
case of negotiating the Law of the Sea agreements. Even more 
profound in terms of influencing the attitudes of high-level decision 
makers was the more generally formulated model of nuclear winter 
accepted by both American and Soviet experts. 
(c) Future generations of negotiators , more exposed to concepts and 
techniques of the information society than the contemporary genera-
tion of negotiators , may accept further extensions of the procedural 
role of knowledge formalized in models and decision support systems 
in negotiations and mediation. 
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To achieve this, the following conditions must be satisfied. 
(a) The principle of user sovereignty should be particularly stressed 
and strictly observed when constructing decision support for negotia-
tions. Diplomats quite rightly stress the role of their intuition and 
negotiating skills. Thus , a decision support system must only augment 
and enhance these skills. 
(b) Prototype negotiation and mediation support systems - including 
various procedural variants , such as support for unilateral decisions 
and support for multilateral role-playing should be introduced as a part 
of training for young negotiators. 
(c) The methodology for developing and using analytical models 
that represent substantive aspects of multi-actor decision situations 
with conflicting interests should be further advanced, along with 
appropriate developments of multi-objective, multi-actor decision 
support. 
4 . THE MCBARG SYSTEM 
MCBARG is an experimental multi-objective optimization system that 
illustrates the issues of supporting the mediation process in bargaining 
situations . In the following example , MCBARG is used to deal with 
international negotiations concerning acid rain . Several countries are 
engaged in developing a mutually acceptable formula to reduce sulfur 
emissions . For each country, the expected emission level of sulfur is 
assumed . Also given is a cost function describing the minimal required 
expenditures for emission control as a function of the emission 
reduction in the country. Sulfur depositions in particular countries are 
described by linear equations of the emission levels with coefficients of 
atmospheric transportation. This simple example was inspired by the 
RAINS model (Alcamo et al., 1990) and is presented in detail in Krus 
and Bronisz (1991). 
Each country can , of course , act independently by enforcing its own 
reduction program and covering its own costs. However, this runs 
contrary to international cooperation , especially if the countries have 
agreed jointly to coordinate their reduction programs and reap 
mutually beneficial results. In fact, results of simulation runs of the 
RAINS model have shown that cooperation is truly effective, saving 
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both costs and effort. Each country has two objectives to be minim-
ized , namely: the monetary share they pay to obtain the joint results 
and the resulting sulfur deposition. The nature of the reduction 
programs in particular countries and the costs of the programs covered 
from a joint fund are the decision variables. 
How can a model such as MCBARG be used to support preparation 
of international agreements where selection of a cooperative solution is 
sought? Certainly, no mathematical model can incorporate all vari-
ables of importance at the level of detail required , but such models 
can, in a simplified way, stimulate the creativity of negotiators by 
providing varied perspectives on their complex problem. In the acid 
rain negotiation application , MCBARG uses more modest models 
than in the RAINS model to illustrate how multiple objectives can be 
incorporated and benefit the exploration for solutions. 
The set of outcomes that are beneficial to all negotiating countries 
(agreement set) in comparison to the noncooperation case (described 
by a disagreement point) can be arrayed on a continuum ; however, it 
is not simple to specify which outcome should be selected as the 
solution . The bargaining problem consists of looking for an efficient 
solution in the agreement set. The solution should be selected 
according to the preferences of the countries and should be unanim-
ously accepted. Roughly speaking, the problem consists of allocating 
the benefits resulting from cooperation in a mutually beneficial fashion 
to all parties. 
MCBARG offers decision support in the form of an interactive 
mediation procedure. This support is framed using a single negotiation 
text procedure described by Raiffa (1982) and the principle of limited 
confidence proposed by Fandel and Wierzbicki (1985) . MCBARG is 
used iteratively across a number of rounds. Each round starts from the 
current status quo point. The system supports players in unilateral 
interactive analysis of the problem with an emphasis on learning. Each 
player can independently scan the possible outcome variants according 
to the rules of the aspiration-led approach of multicriteria decision 
support , as well as different assumptions for the counterplayer's 
preferences or decisions and different assumptions about the possible 
improvements of counterplayer outcomes due to the limited confidence 
principle. After scanning , each player is asked to select a preferred 
outcome. 
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The preferred outcomes of all the players are the basis for calcula-
tion of the result of a round . The result is calculated following the 
limited confidence principle, improving outcomes of all the players in 
terms of the outcomes specified as preferred ones according to a 
common confidence coefficient. The result of a round can be consid-
ered as a single negotiation text proposed by the mediator and to the 
players, and as a status quo point forming a basis for the next round of 
negotiations. The process terminates when the Pareto optimal solution 
in the agreement set is reached. 
Formulation of this interactive process is based on theoretical 
research by Krus and Bronisz (1991). To assure fairness of the 
solutions , axioms such as independence of linear transformations of 
objectives, anonymity of players and criteria , monotonicity, and player 
rationality have been considered (Nash, 1950; Roth, 1979; Kalai and 
Smorodinsky, 1975; Thomson, 1986). Different solution concepts have 
been analyzed and a generalization of the Raiffa-Kalai- Smorodinsky 
solution is used based on the concept of utopia point related to player 
aspirations. The generalized solution is calculated according to the 
preferences of the players. This solution has some useful properties . It 
is resistant to the manipulations of the players . In particular, the 
players cannot benefit from changing scales in their particular objec-
tives , from making decisions during the process that do not truly reflect 
their preferences , and from proposing dummy objectives. Uniqueness 
and convergence of the negotiation process has been demonstrated, 
assuming conditions of player rationality, which are not very strong 
assumptions. In future versions of the MCBARG system, several 
solution concepts satisfying different sets of axioms will be proposed 
for user selection . 
A more detailed description of the MCBARG system can be found 
in Krus , Bronisz, and Lopuch (1990) . The system has been tested in 
experiments with various users for the simplified model presented 
above. A discussion of the experiments can be found in Krus and 
Bronisz (1992). 
The system enables players to learn, analyze, and modify their 
bargaining positions. In this way , it assists in the structuring of the 
negotiation process. The system also supports a mediator role that 
calculates single negotiation texts to be analyzed, modified and 
remodified by the users representing various negotiating parties. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
A major challenge to modelers is to combine human expertise and 
intuition with more formalized knowledge, while preserving the 
strengths of both parts. Can multi-objective modelling, optimization , 
and decision support be useful in this regard for negotiation and 
mediation? The answer is positive in principle, though more practical 
experience is needed . The use of multi-objective model formulation, 
optimization , and game theory treated not as goals or normative 
prescriptions, but as flexible instruments is especially promising. Using 
this methodology, one can design and implement decision support 
systems (DSS) that can be tailored to specific needs. However , to 
successfully implement a DSS, many conditions must be met. We list 
below only a few essential ones (Makowski, 1991). 
• A DSS must support fast, but reliable analysis of large amounts of 
data and logical relations to provide results for experts or decision 
makers. However, such an analysis is problem-specific and usually 
deals with only a few of the issues involved in a complex negotiation 
or mediation. A careful study must be conducted for each case to 
identify and scope the proper design of a DSS. 
• A DSS clearly should be only a supportive tool. The user should be 
aware of its limitations and of the underlying mathematical model. 
Users must be convinced that a DSS is not aimed at replacing the 
decision maker's knowledge or experience, but is just a tool for 
performing sophisticated or cumbersome calculations and analysis 
that is specified jointly with the user. The DSS frees the decision 
maker to concentrate on tactical and strategic issues in the negotia-
tion process . 
• Claims of DSS usefulness must be modest. However, DSS effective-
ness, particularly in the negotiation field , can be improved only 
through real-life applications and feedback. 
• The analytical team which develops a DSS should work in close 
cooperation with future users. Potential applications of DSS must be 
carefully chosen. They should contain a subproblem that is compli-
cated enough to justify development of a DSS but that is simple 
enough to be implementable. 
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Why have such negot1at10n support applications not been more 
widespread? First, the proposed methodology is fairly new. Many 
applications of multi-objective optimization employ techniques that 
have many drawbacks (Wierzbicki and Makowski, 1992), thus spread-
ing a misleading judgment that such techniques are not useful. Second, 
serious applications of modeling approaches used to be restricted to 
specialists well trained in computer systems. This second argument is 
now vanishing (see Andriole in this issue). Development of user 
friendly software, together with powerful but relatively cheap hard-
ware, is resulting in the proliferation of computers to many new areas 
and applications. However, it should be stressed that specification, 
estimation, and verification of mathematical models must be left to 
specialists who work together with future users. 
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DANIEL DRUCKMAN 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR 
NEGOTIATION SUPPORT 
ABSTRACT. In this paper we provide an overview of the issues involved in using 
statistical analysis to support the process of international negotiation. We will illustrate 
how the approach can contribute to a negotiator's understanding and control of the 
interactions that occur during the course of a negotiation. The techniques are suited to 
the analysis of data collected from ongoing discussions and moves made by the parties. 
The analyses are used to illuminate influences and processes as they operate in particular 
cases or in negotiations in general. They do not identify a 'best' strategy or outcome 
from among alternatives suggested either from theoretical assumptions about rationality 
and information-processing (see Munier and Rulliere's paper in this issue) , from 
personal preference structures (see Spector's paper in this issue), or from a rule-based 
modeling system (see Kersten 's paper in this issue). This distinction should be evident in 
the discussion to follow, organized into several sections: From Empirical to Normative 
Analysis ; Statistical Analysis for Situational Diagnosis; Time-Series Analysis of Cases , 
and Knowledge as 'Leverage' Over the Negotiation Process. In a final section , we 
consider the challenge posed by attempts to implement these techniques with practition-
ers. 
Keywords: Statistical analysis , situational diagnosis , time-series analysis. 
1. FROM EMPIRICAL TO NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
The use of statistical analysis of data for decision support turns on the 
issue of how general knowledge can be used in giving advice about 
specific (time and space-limited) problems. For most problems, statisti-
cal techniques are used to discover or describe relationships between 
scaled variables sampled from defined populations. Obtained relation-
ships are evaluated in terms of probabilities of occurrence. Stronger 
relationships (or correlations) between variables are those less likely to 
have occurred by chance alone: For example, a correlation of 0.5 is 
likely to occur by chance in only 5 of 100 samples of size 10 drawn 
from the same population. The most important contribution of 
probability theory is the idea of statistical inference, namely, determin-
ing the extent to which relationships obtained for a given sample apply 
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also to other samples that can be drawn from the same population. 
The inference process is based on the theoretical concept of the 
sampling distribution of a statistic. Simply stated , this is a probability 
distribution of the values of a statistic, such as a t-ratio or an F-ratio, 
computed from all samples of a given size drawn from the same 
population; it is the basis for the tabled values associated with 
probabilities of occurrence found in the back of most statistics texts, 
and permits statements such as a t-ratio of 1.96 is likely to occur in 
only 5 of 100 samples by chance alone. 
Statistical analysis is most appropriate for testing hypothesized 
relationships derived from theory. It provides tools for evaluating the 
strength of relationships obtained from sampled situations. Whether 
confirmed or rejected, the result of the analysis is stated in general 
terms, as applying to a wide range of situations and samples. Less 
attention is paid to the contextual (or case specific) contingencies that 
would qualify the generality of the findings. For this reason , advice 
based on statistical analysis is likely to be largely independent of those 
contextual details that often seem essential to practitioners. How then 
might we bridge the gap between the general, theory-based knowledge 
accumulated through statistical analysis of data and the specific 
information sought about cases by practitioners and policy makers? 
One way to do this is to place the case in a dimensionalized space 
based on a wide sampling of situations. Another strategy is to perform 
time-series analyses of the specific case. The former involves ex-
trapolating from knowledge about a range of known situations to 
situations about which less is known ('extrapolating in space'); it will 
be illustrated with the problem of situational diagnosis. The latter 
involves extrapolating from a known past to an unknown future along 
a time trajectory ('extrapolating in time'). This will be illustrated with 
examples from work on the content analysis of specific negotiations. 
Both of these analytical strategies are descriptive . Each deals with 
the issue of extrapolating from a set of relationships found in one 
situation or time period to another where similar relationships are 
assumed to exist. The transfer of knowledge is problematic for 
processes that are sensitive to context and culture: contextual in-
fluences militate against the development of propositions that apply 
across a wide range of situations. The literature on negotiation is 
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dominated by case studies and by conceptualizations that emphasize an 
intertwining of process and context (see Druckman and Hopmann, 
1989). Like facial expressions, negotiating behavior can be understood 
in terms of both 'universal ' and context-specific elements . For expres-
sions, the facial configurations elicited by the primary emotions 
(happiness, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust-contempt, fear, and 
interest) are universal while the conditions that evoke those emotions 
are culture specific (Ekman et al. , 1987). Similarly, for negotiating 
behavior, convergence processes occur in virtually all cases; when , 
how, and on which issues these processes occur depend on the parties , 
issue-areas, and the broad context surrounding the talks. Thus, 
extrapolation is problematic in developing knowledge about negotia-
tion. It is addressed directly by statistical analysis , particularly those 
aspects of statistics that deal with sampling designs. The strategy 
presented in the next section illustrates an approach to extrapolation 
based on principles of representative sampling of situations . 
The ability to extrapolate knowledge from one situation to another 
does not , however, prescribe actions. Neither analytical strategy 
suggests how to use the information obtained about relationships 
among variables for advice on negotiating tactics . While each strategy 
may alert a negotiator to what happened in other situations and at 
other times, it does not tell him or her what to do in this situation. In a 
later section , we discuss the relevance of descriptive information for 
making prescriptions about negotiating tactics. 
2. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR SITUATIONAL DIAGNOSIS 
A situational diagnosis is an assessment of the negotiating situation in 
terms of the presence (or absence) of those elements hypothesized to 
influence outcomes. Such an assessment is based on knowledge of 
relationships among situational and process or outcome variables. Just 
how to develop this knowledge and how to apply it to particular 
negotiating situations of interest are challenging research issues. In this 
section, we discuss the theoretical underpinnings for the concept of 
situational diagnosis and propose an analytical strategy in several 
parts. 
The idea of a situational diagnosis derives from a research tradition 
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that places emphasis on understanding the negotiation process in terms 
of the way aspects of the situation influence negotiators' behavior. 
Developed largely by social psychologists, this approach contrasts to 
perspectives that focus on persons, structures, or the systems surround-
ing the negotiation. It assumes that much of the variation observed in 
negotiating behavior from one case to another is due to the differences 
in situational attributes that characterize those cases. Just how the 
behavioral variables relate to the situational attributes is an empirical 
issue that can be addressed by statistical analysis of experimental or 
case-study data . Implications of the analyses are , however, limited to 
the variables chosen for study. Thus , the way these variables are 
defined is critical. 
The definition of situational attributes has been guided by conceptu-
al frameworks and by theory. Frameworks are developed to organize 
the parts of a negotiation, often taking the form of flowcharts that 
depict an interplay among influences and processes through time 
(Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965 ; Randolph , 1966; Druckman, 1973 , 
1977). Among the variables highlighted by the frameworks are 
preconditions (relationships, preparation), issues (size and complexi-
ty) , structure of the parties (presidential interest, bureaucratic agen-
cies , third-parties), and the immediate situation (deadlines , other 
parties' concessions and tactics) . Other variables are suggested by 
part-theories developed in related areas. Examples are prenegotiation 
strategizing or studying the issues, developing BATNAs, linking or 
delinking values from negotiating positions, and salient solutions. 
Corresponding ' theories' are the effects of effort on commitment to 
positions (Lewis , 1965), comparison of rewards derived from current 
versus alternative social interactions (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) , the 
way values or ideologies interact with interests ( Coser, 1967), and the 
role of coordination points in solving problems (Schelling, 1960). 
Progress has also been made in defining behavioral variables. Many 
of the indicators refer to negotiating flexibility as manifest in conces-
sions , verbal statements, perceptions , or outcomes. Concessions are 
measured as changes in proposals that occur during the course of 
bargaining in laboratory (e .g., Bartos, 1974) and real-world settings 
(e.g., Jensen , 1988). Verbal statements are coded for tough and soft 
postures and for tactics used to persuade an opponent to alter his or 
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her pos1ttons (e.g., Hopmann and Walcott, 1977). Perceptions are 
assessed as views of the opponents (as tough or soft bargainers) and 
the situation (as win-lose or problem solving), and are often analyzed 
as variables that intervene between the situation and outcomes (e.g . , 
Druckman et al., 1988). Outcomes could be stalemates or agreements 
and are often evaluated in terms of costs incurred or benefits obtained 
by the parties. These measurements have been used in a variety of 
studies designed to discover relationships between situational and 
process or outcome variables . How to use the results in making 
diagnoses of flexible behavior and outcomes in particular cases raises 
the issue of extrapolation. The strategy proposed here addresses this 
issue. It illustrates the way that statistical analysis can be used to bring 
research results to bear on case diagnoses. 
The first task consists of developing a knowledge base for inferring 
relationships among the variables of interest. Since relationships 
cannot be discovered from analysis of single cases , the knowledge base 
must be established from analyses of many cases or from replications 
of experimental sessions where variation occurs on both the situational 
and process or outcome variables. This entails sampling widely across a 
range of negotiating situations in which the key variables can be 
observed and coded. The coded variables are the data that capture 
variation in both situation and process among the sampled cases . They 
provide the information needed to distinguish the cases in terms of 
similarities and differences, a task that can be performed with multi-
dimensional scaling techniques . 
The second task consists of reducing the variation among cases to a 
smaller set of types of cases grouped according to dimensions of 
similarity and dissimilarity. The groupings are discovered through the 
use of statistical scaling techniques that serve to define a dimensional-
ized space based on the coded data . (See Kruskel and Wish, 1990, for 
a discussion of multidimensional scaling; computations can be done by 
such statistical packages as SYST AT, now available for use on 
personal computers.) This task provides an empirical basis for a 
taxonomy of negotiating situations. It is similar in many respects to the 
approach taken by Frederiksen (1971) for categorizing diverse situa-
tions in terms of their similarity in eliciting behaviors. However , while 
this task is useful for generating types of negotiation situations, the 
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categories that emerge apply to the sampled situations and to the range 
of variation characteristic of those situations. They do not encompass 
other situations about which less is known . Another task is needed to 
take into account situations or cases that were not part of the original 
data base used to discover dimensions. The 'new' cases can be located 
within the dimensionalized space (clusters of coded cases) by matching 
aspects of the new situation with the aspects of the analyzed situation 
which were part of the data base: accurate matching depends on 
whether the new situations or cases elicit the same negotiating 
behaviors as those matched situations already analyzed. Having 
accomplished this task, we are ready to perform a situational diag-
nosis . 
The analyses completed to this point provide the information needed 
for diagnosing the likelihood that particular negotiations would result 
in agreement. By assessing a negotiating situation in terms of whether 
the key elements (found in the analyses above to relate to negotiating 
behavior) are present, it should be possible to estimate the extent to 
which parties are willing to move from their initial positions to get an 
agreement or to produce a stalemate. This task is a step between the 
empirical analyses described above and the prescriptive advice to be 
described below. It consists, first , of describing the situation or case in 
terms of the variables found in the above analyses to influence 
negotiating behavior; then, the relationships are represented by 
deriving the behavior of interest , such as negotiating flexibility, from 
the situational variables such as whether the negotiator is constrained 
by instructions from his or her home office. For example, a judgment 
that the chief negotiator representing one of the parties in this case is 
constrained by instructions results in a 'score' of low flexibility for this 
variable; judgments on each of the other variables are similarly shown 
to lead to flexible or inflexible behavior , culminating in an aggregated 
'score' for each of the negotiating parties. Missing from such a 
diagnosis , however, is an evaluation of the relative importance of the 
variables as influences on negotiating behavior. This can be deter-
mined by using another analytical procedure , experimentation. Re-
actions of negotiators (or experimental subjects playing roles of 
negotiators) to alternative scenarios can be used to establish weights 
for the variables. The scenarios can be altered to define different 
experimental conditions, each condition reflecting a particular combi-
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nation of the situational variables . The reactions would be analyzed for 
effect sizes (see, for example, Hedges and Olkin, 1985, or Wolf, 1986) 
or for scale position resulting from such techniques as pair comparisons 
(see Guilford , 1954 ). These techniques can be illustrated. 
Two recent analyses demonstrate how experimental data can be 
used to derive weights . One was a meta-analysis of published bargain-
ing experiments. The other was a simulation-experiment designed to 
elicit decisions about bargaining moves in reaction to alternative 
scenarios. The experiments used in the meta-analysis were organized 
into eight independent-variable (IV) categories. Using procedures for 
converting statistical ratios (F-ratio, t-test) into effect sizes (correla-
tions), average effect sizes were calculated for studies in each IV 
category. Arranged in order of effect size , the variables are as follows: 
type of prenegotiation preparation , negotiator's orientation toward the 
negotiation, distance between initial positions , time pressure (with or 
without deadlines) , type of opponent's concession strategy , the visibili-
ty of the negotiation to others, accountability of the negotiating 
representative , and whether the issues were 'large' or 'small.' The 
effect sizes calculated for these variables can then be used as em-
pirically-derived weights in the situational diagnosis , distinguishing 
relatively strong from weak relationships between the variable and 
negotiating behavior. Several of these variables were included in the 
example of a diagnosis described below. 
The simulation results also provide weights for relevant variables . 
Role players responded to alternative scenarios containing 'packages' 
of situational variables - for example, scenarios hypothesized to 
produce flexible or inflexible decisions about position movement. 
Using a pair-comparison procedure , they compared the variables in 
terms of their relative impact on flexibility in the negotiation. The 
judgments were converted to scaled weights indicating the relative 
importance of each of the variables: Particularly strong weights were 
obtained for visibility of the negotiation (wide versus limited media 
coverage), type of prenegotiation preparation (studying the issues or 
strategizing) , and type of negotiating representative (head-of-delega-
tion or advisor to the delegation). These weightings can then be used 
in a diagnosis that includes those particular variables. (See Druckman , 
1992, for the details.) 
Once determined , the weighted variables provide opportunities to 
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influence the negotiation process. They are the aspects of the environ-
ment that can be manipulated for impact in particular cases. By using 
general results about relationships between variables as a framework 
for making situation-specific judgments, this information would help a 
negotiator who attempts to gauge the flexibility of his or her opponent; 
it would aid a mediator who tries to determine how much flexibility 
exists in a particular situation, and, it would contribute to an analysts' 
understanding of the negotiation process. The negotiator uses the 
diagnosis for strategic purposes; the mediator uses it to ascertain where 
leverage can be applied to get a mutually-acceptable agreement, and 
the analyst can evaluate the correspondence between the diagnostic 
evaluation and actual negotiating behavior. 
Preliminary diagnoses of nine cases illustrate the analytical value of 
the exercise. Each case was construed as a bilateral negotiation and 
coded, for each party, by analysts familiar with the negotiation. 
Coding decisions were made for 17 variables organized in the 
categories of background factors (e.g., relationship between parties), 
issues (e.g., number and complexity), structure of parties (e.g., 
negotiator accountability to agencies), and situation (e.g., deadline 
pressures). Weightings for the variables were not derived empirically 
for this illustrative application; they were determined by judgments 
made by scholars with substantial knowledge about the cases. A 
computer program aggregated the codes for each party, sorting them 
into a two-dimensional 'flexibility' grid divided into thirds. The 
intersection of the parties' flexibility, indicated by a point in one of the 
nine cells, is converted into a likely outcome as either the most desired 
outcome for both parties, a fair agreement, a capitulation of one party 
to the other, to continue negotiating without an agreement, or a 
stalemate . 
Results are shown in Figure 1. Interestingly, the two cases that 
actually resulted in an impasse - MBFR (case 4) and the regime-
insurgent talks in the Philippines (case 6) - are located in the lower-left 
cell whose outcome is judged to be a stalemate. Similarly, for cases 1 
(Panama Canal), 3 (INF), 7 (test-ban in the endgame), 8 (ECE air 
pollution in the endgame), and 9 (US-Canada talks on acid rain) the 
diagnosed outcome of a fair agreement is close to the actual outcome. 
And, for the Spain base-rights talks (case 3), the diagnosed outcome of 
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Cases 
Flexibility 
(Party 2) 
1. Panama Canal, 1974 
2. Panama Canal, 1977 
High 
Low 
3. Spain military base rights, 1985·86 
4. MBFR, 1974-77 
5. INF, 1985-87 
4 
Low 
6 . Philippine's regime vs. National Democratic Front. 1 987 
7. Tes1 ban, 1962-63 
8 . ECE on air pollution 
9 . U.S .- Canada on acid ra in 
' 
3 8 
7 
2 
9 5 
6 
Flexibility (Party 1) 
Fig. 1. Location of cases in a flexibility grid. 
High 
continuing the talks without an agreement would have occurred if not 
for the critical event of Franco's death after ten rounds of negotiation 
(Druckman , 1986). The validity of these results attests to the experts' 
understanding of these particular negotiating situations as reflected in 
their coding decisions . The program provided a framework for relating 
these decisions to possible outcomes, going from diagnosis to prog-
nosis. 
3. TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF CASES 
Analysis of the specific case of interest would seem to translate more 
directly into advice than the results of the situational analysis described 
above . A focus on the particular rather than the general renders the 
approach idiographic and 'clinical'. This approach has the advantage of 
penetrating more deeply into internal case dynamics as well as the 
historical context that determines how the issues are defined, how they 
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are approached by the parties, and the evolution of national policies 
relevant to the negotiations. It has the disadvantage of neglecting 
theory-based knowledge about negotiation that would expand the 
range of insights beyond those available from close analysis of a 
particular case, as well as place the case in the context of other cases 
both past and present. 
Statistical analysis can contribute to an understanding of a negotia-
tion as it unfolds through time. Content-analysis coding of moves made 
in earlier rounds can be used to project trends of moves to be made in 
later rounds. This is a form of linear statistical extrapolation done with 
regression analysis. It has been illustrated with moves made during the 
course of an ongoing negotiation such as the Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reduction (MBFR) talks (Druckman and Hopmann, 1979); it 
has also been done as a retrospective case analysis by Hopmann and 
King (1976) on the partial test-ban talks and by Druckman (1986) on 
the military base-rights talks between Spain and the United States. The 
on-line consultation provided for the MBFR delegation enabled the 
negotiators to use the analysis to influence the process - or, at least , to 
give them a sense of control over the near-future course of events. The 
retrospective analyses provided an opportunity for validation by 
comparing the regression-based forecasts with the actual moves made 
and the outcomes obtained. 
The time series was created for these cases by content coding of 
statements made by the negotiators during the round-by-round discus-
sions. The codes were aggregated by session to form indices of hard 
and soft bargaining following the bargaining process analysis system 
devised originally by Walcott and Hopmann (1975). The trends in 
these indices across rounds provided a data base for addressing 
questions posed by members of the support staff for the negotiations: 
Can critical events such as impasses or proposals be predicted from 
negotiating behavior occurring prior to those events? Can we forecast 
moves made by other delegates in the next round of the talks? On 
which issues are the other delegates likely to be flexible or inflexible? 
Answers to these questions were provided from the results of correla-
tional and regression analyses of the time-series data . 
In the base-rights case , impasses were predicted from the difference 
between the teams' hard behavior in the previous round: The larger 
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the difference, the more likely an impasse would occur in the next 
round (Druckman, 1986). In MBFR, the tabling of a proposal 
occurred following a trend of increasing soft statements through 
several sessions prior to the event, followed by a trend of increasing 
hard statements in the sessions following the event (Druckman and 
Hopmann , 1991). Also in the MBFR talks, the percentage of hard 
statements to be made by the other delegates in the next round was 
projected reliably from regression equations based on correlations 
between the round-by-round hard behavior coded for pairs of teams, 
referred to as patterns of responsiveness; information about past 
patterns of interaction among members of different delegations was 
more useful than extrapolations of trends in a party's own past 
behavior. Using the indices, it was possible to distinguish between the 
MBFR issues where delegates were relatively flexible and those where 
they were inflexible, leading to a definition of a bargaining space 
within which agreements could occur. In fact , the particular trade-off 
suggested by this analysis was recognized by the delegates as a 
potential basis for agreement. For other examples of practical uses of 
time-series analysis in negotiation, the reader is referred to the chapter 
by Druckman and Hopmann (1991). 
If done correctly, a statistical time-series of a single case can uncover 
patterns that project reliably into the future , and may even be 
duplicated in other cases. One such pattern is the way negotiators 
respond to their opposite numbers through the course of the talks 
(Druckman and Harris , 1990). Another pattern is the relative impact 
of external events and internal moves as influences on negotiating 
postures coded from verbal statements (Hopmann and Smith, 1977). 
Certain requirements must however be met in order to do the analysis 
correctly. One is that there be sufficient data points to be able to use 
the most powerful techniques to detect relationships , as well as prevent 
distortion of results due to extreme or isolated events, i.e., the 
degrees-of-freedom problem (Campbell, 1975). Another is to correct 
for interdependencies among variables caused by factors that are either 
internal or external to the stream of moves taken by the parties 
through time. An internal factor is autocorrelation or correlations 
among successive time-dependent moves which extend to points more 
distant in time and disturb the direction of relationships. An external 
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factor is multicollinearity which refers to correlations among indepen-
dent variables which may jointly or singly influence the process; the 
problem here is one of detecting which variables have the largest 
impacts. Fortunately, statistical tests have been devised for detecting 
these problems and adjustments can be made to reduce their impact on 
the results. (See Ostrom, 1982, for a discussion of the advantages and 
limitations of time-series analysis.) 
While the technical problems involved in time-series analysis can be 
solved , other problems are more fundamental and may undermine the 
purpose of the analysis. One problem is the assumption of linearity . 
For many negotiations it may be that processes move along trajectories 
not captured well by linear models. They may be depicted as stochastic 
processes captured by such statistical techniques as Markov chains or 
Bayesian analysis: The former would be sensitive to state changes from 
one stage of a negotiation to another; the latter would revise prob-
abilities of events in response to new information during the course of 
an unfolding negotiation process . (See Job and Duncan , 1982, for an 
illustration of the way these techniques are used to monitor changes in 
the international system.) This is largely a problem of theory- of the 
ways by which we conceptualize processes of negotiation. Another 
problem is that longitudinal analysis is not suited for hypothesis 
testing. This requires that the case , rather than the time period , serve 
as the unit of analysis. By gathering a data base of cases , it would be 
possible to test hypotheses about relationships among variables as they 
operate across a spectrum of cases. The statistical techniques described 
above in conjunction with situational diagnoses would be relevant to 
these comparative analyses. 
4. KNOWLEDGE AS ' LEVERAGE ' OVER THE NEGOTIATION 
PROCESS 
Statistical analysis can play an important role in the application of 
knowledge about negotiating behavior. Its main contribution perhaps 
is to call attention to the adequacy of the data bases which guide 
decisions. A large number of cases, replicated experiments, reliable 
codings , and similarity between the analyzed situations and the case 
about which advice is sought are some of the considerations en-
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tertained in judging 'adequacy'. More often than not, these considera-
tions will highlight the limitations of advice based on personal ex-
perience (e.g. , Lall , 1966) , on 'accumulated wisdom' (e .g., Fisher and 
Ury , 1981), or on case studies (e.g., Walton and McKersie, 1965; 
Bendahmane and McDonald, 1986). They also provide standards 
against which to evaluate nostrums derived from a 'few experiments' 
(e.g., Karrass, 1974). The conclusion often reached is that many 
writers , and some scholars, offer advice without a solid foundation, 
extrapolating beyond the available data bases or out of context. 
The critical function served by statistical analysis can also be 
constructive. The approach encourages the analyst or consultant to 
articulate the dimensions of similarity or dissimilarity among cases in 
order to know the limits of knowledge transfer from one set of cases 
(e.g., those in the 'data base' ) to another (e .g., those not in the 'data 
base'). It reminds the analyst that even the strongest relationships 
obtained in a particular study are probabilistic and could conceivably 
be due to sampling error; thus, the need for replication, large samples, 
and diverse contexts in which relationships are explored. It leads one 
to develop a critical eye for advice offered by 'experts'. Yet even 'bad 
advice' may well be taken seriously by practitioners, leading them to 
make decisions that influence the process or outcome of a negotiation. 
This too can be evaluated by statistical techniques . 
The analytical strategies discussed above can enhance a negotiator's 
leverage over the process. The situational diagnosis alerts a negotiator 
to factors in the situation that may influence the process. He or she is 
likely to have control over, or be able to manipulate , many of these 
factors : for example, the way a delegation prepares for a negotiation , 
BATNAs, perceptions of the size of issues , rate of concession making , 
deadlines . Other factors may be more difficult to control but can be 
monitored and taken into account in devising negotiating strategies: 
for example, the extent to which negotiators are accountable to 
government agencies , the broader relationship between the nations , 
types of third party interests. The time-series analysis provides warn-
ings about possible future developments, especially if past trends are 
repeated. Most interesting perhaps is the way the 'other' team 
responds to 'our' moves or to events that occur during the negotiation. 
Knowing the other's pattern of response to our moves enables a 
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negotiator to alter his or her own concessions or rhetoric to produce 
desired effects. 
Enhanced leverage over the process would result from using the two 
analytical strategies together. The influences discovered by the situa-
tional diagnosis may impact on the process primarily during certain 
stages. By combining the strategies it should be possible to develop a 
more differentiated conception of negotiating behavior. The time-
series analysis could identify points or stages during the process where 
the influences have their strongest (or weakest) impact on negotiating 
behavior: For example , the effects of prenegotiation preparation 
strategies on negotiating postures are likely to be strongest early in the 
talks , dissipating in later stages as the talks proceed through the 
give-and-take discussions. Such refined knowledge about relationships 
and dynamics would contribute to an understanding of the popular 
notion of 'points of leverage '. It would call attention to 'moments ' 
during the process when certain tactics are likely to be effective. 
5. COMMUNICATING WITH THE END-USER 
Many tools developed for negotiators are used primarily by analysts 
whose backgrounds are similar to the developers. Implementing the 
tools for use by negotiators or their support staffs has been difficult; 
few of the analytical techniques discussed in the articles of this issue 
are used on a regular basis to support actual negotiations. Reasons for 
this may have to do with the ' two cultures' problem discussed by 
Druckman and Hopmann (1989) and by Winham (1979) . Several 
dimensions of difference between the research and practitioner com-
munities have made communication difficult: for example , the one is 
oriented toward explanation , the other toward prescription ; the one 
concentrates on general principles while the other focuses on case-
specific details; an emphasis on the process and on strategic interac-
tions contrasts with an emphasis on the context for policy formulation 
and problems of bureaucratic management. Bridging these gaps 
requires a transition from the role of research analyst to that of 
analytical consultant, a role whose function is to adapt knowledge to 
the expressed needs of the 'client' . How best to make this transition is 
a challenge to the ingenuity of the researcher. But , it can be aided by 
some general guidelines. 
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First, rather than attempting to educate practitioners in theory or 
research methodology, the analytical consultant should be educated by 
practitioners to understand their problems, accepting the reality in 
which they operate as one that is crisis-ridden , uncertain, complex, and 
changing in unpredictable ways. Confronting this environment, the 
practitioner views his or her craft as an art; the consultant can accept 
this view, making evident some of the advantages to be gained by 
informing that 'art ' with advances in scientific theory and research. 
Second, the tools should be designed to provide practical solutions to 
problems that arise in specific cases. The results should be judged by 
the practitioner as solutions to his or her problems as these emerge in 
the context of the negotiations. Third, the tool should be user friendly. 
The language used to address the problems should be familiar and the 
questions asked easy to answer. The answers are 'processed' by 
computations done by the computer software; the algorithms do not 
need to be transparent to users. Better yet , the user would benefit 
from a program that also permits him or her to explore alternative 
options or futures, aiding the job of contingency planning engaged in 
by most agencies that support negotiations. Statistical analysis can 
contribute in important ways to the development of useful tools , such 
as those discussed in this paper. Whether these tools are actually used , 
however, is likely to depend more on judgments of practitioners that 
"they work" than on an understanding by them of how they work. 
Implications for application can be illustrated. The intent of a 
diagnosis is to identify those aspects of a complex negotiating situation 
that can be altered to facilitate the search for agreements . Recent 
research suggests the possibility of differentiating more precisely in the 
sense of highlighting just those variables that operate in particular 
phases of a negotiation ; for example, prenegotiating, stage-setting , the 
give-and-take discussions , the endgame. One set of findings from the 
simulation-experiment, discussed above, was trajectories of variables , 
based on the pair-comparison weights , leading either toward agree-
ment or toward a stalemate . For example , the following trajectory 
toward agreement was developed from the findings : 
Being a delegate-advisor and studying the issues (stage 1) ~ 
holding the talks at a peripheral location and being at a 
power disadvantage (stage 2) ~ 
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exposing the talks to only limited media attention and 
having salient outcome options (stage 3) ~ 
exposing the talks to limited media attention and having 
unattractive alternatives to a negotiated agreement (stage 4) 
Similarly, a trajectory toward stalemate took the following form: 
Preparing strategies (stage 1) ~ 
having a power advantage over other delegations (stage 
2)~ 
wide media coverage and few concessions from the other 
delegations (stage 3)~ 
having attractive alternatives to a negotiating agreement 
(stage 4). 
These are some aspects of the negotiating situation that can be altered 
for effect. They serve as guides to the third-party practitioner in his or 
her efforts to create environments that would be conducive to the kind 
of problem solving needed for agreements to emerge. This type of 
information augments the communication and persuasion functions 
performed by mediators during negotiation . 
6. CONCLUSION 
Statistical analysis provides techniques that can be used to support the 
negotiation process. Two approaches are illustrated in this paper. One, 
referred to as a situational diagnosis, provides advice based on 
information obtained from empirical studies designed to discover 
relationships among aspects of negotiating situations, the behavior of 
negotiators during the process, and the outcome. The other, consisting 
of time-series analysis , results in forecasts of likely moves or outcomes 
based on information about past behavior of the negotiating parties in 
particular cases. The value of each approach turns on the issue of 
whether results obtained in other settings (situational diagnosis) or in 
earlier time periods (time-series analysis) are relevant or can be 
extrapolated to new situations. Relevance can be judged in terms of 
statistical criteria of sampling design and data quality. An adequate 
basis for extrapolation can increase a negotiator's leverage over the 
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process, especially when the two approaches are used together. But, 
relevance does not insure implementation of the tools in an actual 
negotiation. The analyst must also confront possible problems of 
communicating with the practitioners who will use the techniques. An 
overview of these problems and some guidelines for dealing with them 
are discussed in a final section. 
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BERTRAND R. MUNIER AND JEAN-LOUIS RULLIERE 
ARE GAME THEORETIC CONCEPTS SUIT ABLE 
NEGOTIATION SUPPORT TOOLS? 
FROM NASH EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENTS 
TOWARD A COGNITIVE CONCEPT OF 
RATION ALI TY 
ABSTRACT. If game theory is to be used as a negotiation support tool , it should be 
able to provide unambiguous recommendations for a target to aim at and for actions to 
reach this target. This need cannot be satisfied with the Nash equilibrium concept , based 
on the standard instrumental concept of rationality. These equilibria , as is well known , 
are generally multiple in a game. The concept of substantive or instrumental rationality 
has proved to be so pregnant , however , that researchers , instead of re-evaluating its use 
in game theory , have simply tried to design concepts related to the Nash equilibrium , but 
with the property of being unique in a game - i.e ., they have devised ways of selecting 
among Nash equilibria. These concepts have been labeled refined Nash equilibria. 
The purpose of this paper is to show the following. 
(a) The different types of refined Nash equilibria , based on the principle of backward 
induction, can lead to severe contradictions within the framework itself. This makes 
these concepts utterly unsatisfactory and calls for a new appraisal of the reasoning 
process of the players. 
(b) The degree of confidence in the principle of backward induction depends upon the 
evaluation of potential deviations with respect to the extended Nash equilibrium concept 
used and upon the possible interpretations of such deviations by the different players. 
Our goal is to show that the nature of these possible interpretations reinforces the 
argument that a serious conceptual reappraisal is necessary. 
(c) Some form of forward induction should then become the real yardstick of 
rationality , extending Simonian procedural rationality towards the concept of cognitive 
rationality. This could open the way to a renewed game theoretic approach to 
negotiation support systems. Such a research program, which would be a revision of the 
basic game theoretic concepts , is dealt with in the end of the paper. 
Keywords: Game theory , Nash equilibrium, perfect equilibrium , trembling hand 
procedure, backward induction , common knowledge , strategic deviation , forward 
induction , dynamic rationality , cognitive rationality. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether game theory could serve as a decision aid has 
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been debated for many years. When it comes to negot1at10n, the 
favored solution calls for a concept of basically noncooperative 
behavior , allowing for some possibility of cooperation or strategy 
coordination . 
For example , disarmament negotiations have followed such a path . 
Typically, one chief of state announces a (sometimes unilateral) move, 
others announce their response to the move , and so on, without formal 
bargaining sessions . Similar observations can be drawn from develop-
ments in the recent conflict between Serbia , Croatia , Slovenia and 
other members of the former Yugoslavian Federation . 
The closest available concept is the Nash equilibrium, which leaves 
possibilities for a certain amount of cooperation between players . Such 
possibilities have implicitly been modeled in the refinements of the 
concept, but it can be shown that this modeling is consistent with the 
backward induction principle on which these refinements rest. As an 
example , take the idea of perfect equilibrium . The idea is that the 
rationality of a player's strategy should be evaluated not only at the 
beginning of play , but also at any node of the game, including the 
response to an opponent's unexpected deviation from equilibrium, and 
that all players implicitly agree on the rationale behind the ensuing 
selection of Nash equilibria. This is but one particular way to model 
noncooperative behavior with coordination of moves! Alas, using the 
backward induction principle to model the idea leads to two possible 
consequences: first , to discarding the most interesting coordination 
between the moves of the players ; second, and worse , to dominated 
outcomes. 
If one wants to keep the rationality concept which underlies the 
Nash equilibrium point (i .e . , the concept of instrumental backward 
maximization of some objective function, assuming implicitly that what 
we hold to be true about the others' behavior is not to be questioned) , 
the design of a strategic concept which would have the property of 
being unique in a game can certainly be regarded as the design of 
techniques of selection among Nash equilibria. But the trouble has 
been that these techniques have themselves become the objective of 
research, probably because keeping the backward induction concept 
has turned out to be a difficult constraint to meet. 
As J. C. Harsanyi ( 1984) once explicitly pointed out: 
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We need a theory which selects one specific equilibrium as the solution of the game. In 
fact, Sellen and myself have as a main objective to establish a mathematical criterion 
which always will select a particular equilibrium point as the solution. This fundamental 
objective boils down to overcoming the multiplicity problem. 
Section 2 shows that this research program has led to fundamental 
inconsistencies within the framework of backward induction reasoning. 
Section 3 deals with what should be viewed as the real challenge to 
game theory, if one wants to use the concepts it offers in negotiation 
support systems. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks and 
suggestions on the design of the research program. 
2. SOME SEVERE LIMITATIONS IN BACKWARD INDUCTION 
MODELS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA SELECTION 
2.1. Perfect Equilibrium and Trembling Hand Reasoning 
The models dealt with in this section have been developed under the 
extensive form of games and are linked to the seminal work of Kuhn 
(1953) on behavioral strategies. They include the 'perfect equilibrium' 
concept of Selten (1975), as well as the 'sequential equilibrium' of 
Kreps and Wilson (1982a). These concepts look for good reasons for 
every player to select given equilibria, and possibly one given equilib-
rium. If they are successful in doing it, the players will indeed abide by 
these good reasons, not only because they find them convincing, but 
also because they think that the other players will share this opinion 
and thus also abide by these good reasons. These good reasons are like 
the recommendations of a chessbook: smart players will follow them 
only if the book convinces them that the opponents will do the same. 
In other words, the good reasons given by backward induction models 
of selection, like the recommendations of the chessbook, have to be 
common knowledge among the players to be of any value. Let's recall, 
as the epitome of this kind of model, the perfect equilibrium and the 
'trembling hand' perfect equilibrium of Selten. 
2.1 .1. Perfect equilibrium. In a two-player game, the good reason 
behind the selection of some perfect equilibrium, say (B, Y), is as 
follows: in every subgame of the game-tree (even if it is outside the 
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equilibrium path, and thus has zero probability of ever being reached), 
let us demand that the decisions of the players implied by (B, Y) 
constitute a Nash equilibrium for the subgame. Thus, between two 
Nash equilibria, say (A, X) and (B, Y), let us select the one in which 
the strategy of the second player would be played at any node of the 
game, if the first player would effectively drive the play to that node by 
choosing his strategy - i.e., A in the first case and B in the second. 
Using this rule, one can easily look at terminal subgames and then 
maximize backward. If, however, a game displays several perfect 
equilibria - which is often the case - the rational foundation of this 
reasoning of a credible threat can be questioned. However, difficulties 
increase considerably when imperfect information games are consid-
ered. 
2.1.2. Trembling hand. The limits of Bayesian inference procedures 
are encountered in imperfect information games. To select an equilib-
rium, a player has to evaluate and re-evaluate its probability of 
occurring with respect to the out-of-equilibrium context. By definition, 
however, we do not know anything about the beliefs regarding out-of-
equilibrium matters. Mere intuition tells us that this makes Bayesian 
inference methods and backward induction inappropriate for solving 
the problem. 
Let us briefly recall the extension of the perfect equilibrium concept 
by taking into account potential deviations with respect to the equilib-
rium path, which is discussed by Harsanyi (1973) and Selten (1975). It 
assumes that all players i, i = 1, ... , n, select totally mixed strategies 
in the following sense: 
Vi, i = 1, 2, ... , .... , n 
Vi, X; EX; (set of available strategies of player i) 
VE, E > 0, 3E;, E; > 0, such that E > E; = p(x;) > 0 
where p (x;) is the probability that player i plays X; . 
A game giving rise to such behavioral schemes is called an E-perturbed 
game. An n-tuple (x~, .. . , ... , x;*, . .. , ... , x;) = (xn; is an 
E-equilibrium if and only if: 
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(a) Vi, i = 1, .. . , n , 'rfx ; EX;, 'VE, E > 0, 3E;, E; > 0, 
such that E > E; = p(x;) > 0 
(b) Vi, i = 1, ... , ... ,n, (xt); = (xt, x:;) = Arg Max E(U;(x;, x:;)) 
X;EX; 
Then a Trembling Hand equilibrium (xt); is such that 
(a) 'VE, E > 0, (xt); is an E-equilibrium. 
(b) When E goes to 0, (xt); is a Nash equilibrium. 
Such an equilibrium may be shown to exist (Selten, 1975).1 An 
interesting feature of the concept of the Trembling Hand equilibrium is 
precisely that, in games with imperfect information, Bayes' theorem is 
applied everywhere, on equilibrium paths as well as on off-equilibrium 
paths: 
2 .2. Internal Inconsistency of the Concepts 
The perfect equilibrium concept and the trembling hand perfect 
equilibrium concept , as well as all other concepts aimed at selecting 
Nash equilibria on similar grounds and by backward induction , raise 
different types of problems. 
As Kreps and Wilson (1982) have shown, a trembling-hand proce-
dure is not very selective unless particular conditions on the game 
structure are imposed. This leaves the problem of recommendation in 
the negotiation process unsolved. 
On the other hand, experimental studies over the last 35 years have 
raised many doubts on expected utility behavior among individuals. 
More particularly, the certainty effect (Allais, 1953, 1979, 1988) and 
the overweighting of small probabilities effect (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Allais, 1988) entail either discontinuities in the antici-
pated payoffs of the players, or , at least, strong nonlinearities of these 
payoffs either for small probabilities or for probabilities close to one. 
Anticipated utility models, for instance, take such behavior patterns 
into account (Munier, 1989), for example. 
If there are discontinuities, Selten's theorem (1975) is not sufficient 
to ensure the existence of an E-perfect equilibrium. Neither is Das-
gupta and Muskin's theorem (1986) for it assumes that E-probabilities 
make payoffs negligible, which is true only if the players' behavior can 
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be represented by a preference functional which is linear in the 
probabilities , i.e., by some expected utility pattern of behavior. It is 
not true if they follow an anticipated utility behavior. In this case , 
existence of an E-equilibrium is not ensured when payoff functions 
exhibit some discontinuity in pure strategies. Existence of an E-perfect 
equilibrium is thus ensured only under restrictive conditions. 
But we shall not overemphasize these difficulties, for three other 
problems are more fundamental. They show that using the perfectness 
criterion and the Trembling Hand procedure leads to potential con-
tradictions and that these techniques are either inappropriate or of a 
limited applicability. 
2.2.1. How consistent are cooperation and backward induction? Con-
sider the following example of an alternated two-person game with 
complete information and finite horizon (T = 3), the extensive and 
normal forms of which are displayed in Figure 1. A first contradiction 
appears as soon as it is observed that the only perfect equilibrium 
corresponds to (51' 52 , 5 1 . ) with an associated payoff vector of (2 , 0) , 
while this payoff is strictly dominated by the imperfect equilibrium 
(C1 , C2 , C, .). Decomposing the game according to the backward 
induction principle leads to precluding every possible cooperative 
behavior between players . Such a cooperative behavior could lead to a 
dominating outcome, but would require the players to conceive of time 
in the commonsense meaning of the word, i.e. to think in terms of 
forward induction . 
This conclusion leads to either rejecting the backward induction as a 
necessary and sufficient principle of rationality, when confronted with 
the problem of equilibrium selection, or accepting it under the 
restrictive proviso that it is common knowledge among the players 
(Binmore, 1990, Ch. 4), while Bicchieri (1990) unconvincingly at-
tempts to weaken this common knowledge condition . As we will see, 
however, the latter possibility leads in turn to a contradiction. 
2.2.2. Is a trembling hand equilibrium path common knowledge ? If 
common knowledge is modeled as a probabilistic structure (Tan and 
Werlang, 1988; Brandenburger and Dekel , 1987) , it can be shown that 
a trembling hand perfect equilibrium cannot be common knowledge 
among the players (see appendix). But , if it is not common knowledge , 
all the reasoning crumbles and the concept cannot logically hold; if I 
am not sure that my opponent is playing trembling hand , nothing will 
assure me that my interest is to play trembling hand . 
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among the players (see appendix) . But , if it is not common knowledge , 
all the reasoning crumbles and the concept cannot logically hold ; if I 
am not sure that my opponent is playing trembling hand, nothing will 
assure me that my interest is to play trembling hand. 
Here the difficulty of the simple Nash equilibrium concept is 
apparent: if my opponent deviates, why should I continue to play the 
Nash equilibrium and not deviate myself? 
2.2.3. Are deviations necessarily errors? Using the same example , we 
find that the nature of a possible deviation constitutes a second 
inconsistency within the concept of perfect equilibrium. Let us con-
sider the perfect equilibrium (Sp S2 , S1. ) . 
Selten's reasoning (1975) holds that , if one observes an unantici-
pated deviation with respect to an equilibrium path, one will interpret 
it as an involuntary mistake of the deviating player, without any link to 
the other period moves of this player. Time independence of the 
mistakes is related to the agent's normal form representation of the 
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game, where every player is divided into as many independent 
subplayers as there are possible moves for him in the game. 
In this view, for each player , E-trembling at each one of his moves in 
the game does not depend on E-trembling at the other moves. Quite 
consistently, every deviation with respect to an equilibrium path is 
seen as a simple mistake. 
But, if one regards the agent's normal form as an ad hoc representa-
tion of the game, the hypothesis of a statistical dependence between 
the E-tremblings of a given player during a play appears to be quite 
plausible and indeed very likely . 
In the above example of a game, (C1 , S 1. ) constitutes a deviation for 
player 1 with respect to the imperfect equilibrium (C1, C2 , C1. ). Let 
p(C1> S 1. ) = E, with 0<E < 1. With this probability in mind , player 2 
selects the imperfect equilibrium strategy C2 by taking the limit - as 
the Trembling Hand procedure recommends - of the following compu-
tation: 
p(C1, Ci .) 
p(Ci .) = p(C1 , C1. ) + p(Ct> S1. ) 
1- p(S1, S1. ) - p(S1, C1.)- p(C1, S1. ) 
l -p(S1 , S1. )- p(S1, C1. ) 
p(CI> S1.) 
= 1 - "-1---'-p-(S-'-1-) 
Thus, for every given value of the probability that player 1 deviates at 
his first move, p(S1 ), one computes: 
F. 
limp(C1 .) =lim
0
1- 1- p(S
1
) = 1 · 
0 ...... ...... 
It then becomes clear that player 2, when observing C1 as a deviation 
of the perfect equilibrium of the game , will not interpret it as a simple 
mistake. He will base the selection of move C2 on this observation, 
following the above probability computation. C1 represents a relevant 
informational signal, to which a meaning has to be attached before 
player 2 selects his own move. 
Let us briefly summarize. Problems of existence, as well as problems 
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to reduce the number of possible equilibria to 1, have the same 
consequence as the impossibility for the equilibrium path of being 
common knowledge: Players will not trust the Trembling Hand pro-
cedure as a safe decision aid. Each player will not be certain that an 
equilibrium will obtain (existence problems); he will doubt whether the 
equilibrium he is working on will necessarily be the same (capacity of 
selection problems) as the one(s) other players are aiming at (and thus 
upon the fact that his strategy could be a best reply to theirs) ; he will 
not trust that the other players will follow the same rules of conduct 
for they cannot be common knowledge; and he will then expect them 
to deviate from the equilibrium path (from the same observation) . 
It appears therefore that deviations from equilibrium paths, far from 
being necessarily irrational, may represents signals which, if they could 
be interpreted, would constitute the most interesting inputs into a 
negotiation support system. 
3. NECESSARY AND DIFFICULT INTERPRETATION OF 
DEVIATIONS : THE REAL CHALLENGE TO GAME THEORY 
In a game theoretic framework , a strategy is not a mere plan of action , 
as was the common definition used until the late 1970s. Let us quote 
Rubinstein (1991) in an article which was brought to our attention only 
after we wrote an earlier version of this paper: 
Could we not narrow the formal definition of a 'strategy' to specify an action only at the 
decision nodes which are not excluded from being reached by the strategy? If we were 
only investigating Nash equilibria of extensive games, then the game-theoretic definition 
would indeed be unnecessarily broad ... Player l 's strategy at ... [some node of the 
game out of the equilibrium path] must be interpreted as what would be player 2's (as 
opposed to player l 's) belief regarding player l 's future play , should player 1 decide to 
deviate from what was believed to be his original plan of action. Thus , a strategy 
encompasses not only the player's plan , but also his opponent's beliefs in the event that 
he does not follow that plan. 
This is an elegant and very clear statement of the necessity of 
interpreting the deviations of other players from their Nash equilib-
rium path and thus the very nature of a strategy. Meaningful devia-
tions from any equilibrium path can very well occur and it would thus 
be of great interest to infer the rationality underlying such deviations . 
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This would then advise the negotiator on where to move according 
to the retained interpretations of observed deviations . The nature and 
content of such interpretations is thus a central question. Solving it 
would amount to selecting a new subgame target; when a player 
deviates from a given equilibrium path, he informs the other players by 
aiming at a different outcome than the one attached to the former 
equilibrium path. 
In this general perspective, one of the most frequently used selection 
criteria is the one of Cho and Kreps (1987). This criterion rest on the 
two following rules: 
• Every deviation should be interpreted with respect to an equilibrium 
path. 
• An equilibrium will be discarded if a deviation can be interpreted 
without ambiguity for all players and if this deviation ensures the 
deviating player of a higher payoff than the equilibrium payoff. 
In Section 3.1 we evaluate the extent to which this criterion is 
insufficient to interpret deviations and in Section 3.2 we suggest 
directions for a research program. 
3.1. The Challenge to the Cho-Kreps Criterion 
Figure 2 illustrates an example of the possible use of this criterion (see 
Ponssard, 1990) . In the figure , x is some payoff for player 2 when 
player 1 plays A. By deviating from the equilibrium pair (A, •) to 
(B, •) player 1 clearly shows that he wants to gain more than 3; 
therefore, he wants to play T to obtain a payoff of 4. He thus 
unambiguously suggests that player 2 plays L. Therefore, (B, T , L) is a 
more stable equilibrium than (A, • ) , which should therefore be 
disregarded on the basis of the information provided by the deviation. 
The strength of this proposition lies in the fact that the two players 
admit it, i.e., that it constitutes a common knowledge among them . 
The fact that player 1 will play T if he deviates from (A, •) by 
playing B is clearly interpreted by player 2. Player 1 will guess that 
interpretation by player 2 but nevertheless maintain his deviation . 
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Fig. 2. 
Thus , all levels of interpretation of the deviation come to the same 
conclusion: there is no ambiguity on the meaning of the deviation. 
Unfortunately, this result is not always true. An unambiguous 
deviation of a given order of interpretation can become an ambiguous 
one at a higher order. To show this, let us consider the example of the 
'Chain-Store Paradox' given by Selten (1978) . 
Let a monopolist M, in a given market, be confronted to two 
successive potential entrants £ 1 and £ 2 • For every entrant , the 
game is as follows: either he does not enter the market, and the mo-
nopoly is maintained, or he does enter the market. In the latter 
case, the monopolist can either accept to share the market or stage a 
retaliation campaign which proves to be very costly to him and to his 
competitor. 
To deter his potential competitors from entering the market , the 
monopolist has to make them believe that retaliations would not be 
costly to him. He thus has to acquire the reputation of being a hard 
monopolist, whereas he in fact is a soft monopolist. To model this 
(Figure 3) , two possible versions of the game are created: one with a 
hard monopolist (version H) and one with a soft monopolist (version 
S). If the potential entrants believe the monopolist is playing version 
H, whereas he is really playing version S, the monopolist will have 
succeeded in acquiring the desired reputation. 
Let us now assume that the two potential entrants play sequentially. 
On the extensive form of the game , let us denote the following moves: 
, 
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Stays out (0) 
0 a a 
Entrant 
Accepts (A) 
b 0 -1 
Fights (F) 
b-1 -1 0 
payoff of the Entrant _j ~ 
payoff of the "soft" Monopolist 
payoff of the "hard" Monopolist 
(a> 1 and 0 < b < 1) 
Fig. 3. 
0 1 : Potential entrant E 1 stays out of the market . 
11: Potential entrant E 1 enters the market. 
F 1 : The monopolist stages a retaliation campaign . 
A 1 : The monopolist agrees to share the market . 
The only interesting case in this game appears when E 1 enters the 
market and the monopolist decides to fight back. What should E2 
conclude about the nature (hard or soft) of the monopolist and what 
moves will this entail from E2 as well as from the monopolist? 
Let us apply the Cho-Kreps criterion to determine moves by E 2 and 
M: 
(1) E2 should enter if he thinks that Mis soft, and otherwise stay out. 
(2) If E2 enters, M fights back if he is hard and accepts if he is soft, 
even though he regrets that E2 was not convinced of a hard 
reputation. 
Let us consider the following deviation: M, being soft, fights E 1 in 
order to impress E 2 . This strategy is a deviation from the acceptance to 
share the market, because the retaliations are costly to M. This 
deviation indeed allows the monopolist to get, at best, a payoff of 
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(a - 1) instead of (a) if he had not deviated. Thus, according to the 
Cho-Kreps criterion, one has to conclude that if M fights E 1, this is 
because M actually is of the hard type. This reasoning will make E 2 
feel confident as to the true nature of M. Cho-Kreps would argue that, 
for M to fight E 1 , if he himself is soft, is not a Nash equilibrium 
strategy . 
This conclusion can be challenged, however, on the basis of an 
argument in common knowledge . Let us look at the successive orders 
of interpretation of the Cho-Kreps criterion: 
Order 1. This level of reasoning of the Cho-Kreps criterion is the 
following: 
either M retaliates against E 1 , then he is hard . 
or M accepts the entry of E 1 , then he is soft . 
This proposition is known by M and E2 . 
Order 2. But one can immediately see that the monopolist M can make 
use of E2's expectation , i.e., of the former proposition. In this case , M 
will fight E 1 to acquire a hard reputation in E2's view. His expectation 
being thus manipulated by M, E2 will not enter the market. 
Order 3. We can go one step further. E2 might anticipate that M will 
follow Order 2 reasoning and thus guess that M has fought E 1 only to 
impress him. Having realized this, he then will enter the market. 
This infinite regression of the different orders of reasoning shows 
clearly that E2's interpretation of the deviation F1 of the monopolist is 
ambiguous. This ambiguity arises from the fact that the interpretation 
is not common knowledge among the players (which would imply an 
identity of the interpretations of all orders). Put in other words, the 
Cho-Kreps criterion does not take into account that every player can 
try to manipulate the expectation and rationality of his opponent(s). 
This could mean that a non-manipulable rationality should be of a 
different kind than the usual Nash rationality. 
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3.2. A Research Agenda for Game Theoretic Negotiation Aids 
First we should emphasize that the very problem raised here had been 
considered by the founders of game theory who, however, felt that 
deviations should be interpreted as 'irrational'. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947, 2nd ed.) explicitly stated: 
The rules of rational behavior must provide definitely for the possibility of irrational 
conduct on the part of others. In other words: Imagine that we have discovered a set of 
rules for all participants - to be termed as 'optimal' or 'rational' - each of which is 
indeed optimal provided that the other participants conform. Then the question remains 
as to what will happen if some of the participants do not conform .... If the superiority 
of 'rational behavior' over any other kind is to be established, then its description must 
include rules of conduct for all conceivable situations including those where 'the others ' 
behave irrationally, in the sense of the standards which the theory will set for them. 
We have shown that such an interpretation of deviation does not help 
our problem and, more importantly, is erroneous. We have also 
suggested that it is difficult to find any other interpretation of such 
deviations to the backward induction principle. We thus suggest using 
some type of forward induction reasoning scheme. 
More precisely, one could consider first the reasonable extent of 
common knowledge elements within the negotiation situation. This 
extent usually depends directly on the content of the prenegotiation 
phase and could be regarded as embedding some scenarios of the 
negotiation session (Ponssard, 1990). Which scenarios would qualify 
for reasonableness could be regarded as some form of convention 
between the players. 
The question would then be how to interpret a deviation from such a 
reasonable scenario. We believe that no universal scheme of rationality 
should be devised toward this end. We think that the memory of each 
player in the game can offer some history of deviations, the regularities 
of which should bring some comprehension of the local and contingent 
scheme of rationality used. Experiments could help in testing some of 
the preliminary conclusions reached. Interpretations could then be 
offered and would help the negotiator make his own local but strategic 
choices. 
Such a research program borrows from game theory and the theory 
of comprehension (Schank, 1985) and from the newer concepts of 
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strategic information systems (Tardeu and Theys, 1987). The concept 
of strategy derived from the theory of games and the one derived from 
strategic management theory, previously viewed as very different, now 
appear to be converging, thus providing negotiators support in their 
difficult task. Such a research program must obviously be conducted on 
an interdisciplinary basis. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Nash equilibrium refinements both restrict and extend the original 
concept. They restrict the concept to the extent that they define the 
more severe conditions one can encounter when selecting from the 
multiple Nash equilibria . But they also stretch it , for they want it to 
apply to games in extensive form, i.e., to a context where time is 
somehow modeled, at least with a sequential character. What we have 
shown here, we think, is that both types of efforts raise more problems 
than they can presently solve. 
Although the backward induction principle represents an interesting 
attempt toward an appraisal of intertemporal rationality, our analysis 
shows that it crucially raises the problem of the nature and the 
significance of potential deviations and of their successive levels of 
interpretation. Bayesian backward induction models rest on the 
possibility of a deviation but do not admit that the interpretation of 
such deviations could be ambiguous. Presently , available models 
consider exclusively such deviations as mistakes. 
Deviations from the standards which the theory will set can be 
mistakes , but also strategic signals. In every case , they are required to 
be first analyzed and then interpreted; the theory should tell us an 
appropriate response for all connected situations . This , in turn, calls 
for a group decision support system which could help interpreting 
deviations. The relevant concept of rationality is thus the concept of 
cognitive rationality, emerging from the comparison of what the others 
think of the situation and what we think of it. Rationality is not, in this 
view the traditional contingent and static maximization rule we have 
been used to, but a treatment of information in a dynamic and 
interactive process. 
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This completes the argument that game theory , if we want it to 
provide guidance to the negotiator in real negotiation processes , has to 
change the basic concept of rationality it has used until now. 
APPENDIX 
In Selten's 'Trembling hand' procedure , all out-of-equilibrium paths 
receive an equal probability Elm if E is the degree of error with which 
the other players deviate . But where does this 'trembling hand ' way of 
modeling the problem come from? There are two possible answers: 
- an exogenous answer: The modeler dictates the rule and imposes it , 
acting as a 'benevolent umpire'. This answer can be relevant in the 
case of arbitration schemes, but not in the case of a negotiation aid . 
- an endogenous answer: the rule of analysis emerges from a conven-
tion (Lewis , Schotter) between the players. This could be relevant to 
negotiation aids, but requires, to be effective, that the convention is 
common knowledge . It can be shown , ad absurdum, that this is 
impossible. 
To show it, let us define common knowledge as a probabilistic 
structure . Let: 
E 
P(.) 
r:o 
r;(. ' . ) 
t~( . , . ' .) 
be the set of events assumed to be observable by all agents . 
be the set of probability measures on some subset (.) of E. 
be the belief of order 1 of player i, on some subset (.) of E . 
be the belief of order 2 of player i, i.e. , the belief on some 
subset of the set B :(.) of all possible beliefs of order 1 on 
the subset (.) of E of the other players, on the one hand, 
and on this subset (.) of E , on the other hand. 
be the belief of order 3 of player i, etc. 
For any given player i, the set T; of all possible beliefs is a set of 
infinite sequences of beliefs: 
( 1 2 00) t; = ti' ti' .. . ' ti t;E T; . 
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Common Knowledge Conditions 
VA CE, A is common knowledge if, from every player i's point of 
view, two conditions hold: 
(1) Certainty condition: i knows that A is certain, i.e.: 
t; = (t;, t~, .. . ) is such that t;(A) = 1 . 
I ' . Let B; (A) be the set of all possible such t; : 
B ;'(A)= w:' t~, .. . )}E T; with t;(A) = 1. 
(2) Reciprocity condition: i knows that the beliefs of every order of all 
the other players j (j ¥- i) regarding A superimpose with his own 
belief. 
I .. Let B; (A) be the set of all beliefs of order 1 for which (1) and (2) 
are met. 
t;EB;1 .. (A)~t;EB:'(A) and Vj , j#-i, t1 EBJ'(A). 
For higher orders of beliefs (k > 1): 
t; E B7 .. (A) = t;, t; E B7 - 1'(A) and Vj , j ¥- i, t1 E s;-1·(A). 
Definition. A is Common Knowledge if and only if Vi , B ~·· = 1. 
IMPOSSIBILITY PROPOSITION. Let s0 be the equilibrium strategy 
to be a Trembling Hand-type of procedure. S 0 will be common 
knowledge if and only if B ~ .. (S 0 ) = 1. But assigning non-null prob-
abilities to strategies other than S 0 , in compliance with the procedure , 
means that 
B~ .. (S 0 ) < 1 , a contradiction . 
Q.E.D. 
NOTE 
1 Other concepts of Nash-refined equilibrium also rest on the idea of an e-perturbed 
game , although they use either a different definition of an e-perturbation or a different 
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process of convergence. Such are the equi librium concepts suggested by Myerson (1978) , 
the 'Sequential Equilibrium' of Kreps and Wilson (1982), and the 'Stable Equilibrium' of 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). 
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G. MATTHEW BONHAM 
COGNITIVE MAPPING AS A TECHNIQUE FOR 
SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 
ABSTRACT. This article explores the use of cognitive mapping as a tool for supporting 
international negotiation. Cognitive mapping was developed from the research tradition 
in cognitive psychology that was pioneered by Heider, congruity theory and attribution 
theory. Applied to political analysis, the technique can be used to represent causal and 
quasi-causal thinking about a specific policy area. Cognitive maps can be hand-drawn , 
or, in the case of maps consisting of more than 25 concepts , machine-generated for 
detailed and systematic analysis. Regardless of the format , cognitive maps can be 
examined to determine the most central concepts, the explanation of a problem in terms 
of its root causes and potential consequences , the use of evidence, such as historical 
analogies, internal consistency, and perceived consequences of policy proposals. Al-
though the technique was designed to represent the views of individuals , cognitive maps 
can be aggregated to study collective decision-making. Applied to international negotia-
tion, the technique can be employed as a substance-focused tool to represent and 
integrate knowledge about a specific policy area for use by negotiators. As a process-
oriented tool , the technique can be used to help negotiators understand better their own 
assumptions about a problem, the viewpoints of other parties to the negotiations , and 
the ways others see their own position. In this mode , the technique has promise for 
promoting convergence of views and negotiated agreements. 
Keywords: Cognitive mapping, cognitive psychology , international negotiation , collec-
tive decision-making, knowledge representation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Negotiators may find that cognitive mapping is a useful tool for helping 
them to prepare and engage in negotiation. At the pre-negotiation 
stage they can prepare for the talks by mapping out their own 
assumptions to explore the costs and benefits of alternative proposals, 
and they can construct cognitive maps of the other parties to the 
negotiation to anticipate their initial positions. Once the negotiations 
have begun, cognitive mapping can be used by negotiators to gain a 
better understanding of the statements and arguments of the other 
parties, as well as to provide a template for seeing how others 
comprehend their own position. Finally, the technique can be em-
Theory and Decision 34: 255-273 , 1993. 
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ployed to help combine the pos1t10ns of the various parties to the 
negotiation and create a package deal that can be described in a single 
text. 
This article will introduce cognitive mapping by situating the 
technique within its research tradition and providing a brief outline of 
the technical underpinnings, along with its assumptions, inputs, and 
outputs . The article will also describe the transformation of cognitive 
mapping into a 'hands-on' tool that can be used by negotiators 
throughout the negotiation process. Because cognitive mapping is 
intuitively understandable, the technique can be used by diplomats, 
themselves, to assess differences in assumptions and positions as they 
strive to reach cognitive convergence and concrete agreements. 
2. THE TECHNIQUE OF COGNITIVE MAPPING 
2.1. Research Tradition 
Cognitive mapping is an outgrowth of the research tradition in 
cognitive psychology that was pioneered by Heider (1946), who 
developed the concept of 'congruity' in human cognition , and 
Cartwright and Harary (1956) , who generalized Heider's theory to a 
greater range of empirical cases and used the mathematical model of 
linear graphs to build a theory of cognitive balance (Harary 1959). 
Further contributions were made by Osgood et al. (1957) , whose 
concept of semantic space , "a region of some unknown dimensionality 
and Euclidian in character" (p . 25) was used to construct a measure of 
connotative meaning. Kelly's (1955) approach to the measurement of 
personality , although developed independently of Heider and Osgood 
et al., is similar in that a person's cognitive system is arranged in the 
form of an interrelated set of subordinate and superordinate con-
structs , which he or she relies on to anticipate events and classify 
experience. 
Another contribution of Heider (1958) to cognitive psychology led 
to an interest in the process of "causal attribution in the perception of 
others ,' ' and the development of attribution theory. Attribution 
theorists have studied the efforts of people to explain and draw 
inferences from behavior - their own behavior and the behavior of 
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others. According to attribution theory, people are 'constructive 
thinkers' or 'naive scientists' who search for the causes of events and 
draw conclusions about people and their circumstances as a basis for 
action. The 'naive scientist' framework, however, is not the only way 
of thinking about attribution. Attributions serve other functions, in 
addition to cognitive mastery, such as the need to protect or enhance 
self-esteem (Miller 1976), to create a favorable impression to others 
(Bradley 1978), and believe in a just world (Lerner and Miller 1978). 
In the field of international relations, Jervis (1976) has applied 
attribution theory to foreign policy decision-making, Heradstveit 
(1979) has studied how Arabs and Israelis attributed the causes of the 
Middle East conflict, and Larson (1985) has tested attribution theory 
as an explanation of the containment policies of the cold war .1 
2.2. Cognitive Mapping 
The term 'cognitive mapping' was first used in the psychological 
literature by Tolman (1948) to describe the field map that becomes 
established in a rat's brain while running a maze . Generalizing to 
human beings, Tolman distinguished between 'narrow cognitive maps', 
which lead to aggression, and 'truly comprehensive maps', which result 
in rational behavior (p. 208). 
Twenty five years later the term was used by Shapiro and Bonham 
(1973), and Axelrod (1976) to denote a pictorial representation, 
consisting of points (nodes) and arrows (links), of a person's political 
beliefs and values: 
The concepts a person uses are represented as points, and the causal links between the 
concepts are represented as arrows between these points. This gives a pictorial 
representation of the causal assertions of a person as a graph of points and arrows. This 
kind of representation of assertions as a graph will be called a cognitive map . The policy 
alternatives, all of the various causes and effects, the goals and the ultimate utility of the 
decision-maker can all be thought of as concept variables, and represented as points in 
the cognitive map (Axelrod, 1976, p. 5). 
Small cogmt1ve maps, such as the one shown in Figure 1, can be 
drawn by hand, and, with a little practice, the direct and indirect 
connections of any single concept to other concepts in a cognitive map 
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Fig. 1. 
can be calculated in one's head. For example, in Figure 1, Concept 7 
has a positive effect on Concept 11, because the path between the two 
concepts has an even number of negative arrows, while Concept 4 has 
a negative effect on Concept 11, because its path contains an odd 
number of negative arrows. For large cognitive maps, however, the 
calculations are more easily performed by a computer. First, a hand-
drawn cognitive map is converted into a valency matrix, V, a square 
matrix of size n x n, where n is the total number of concepts in the 
corresponding cognitive map (see example in Figure 2). From the 
valency matrix, the computer can construct a reachability matrix , 
computed as R = V + V 2 + V 3 + vn - i, since the longest possible path 
in a cognitive map with n concepts is of length n - 1. The reachability 
matrix for the cognitive map shown in Figure 1, is displayed in Figure 
3. A nonzero entry in this matrix shows the concepts that are 
connected, either directly or indirectly, to other concepts in the 
cognitive map. From the reachability matrix, it is easy to see the 
overall structure of the whole set of beliefs and values in the cognitive 
map; for example, a reachability matrix with many non-zero entries 
suggests a relatively complex cognitive system (Levi and Tetlock, 
1980). 
The flexibility of the cognitive mapping approach across different 
levels of abstraction has enabled investigators to apply the approach to 
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Row 
abs. 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IO II sums 
l 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 I 
3 I 0 0 0 I -I 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4 I 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 0 0 l 5 0 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 I 0 0 2 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 
7 0 0 D 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 I 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 I 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 I 
IO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Column 0 0 0 2 2 I 0 I 3 I I 11 
abs. sums 
Fig. 2. 
Row 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 sums 
I 0 0 0 1 I I 0 0 I I 1 6 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 2 
3 0 0 0 I I I 0 0 I I I 6 
4 0 0 0 0 I I 0 0 I l I 5 
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 I I I 4 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I 0 I 3 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 2 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Column 0 0 0 2 3 4 0 I 7 5 8 30 
sums 
Fig. 3. 
a wide variety of policy situations, ranging from the political thinking 
of President Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Sergeev et al. , 1990) 
to juror decision-making (Pennington and Hastie, 1991). Cognitive 
mapping has also been employed to study international negotiation. 
Axelrod (1977), in his research on argumentation in foreign policy 
settings , compared cognitive maps constructed from the 1938 Munich 
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negotiations to deliberations that took place within a single nation . He 
found relatively less disagreement over causal relationships in the 
Munich negotiations than in collegial and bureaucratic groups. 
Bonham et al. (1987), used cognitive mapping to compare two sets of 
negotiations, the 1905 negotiations between Sweden and Norway over 
the dissolution of the Union between these countries , and the discus-
sions at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 over the future of the Saar 
Basin . This research demonstrated the utility of cognitive mapping as 
an organizing device for representing the beliefs and values of the 
negotiators . For example , when an aggregate cognitive map of the 
Saar Basin discussions was analyzed, the shared meanings , as well as 
the conflicting understandings, emerged as well-defined cognitive paths 
(Bonham and Shapiro 1988a) . 
2.3. Assumptions 
Rather than concentrating on structural or organizational effects on 
international negotiation, the cognitive mapping approach focuses on 
the thinking processes of the negotiators. To the extent that other 
kinds and levels of effects on negotiation are involved, their impact is 
assumed to be mediated through their effects on the perceptions and 
interpretations of the negotiators. 
By applying a cognitive mapping approach to international negotia-
tion , one incorporates an epistemological assumption that is the 
dominant view in cognitive psychology today. The assumption is that 
there exists no 'event' or 'situation' that has meaning apart from the 
constitution and interpretation of events and situations by the active 
cognizing of persons. As this assumption applies to international 
negotiation, it implies that no event can become part of the negotiating 
context until a negotiator constitutes the event by selecting out aspects 
of the experiential environment for special attention. This selecting out 
process is therefore to be considered as being as much a part of 
negotiation as is the process of selecting among alternative proposals 
on the negotiating table, which is more familiarly recognized as part of 
negotiation. 
Having assumed that negotiators bring an interpretive framework to 
the table, this approach posits a set of cognitive operations that are 
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presumed to be related to each other both in a particular structure and 
sequence. The details of this 'cognitive process model ' are described 
elsewhere .2 What is important to note in identifying the cognitive 
mapping approach is its empirical base . The approach is more 
empirically based than, for example, a rational choice approach to 
negotiation, for it is built upon what is known about thinking rather 
than on a reconstruction of how one might think if one adhered to 
certain logical rules for processing information. 
The cognitive mapping approach also avoids the limitation inherent 
in rational choice approaches with respect to the problems of what 
information is . To the extent that one cannot find a situation in which 
it is obvious as to what 'information' is , one is not justified in speaking 
about the rationality of the choices involved. Complex negotiations 
such as those involved in arms control and disarmament are clearly 
situations where it is problematic as to what information is relevant. 
The cognitive mapping approach provides an alternative for studying 
negotiating situations where one must include the constitution of the 
situation and thus what valid information is as part of the process. 
2.4. Coding Cognitive Maps 3 
A cognitive map consists of two elements, concepts and causal (or 
quasi-causal) beliefs . Concepts refer to a person's mental images or 
ideas of a class of objects. In the illustration of President Wilson's 
cognitive map, described below (see Figure 4) , 'excessive demands ', 
'impression of injustice', and ' reasons for seeking revenge' , would be 
Excessive demands~ 
Impression of 
Negotiations with ~ 
moderation and equity 
.. 
injustice---+ Reasons for seeking revenge i + 
Discontent 
t+ 
Conflicts 
+ + 
Future wars 
Fig. 4. 
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examples of such mental images. As Axelrod (1976) points out, 
different types of concepts can be represented in a cognitive map: 
They may be continuous variables , such as an amount of something; they may be ordinal 
variables , such as more or less of something, or they may be dichotomous variables, such 
as the existence or non-existence of something (p. 59). 
The other basic element in a cognitive map is the causal belief - a 
presumed causal or quasi-causal linkage between two concepts. Beliefs 
reflect both the congealed experiences of a person and his or her 
expectations about the future environment. In a cognitive map causal 
or quasi-causal beliefs are represented as signed arrows, with the tail of 
the arrow denoting the 'cause' and the head of the arrow the 'effect '. 
The signs on the arrows identify the nature of the causal relationship; a 
positive sign indicates that a concept is perceived to increase or 
promote another concept , while a negative sign is used to represent an 
inverse relationship. Taken together, the concepts and causal linkages 
between concepts form the cognitive map . 
Cognitive maps can be coded directly from a text of a document, 
speech, interview, or transcript of a meeting. The process begins by 
marking the text with circles and arrows to identify the concepts and 
links between them that are expressed by the author. Some of the 
linkages are easy to find , while others must be inferred from the 
context and structure of the argument. A plus sign + can be used to 
indicate a positive relationship (increases , promotes, leads to, contri-
butes to, a condition of, etc.) , and a minus sign ( - ) to indicate a 
negative relationship (decreases, detracts , diminishes , does not depend 
on , etc.) . 
After the text has been coded, the next step is to begin drawing the 
cognitive map. As a convention, concepts which refer to proposals or 
policy options are placed on the left-hand side of the map , while 
concepts that denote goals or values are placed on the right-hand side. 
In general , arrows should move across the page from left to right; that 
is, from proposals to values. Experience shows that it is advantageous 
to position the most central concepts in the middle of the map , if 
possible , and the least central and most unconnected concepts on the 
edge of the map. The arrows can be tagged with information about the 
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author and the position in the text and / or transcript. If the resulting 
cognitive map is small , that is , consists of fewer than 25 or 30 concepts 
(typical of a five-page text) , it can be analyzed directly by the use of 
paper and pencil. Larger maps are more efficiently analyzed by 
computer, after conversion to an adjacency matrix (see above) . 
The presence of cycles in a cognitive map may create problems for 
the analyst. A cycle is a path that has an arrow from the last point to 
its first point (Axelrod , 1976, p. 66) . In Figure 1, for example , a cycle 
could be created by adding an arrow from Concept 6 to Concept 1. If 
the arrow is positive, it is no problem, because it simply amplifies the 
initial concept. On the other hand , an arrow with a negative sign 
would counteract the initial concept. As a general rule, a cycle with 
positive arrows or an even number of negative signs is deviation-
amplifying, and a cycle with an odd number of negative signs is 
deviation-counteracting (Axelrod , 1976, pp . 67-68). 
Cycles are interesting because they either reinforce or neutralize 
perceived relationships between concepts, depending on the sign of the 
cycle . In the absence of other information, such as a reference by the 
author to time , cycles can be handled by chunking them to create more 
abstract constructs that describe the underlying relationship (Cutter , 
1982, p. 96). Alternatively , the cycle can be represented as a separate 
submap that can be isolated for further analysis. 
2.5. Outputs 
The analysis of a cognitive map is straightforward, regardless of 
whether it is hand-drawn or has been machine-processed. Maps of 
individual political actors can easily be examined to determine the 
most and least central concepts , their explanation of a problem in 
terms of root causes and future consequences , their use of evidence , 
such as historical analogies to support arguments , internal consistency , 
and perceived consequences of various policy options or proposals. 
Examples of such outputs can be found in a case study of a 'foreign 
policy advisor' who participated in a gaming exercise on the Middle 
East (Bonham and Shapiro, 1976b) . The cognitive map , which was 
coded by the authors from a transcript of the discussions in the gaming 
exercise, consisted of 73 concepts and 115 arrows for the foreign policy 
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advisor. Inspection of the hand-drawn map reveals that three concepts 
are very central to the advisor's beliefs about the Middle East: 
'Friendly relations between Arabs and the United States', 'moderate 
Arab regimes', and 'stability in the Middle East' (pp. 126-27). 
Centrality can be determined by counting the number of arrows 
(perceived 'causes' and 'effects' of a concept) coming into and leading 
from each point in the cognitive map. 
The explanation of a problem in a cognitive map consists of all paths 
leading to a concept (or concepts) that describes the problem, the 
antecedents, as well as all paths leading from that concept, the 
consequences. In the case of the foreign policy specialist, 'Syria's 
intervention in Jordan' had its roots in 'the occupation of Arab 
territory by Israel', and 'alienation of the Arabs from the United 
States', while the consequences of the crisis would likely be 'instability' 
and 'increased Soviet presence in the region' (pp. 129-135). The 
evidence for this explanation, which was also tagged on the arrows of 
the cognitive map, consisted largely of the foreign policy specialist's 
analysis of events surrounding the 1967 war in the Middle East (p. 
130). Furthermore, in this cognitive map, like most maps of in-
dividuals, the explanation was 'balanced', that is, there were no 
internal inconsistencies (Axelrod 1976, p. 90). 
Inspection of a cognitive map also enables the analyst to determine, 
with respect to an individual's explanation of a problem, the impact of 
various policy proposals or options on his or her policy goals. Such 
calculations can be made using either a hand-drawn cognitive map or 
by a computer-generated reachability matrix. In the case of the foreign 
policy specialist who participated in the Middle East gaming exercise, a 
package deal of two proposals, 'reassuring the Arabs that the United 
States is not hostile to them' and 'convincing the Israelis that their 
security cannot be achieved by occupation', emerged as the most 
preferred policy options, while 'the use of U.S. military forces' was the 
least preferred option (pp. 135-137). 
The thinking of collectives, such as small groups, can also be 
represented in a cognitive map. One way to study a collective is simply 
to combine the cognitive maps of individuals into one large cognitive 
map. An alternative to a mechanical combination of beliefs is to 'let 
the collectivity speak for itself' and code the documents that are 
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produced by collectives such as committees (Axelrod, 1976, p. 239-
243). Both approaches were used in a study of 23 oil policy decision-
makers in Norway . Oil policy officials were interviewed to produce 
individual cognitive maps. The individual maps were aggregated to 
form a collective cognitive map consisting of 175 unique concepts and 
1065 perceived causal relationships . This aggregate map was analyzed 
and compared to a parliamentary debate in Norway on a proposal to 
extract oil in a northern region of the country (Shapiro et al ., 1988) . 
In a follow-up study, a sample of policy makers participated in an oil 
policy gaming exercise, and the resulting game transcript was coded 
and analyzed to study collective decision-making processes , including 
the argumentation and policy choice of high-level officials (Bonham et 
al . , 1988b) . In the cognitive map of a group or committee , the focus of 
the analysis becomes the conflicting viewpoints of the members , and 
the resolution of such conflicts "through interpersonal interaction 
which establishes predominant discursive practices or 'explanations' of 
the situation prior to the selection of policy choices" (Shapiro et al., 
1988, p. 401). In the study of Norwegian oil policy that was based on 
an aggregation of individual cognitive maps, there were 30 instances of 
'direct' conflict; that is, where individuals disagreed about the sign of 
an arrow , and over 300 instances of 'indirect' conflict that involved 
more than two concepts and longer chains of reasoning (Shapiro et al. , 
1988, p. 417). For the study that used the game transcript as a 
collective document , 24 .6% of the explanatory paths were incongruent 
with other paths (Bonham et al., 1988b, p. 406). In such instances of 
cognitive conflict, the analyst can examine how the collective attempt-
ed to resolve its differences and come to an agreement. In the study 
based on the aggregated cognitive map, the conflict was resolved by a 
vote of 76 to 26 in the Norwegian Starting (Parliament), while the 
game participants were unable to reach a consensus. 
Regardless of the type of cognitive map (individual, aggregate , or 
collective) , the technique is valuable for studying changes in beliefs 
and argumentation over time. Two studies have made use of actual 
events to observe adjustments that policy officials make in their 
thinking to accommodate new information . In one study , oil policy 
officials were interviewed before and after an oil pollution accident. 
An analysis of the cognitive maps showed that the environmentalists in 
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the sample became much less sanguine about the consequences of oil 
pollution accidents, and argued for stronger anti-pollution measures, 
while the other officials viewed the consequences of oil pollution much 
the same way as they did before the accident (Bonham et al., 1978). 
The other research that compared cognitive maps of individuals over 
time was conducted before and after the 1973 war in the Middle East. 
A comparison of pre-war and post-war cognitive maps of U.S. officials 
from the State Department, National Security Council, and Depart-
ment of Defense, showed almost no restructuring of beliefs as a result 
of the conflict. The 1973 war reinforced the views of some officials 
while it led others to perceive certain concepts as having a negative 
rather than positive effect on their values (Bonham et al., 1979). 
3. USES OF COGNITIVE MAPPING BY NEGOTIATORS 
3.1. A Substance-Focused Tool 
Although cognitive mapping has not been used extensively to repre-
sent knowledge about policy issues, the technique has been applied 
and tested in a wide range of policy areas (Bonham et al., 1986a). 
These studies suggest that cognitive mapping is a powerful way to 
represent and integrate information of a causal or quasi-causal nature. 
Unlike many artificial intelligence approaches to knowledge repre-
sentation, cognitive mapping assumes that language is constitutive of 
knowledge rather than simply a transparent medium for representing it 
(see Assumptions). From this perspective 'knowledge representation' 
becomes more than merely finding the appropriate language within 
which to capture the inference process for speaking with semantic and 
syntactic exactitude about causation. It involves, rather, the develop-
ment of a system for legitimating appropriate questions which are 
always presupposed within any problematic, that can give rise to an 
explanatory account. Cognitive mapping distinguishes itself precisely in 
this area because it is oriented toward the problem of what frame of 
reference is appropriate to understanding a given situation (Shapiro et 
al., 1988). 
To use cognitive mapping as a tool for representing and integrating 
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substantive knowledge about an issue being debated in an international 
forum , negotiators and their staffs would collect information, either in 
the form of published literature or interviews with experts, and code 
the material into cognitive maps. Because this task is quite time-
consuming , it would, most likely, have to be done at the pre-negotia-
tion stage . Individual cognitive maps, which reflect the knowledge 
contained in a specific journal article , book chapter, or expert 
interview, would be aggregated into a single large cognitive map for 
each issue area , following the procedure for aggregating maps that was 
utilized in the oil policy study (Shapiro et al., 1988) . Before achieving a 
synthesis of knowledge about an issue area , the concepts in the map 
would be checked for synonyms, and it might be necessary to redefine 
local and global terms into structurally equivalent constructs. Finally , 
the causal or quasi-causal linkages would be analyzed for instances of 
conflicting knowledge, and the conflicts would have to be resolved, 
perhaps by further research or the use of expert panels. The resulting 
cognitive map can be treated by negotiators as a structural representa-
tion of knowledge within a particular issue area in the form of concepts 
and causal relationships between concepts. 
To test the feasibility of using cognitive mapping to represent 
knowledge about an international problem area , the technique out-
lined above was applied to the negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force 
Reduction (MBFR), which were conducted in Vienna in the 1970s. As 
a step toward the achievement of an integrated conceptual framework 
for the MBFR talks, Guetzkow (1978) constructed a cognitive map of 
the major issues based on information supplied by the MBFR Task 
Force. This cognitive map was enriched by integrating it with concepts 
and propositions from the international relations literature , particular-
ly the literature on fear and trust. 
The MBFR exercise illustrates the feasibility and promise of cogni-
tive mapping as a technique for representing knowledge about an issue 
domain at the pre-negotiation stage . This use of the technique , 
however, depends upon the availability of a comprehensive and 
systematic collection of documentary material and the efforts of 
negotiators and staff members to code the information and create an 
integrated cognitive map that can be used in the actual negotiations . 
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3.2. A Process-Focused Tool 
Cognitive mapping can also be used to great advantage as a process-
focused tool to promote the convergence of perspective and the 
achievement of agreement in international negotiation. At the pre-
negotiation stage, negotiators can use the technique to map out their 
own assumptions and explore perceived effects of various proposals on 
their policy goals. Other applications of the technique can also be 
useful at this stage. The statements of other parties to the negotiation 
can also be mapped and analyzed to anticipate their arguments and 
proposals. On the basis of this analysis, counter-arguments and 
alternative proposals might be prepared. 
Once the negotiations have begun , negotiators can promote conver-
gence by mapping the statements and positions taken around the table. 
Here, simple hand-drawn maps, which do not require machine pro-
cessing, would help to pinpoint areas of conflict, not only with respect 
to policy goals , but also the underlying assumptions that lie behind the 
argumentation. Compared over time during the course of the negotia-
tions , hand-drawn cognitive maps might enable negotiators to de-
termine areas of convergence and the underlying conceptual structure 
that supports the convergence . 
The utility of cognitive mapping as a tool for helping to promote 
convergence and agreement in negotiation is demonstrated in a study 
of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference (Bonham et al., 1991a). Using the 
transcripts from the conference, aggregate cognitive maps for the Big 
Four were constructed and compared over time for the negotiations 
over the Saar Basin. These maps were analyzed to describe how 
Wilson , Lloyd-George , Clemenceau, and Orlando developed a shared 
understanding of the problem and arrived at an agreement on the 
future of the region. 
Cognitive maps of the initial discussions over the Saar Basin 
revealed major differences between the negotiators over the future of 
Germany. For example , in a meeting between President Wilson, Mr. 
Lloyd-George , and M. Clemenceau in Paris on 27 March 1919, Wilson 
argued that moderation should be shown toward Germany. Wilson's 
cognitive map begins with the concept , 'excessive demands' , and is 
linked to other concepts by causal connections, which can be repre-
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sented by the signed arrows (see Figure 4 ). According to Wilson's 
reasoning, excessive demands create the impression of injustice, thus 
fermenting discontent among the German people and providing 
Germany with reasons for seeking revenge. Discontent leads to conflict 
and sows the seeds of future war. Wilson argued that these con-
sequences can be avoided by 'negotiation with moderation and equity', 
a concept that reduces the impression of injustice. 
M. Clemenceau's reply produces a reality that differs from that of 
Wilson's by using a national character discourse to explain the 
behavior of Germany (see Figure 5). The 'German spirit' creates the 
desire to impose force on others and leads to aggression . This can be 
avoided , according to Clemenceau, by imposing sanctions on Germany 
to assure the fruits of victory. 
As the process of negotiation unfolded , its degree of success seemed 
to be related to the degree to which negotiators constructed shared 
cognitive maps, which amounted to their building of a shared 'reality' .4 
More specifically, as each proposal was offered, there occurred a 
within-nation information processing in which the proposal is first 
connotatively amplified and then valued within the receiving nation's 
cognitive map . If not, it was followed by a counter proposal. More-
over, as the negotiation proceeded, each proposal offered was selected 
not only to the extent that it spoke to the goals of the nation making 
the proposal, but also because it had some chance within the JOmt 
cognitive map, i.e., it was intelligible and coherent within each 
negotiator's cognitive map . 
For example, in the 1919 negotiations when Wilson proposed his 
idea of justice as the avoidance of 'excessive demands ' on Germany, 
Clemenceau proposed, instead, multiple interpretations of 'justice'. He 
argued that " what we regard as just here in this room will not 
necessarily be accepted as such by the Germans ," and he offered some 
evidence for differentiation of the term: "Note that no one in 
German 
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------< ..... of victory 
Fig. 5. 
270 G. MATTHEW BONHAM 
Germany draws a distinction between just and unjust demands of the 
Allies. " Later, in an attempt to build support for his position, he 
proposed another concept of justice: 
There is a sense of injustice as between allies which must be satisfied. If this feeling were 
violently thwarted , either in France or in England, grave danger might follow. Clemency 
toward the conquered is good; but let us not lose sight of the victors. 
By introducing a new notion of justice and playing on the fears of 
'grave danger' (i .e., revolutionary movements) , Clemenceau attempt-
ed to construct a strategy that would evoke a cognitive map he shared 
with Wilson and Lloyd-George. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
While the cognitive mapping is no panacea for negotiators , it repre-
sents an improvement over intuitive analysis, which is often un-
systematic. The output of the approach is concrete and it can therefore 
be applied to specific policy problems. Furthermore, the output is 
congruent with the way in which negotiators themselves use concepts 
and justify policy positions. The approach shows the kind of thinking 
that will take place when negotiators confront a problem, and it traces 
the implications of this thinking for policy choice . 
The cognitive mapping approach also reveals the structure of 
thinking about a problem , a structure which is often much less complex 
than practitioners realize . It shows which factors actually have an 
impact on judgement and singles out these factors which are relatively 
unimportant. Through the use of cognitive maps , either hand-drawn or 
machine-processed , negotiators might be able to construct richer , 
much complex cognitive structures as well as alternative ways of 
looking at a problem. In short , the cognitive mapping approach is 
flexible over a range of issue areas , and it is a heuristic device which 
can also be used to help promote negotiated agreements. 
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NOTES 
1 For a recent review of social psychological approaches to the study of foreign policy 
decision-making, see Yertzberger (1990) . 
2 See Bonham et al. (1976a) , Bonham and Shapiro (1986) , and Shapiro et al. (1988). 
3 Coding procedures for inferring and constructing cognitive maps can be found in 
Axelrod (1976), Bonham and Shapiro (1986b), and Ackerman et al. (1990). 
4 Although this proposition has not been tested , experimentally , it is suggested by the 
study of the 1919 negotiations , as well as Bonham et al. (1987) , Bonham et al. (1988b) 
and Bonham et al. (199lb). 
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DHANESH K. SAMARASAN 
ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND THE MANAGEMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
ABSTRACT. Negotiation management , a framework for practical implementation of 
computer-based support to negotiators and their staffs , is defined and described in this 
paper. In particular , three integrated tools and their underlying methodologies, are 
illustrated. The collaborative use of computers and information techniques in complex 
negotiation is framed in terms of a 'discovery and design ' paradigm in which parties 
engage in dialogue, learn, and develop trust that can support the negotiation itself 
through a process of joint analysis and modeling. 
Keywords: Negotiation modeling, simulation, fairness, consensus rules , statistical 
analysis , information systems. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
It has been observed that much work has been done to develop 
analytical techniques that can describe and explain processes of 
international negotiation after the fact, but that far less is known about 
how these techniques can be used to aid negotiators during their 
negotiations . There are good reasons for practitioners' reticence when 
it comes to the adoption of analytical methodologies as tools in 
negotiation, and the usually concomitant requirement that computers 
be used only makes matters worse. The reasons for practitioner's lack 
of enthusiasm are many (Nyhart and Samarasan, 1990) and include: 
1. a perception that the costs of adoption - financial and otherwise -
outweigh the expected benefits; 
2. a distrust of the proffered tools , founded, ironically, on the 
readiness of other parties to use them; and 
3. a lack of ownership over the tools, which leads to rejection on 
grounds that models and mathematics are not relevant to the 
negotiation process. 
Each of these factors can usually be traced to failure of the meth-
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odologist/ consultant to discover and communicate the benefits of 
analytical tools in a rigorous and convincing manner; a failure to 
present the joint use of tools as a simultaneous opportunity for all sides 
in a negotiation; and a failure to emphasize that analytical tools and 
computerized calculations are not meant primarily to predict or 
guarantee success but to enhance communication and the sharing of 
information in the intensely human process that is negotiation. 
1. NEGOTIATION MANAGEMENT 
Recent writers have approached the effective application of computer 
models in negotiation and group decision-making on three fronts: 
1. general principles (Shakun, 1981; Straus and Bazerman, 1985; 
Straus, 1986; Samarasan, 1986); 
2. specific computer methods and system architectures (Steeb and 
Johnston, 1981; Ezrol, 1987; Goltner, 1987; Stefik et al., 1987; 
Goltner, 1988; Roe, 1988; Samarasan, 1988); and 
3. practical guidelines for the use of specific modeling tools in 
particular negotiation contexts (Raker, 1987; Lando and Tong, 
1988; Lee, 1988, Nyhart and Samarasan, 1988; Samarasan and 
Messina, 1988). 
All three of these elements - principles, tools, and practical 
guidelines - are included in negotiation management, an emerging 
framework that emphasizes the important role of information and 
knowledge as resources in negotiation (Nyhart and Samarasan, 1989; 
Samarasan, 1987). 
Negotiation management is a framework built around the use of 
generic software, designed to aid the processes of collaborative group 
decision-making in complex multi-party, multi-issue negotiation. By 
complex negotiation, I refer particularly to those where: 
1. the points of dispute are technical and involve a high degree of 
uncertainty: 
2. practical experimentation with solutions is too expensive or risky; 
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3. there is no unquestioned authority to whom the disputing parties all 
defer; and 
4. prompt resolution and a return to friendly, or at least stable , 
relations are desired. 
'Complex negotiations' are usually negotiations among several parties 
about numerous issues . The issues may be independent, but more 
commonly they are naturally coupled. They are ' technical' in the sense 
that they spring from specialized scientific or technological con-
troversy . Contemporary examples of technical problems in internation-
al negotiation include arms reduction, the economic effect of restric-
tive tariffs and quotas , and the resolution of long-standing regional 
conflicts . When proposals are made in these negotiations , they cannot 
be tested clinically , and structural problems due to incomplete or 
inaccurate knowledge cannot be exposed immediately . When there is 
no obvious and constructive settlement, the absence of an unques-
tioned authority forces the parties to negotiate under uncertainty. And 
in most of these cases, prompt resolution is rare. The typical alterna-
tives to negotiation are usually costly, lead to extended stalemate, and 
can be disastrous in the long run . 
There are, of course, countless analytical methodologies on which 
one could base the design and development of tools for negotiators , 
including (Samarasan , 1988) : 
1. dynamic simulation of the process of negotiation; 
2. dynamic simulation of the substance under negotiation ; 
3. analysis of similar precedential disputes and negotiations; 
4. risk and decision analysis; 
5. utility analysis; and 
6. expert systems. 
The following section elaborates on three negot1at1on tools that are 
based on practical utility and experience more so than on theoretical 
analysis. The three tools are: 
1. SAM: a modeling tool designed to simulate the effect of various 
group decision-making norms in the process of negotiation; 
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2. ISES: an integrated simulation and evaluation system with which 
negotiators can assess the appropriateness of relative acceptability 
of incoming and outgoing settlement proposals; and 
3. MATCH: a tool designed to help negotiators identify effective 
settlement strategies based on the analysis of precedent conflicts 
and negotiations. 
These tools illustrate the kinds of capabilities that are important in the 
management of complex international negotiation. 
2. TOOLS FOR NEGOTIATION MANAGEMENT 
2.1. SAM: Simulating the Process of Negotiation 
The synthesis of an agreement - the design and creation of a mutually 
acceptable solution through negotiation - appears to be at least as 
important and difficult a process as the analysis that helps parties shape 
their bargaining tactics and competitive strategies . One way of improv-
ing the chances that an agreement can be synthesized is to provide 
negotiators with a tool to simulate the effect of decision-making norms 
that govern the process of negotiation . In particular , the norm of 
fairness is powerful and of almost universal interest. 
SAM is a computer program - actually , a suite of programs - that 
enables parties to design, simulate , and select fair negotiation and 
group decision-making processes (Samarasan , 1986; 1988; 1989; 1990a; 
Nyhart and Samarasan, 1989). The use of SAM encourages parties to 
explore diverse conceptions or norms of fairness in negotiation . An 
idealized vision of this process of exploration is as follows : 
1. parties begin by each voicing their own conceptions or norms of 
fairness ; 
2. they then jointly build SAM models of these various norms: 
3. the parties run each SAM model, thus simulating each of the 
modeled norms for group decision-making; 
4. as different agreements emerge, the parties evaluate each one on 
the basis of its substantive impact on its interests. 
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5. finally, by iterating through the procedure, the parties jointly arrive 
at a mutually acceptable definition of a fair decision-making 
procedure whose substantive outcome is also acceptable. 
At first glance, the idea may appear somewhat peculiar. On reflection, 
however, one sees that it is consistent with the need, in negotiation, to 
agree first on principles and group norms for decision-making before 
embarking on an emotionally charged bargaining process. Further-
more, it builds on a long tradition of applied mathematics in 
economics , political science, cognitive science, and general systems 
theory. Finally, I note that it offers a mechanism through which 
negotiators can synthesize process-related analysis with subject-specific 
assessment of alternate substantive options that might resolve the 
conflict they are negotiating. 
To illustrate the use of SAM, consider the so-called 'rule of 
consensus'. This rule states that negotiation among n parties can only 
be settled when all have agreed to one solution. In other words , 
forcing a minority to capitulate is unfair. Next , consider a group of n 
negotiators wondering how to settle fairly on some unknown X *, the 
numerical level at which a particular issue is to be ultimately settled . 
Assumed that X * is defined on some closed interval (Xmin ' Xmin] 
which, by prior agreement, contains all conceivable settlements. Given 
a set of individual preferences p,, , a set of individual upper bounds on 
offers, U,,, and a set of individual lower bounds on offers, L 11 , one 
party might argue in purely utilitarian grounds that the fairest consen-
sus is the one which minimizes total group compromise, D. The 
imperative mathematical representation of this statement is: 
(1) Minimize n =!(IP; - X *I) such that L; ~ X* ~ U; 
for all i ~ n 
If no solution exists to this optimization problem , all n parties would 
have to reconsider their inputs P11 , U,,, and L,, and then restart the 
process. If there is exactly one solution, then it is trivially the 'fairest' 
solution. But if more than one solution exists - in other words, if 
distinct values of X* result in the same value for f2 - then there is a 
positive and meaningful bargaining range. The choice of an ultimate 
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settlement from among the possibilities within this range, if it is still to 
be made on equitable terms , requires further analysis . 
In order to further pursue fair solutions, the parties must probe 
deeper into what they each mean by fairness. For example , one party 
might argue that negotiators ought to be rewarded for being flexible. 
This assumption could be represented in Equation 2 by setting K; 
directly proportional to flexibility , which might be defined as (U; - L;): 
(2) Minimize n = X(K;IP; - X *I) such that L; ~ X * ~ U; 
for all i ~ n 
In this case , K; could be understood as a simple weight applied to the 
opinion or preference of party i. Alternatively, K; could be set to 
increase non-linearly with MIN [(U; - P;), (P; - L;)]. This slightly 
more cynical condition implies that each negotiator values another's 
flexibility more when it is symmetric about a preference point than 
when it is skewed, because the symmetric form is less obviously 
self-serving or manipulative . 
To take yet another example , one could argue that the fairest 
consensus settlement is one in which no party achieves its preferred 
level unless all parties do . Thus , another condition would be added to 
Equation 2: X * =I= P; for all i ~ n , unless P; = C for all i ~ n , where C is 
some constant. Notice that these and other additional conditions can 
be added to the list of constraints in Equation 2 according to ordinary 
rules of logic. Properly formulated , each condition implies a group 
decision-making rule or norm . When these rules or norms are weighted 
and combined , the resulting set of constraints on solutions can be 
called a 'constitution' or , more grandly a 'social contract'. The former 
usage borrows from Arrow , and the latter from Rawls (1971) and 
thereby from Rousseau. 
The 'consensus' example discussed above shows how and why one 
might translate given intuitive conceptions of fairness into mathemati-
cal models that are neither exclusively descriptive nor exclusively 
prescriptive. SAM enables negotiators to build models of this kind. 
The benefits of doing so are at least four-fold: 
1. the intuitive basis for each suggested norm is made explicit and can 
then be communicated and shared; 
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2. norms can be combined in various ways to form 'constitutions'; 
3. the power of the computer can then be used to simulate multi-
party , multi-issue decision-making norms; and 
4. possibly , new principles or mutually acceptable norms can be 
discovered or developed. 
Assuming that a fair negotiation process is more acceptable to parties 
than an unfair one, all of these benefits are consistent with a view of 
negotiation in which it is considered more effective if, among other 
things , each party perceives that the particular process of group 
decision-making is acceptable. 
A slightly different use of SAM is in planning for negotiation. A 
negotiator or neutral mediator might use a comprehensive process 
simulation model to predict the course of on-going or future negotia-
tions or, more usefully , to synthesize multi-dimensional settlement 
proposals that are designed to appeal to as many negotiating counter-
parts as possible. Yet another use of SAM is not directly in negotiation 
management but in research and theory-building. By fine-tuning a 
SAM process simulation model with empirical data, it is possible to 
specify and develop analytical models of negotiation that have obvious 
and intuitive correspondence to real-world negotiation phenomena , 
even when these phenomena involve subjective factors not susceptible 
to other modeling methodologies. 
2.2. !SES: Integrated Simulation and Evaluation 
ISES is a program that facilitates the evaluation of complex settlement 
proposals ; to date, the program has been developed in the context of 
arms control negotiations (Goltner, 1988), but I choose to describe it 
here in the context of a different East-West interaction: the negotia-
tion of a Western-Russian industrial joint venture. 
This program combines a particular simulation model (or set of 
simulation models) and a rule-based evaluation procedure in an 
integrated , multi-user system. Parties exchange proposals, usually in 
the form of long and complicated sets of parameters stored and 
transferred electronically. The consequences of an agreement based on 
each of these proposals is determined through the use of the simulation 
model. Then , the evaluation system helps in flagging those proposals 
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that need special attention because they (or their consequences) fail to 
meet certain criteria pre-specified by the parties. 
In the context of Western-Russian joint venture negotiations , ISES 
could be used to help negotiators evaluate the terms of proposed 
contracts in light of their interests. For example, consider a joint 
venture that will manufacture three different products out of seven 
produced elsewhere by the prospective Western partner. The Russian 
side might have an interest in modernizing the industrial base by 
obtaining access to advanced Western technology and management 
skills . This interest can be analyzed and formulated in terms of an 
equivalent rule , so that the underlying interest would be satisfied if, 
say, the proposed venture were to be such that, within five years, it 
could produce A , B and C; or could produce , within eight years, M 
units per year of B and N units per year of G , etc . Each part of the 
rule can be tested in a simulation model and the underlying interest 
checked in ISES. 
The use of ISES helps negotiators to show clearly how their 
negotiating positions and underlying interests are related. The pro-
gram's evaluation section requires users to be explicit about their 
interests . In order to use the evaluation feature, users have to specify 
various tests and rules. Tests are formulated in terms of comparisons 
among the many variables being negotiated or discussed: some of these 
variables may take on values that are assigned in the associated 
simulations . Rules then combine these tests as necessary to define 
broader interests . As settlement proposals are exchanged, the system 
automatically checks each proposal to see if these rules are violated. 
2.3. MATCH: Analysis of Precedent Cases 
Parties in a negotiation can use the computer to help them learn from 
precedent. For example , a negotiator might obtain answers to the 
following kinds of questions: 
1. what cases are similar to a given case? 
2. what is the probability that a given case can or will be settled? 
3. what is the probability that a given case will be settled within some 
period? 
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4. what is the probability that a given case will be settled for less than 
some value? 
5. what is the expected lifetime and cost of settling a given case? 
6. what tactics have other negotiators tried in similar cases and with 
what result? 
7. what is the expected result of using a given tactic in a given case? 
8. how often is a given tactic associated with a given result in similar 
cases? 
The computer can aid in the generation of descriptive statistical reports 
about prior cases , the calculation of probabilities of future events , and 
possibly in the modeling of the future progress of the current case , 
taking into account subjective estimates of the reliability and relative 
importance of the data (see Druckman, in this issue) . 
Negotiators can use statistical estimates to identify expedient courses 
of action as they plan their negotiating strategies. Once a set of cases 
has been identified that is similar in some relevant sense to the case at 
hand , negotiators might be able to estimate the likelihood that a 
particular action or decision will lead to a desired result. In political , 
military , and para-military conflicts, for example , negotiators and 
decision-makers have found it useful to know whether a particular 
proposal for action - whether conciliatory or belligerent - will lead the 
conflict towards or away from resolution . Bloomfield and Beattie 
(1971), for example, describe a program called CASCON, designed to 
aid in the resolution of small wars and local conflicts: before the 
program can be used , a standardized series of questions about a large 
number of similar conflictual situations is formulated to elicit informa-
tion from experts; this information is stored in a knowledge base ; users 
specify their particular conflict using some or all of the attributes coded 
for in the knowledge base ; the program locates those cases that are 
most similar to the one at hand and present them together with some 
analysis. The imputation of strategic value to summaries of similar 
cases is based on the prescriptive interpretation that steps identified as 
having been correlated with preferred outcomes in the past will, if 
taken in the current case, again lead to similar preferred outcomes. 
MATCH is a computer program designed to help negotiators and 
third parties understand the history and potential course of a negotia-
284 DHANESH K . SAMARASAN 
tion and to develop a strategy for resolving it (Samarasan , 1989; 
1990a). The use of MATCH depends on the existence of a data base 
containing information about similar cases: the program provides the 
user with a customized window into the data base. The program itself 
is generic, and consists only of (i) a set of matching algorithms, (ii) 
data types and file formats that specify an input I output mechanism, 
and (iii) a user interface. All context-specific information is stored in 
frame models, which are separate documents built with MATCH. 
Results of a match are of two kinds : (i) a MATCH set , or list of 
matching cases selected from the data base , and (ii) MATCH statistics , 
or summary information in the form of pertinent expected values and 
probabilities. The program leads the user through an interview, asking 
for answers to the specific questions listed in the frame, and building a 
profile of a case. The profile is then compared with entries in the data 
base to generate a MATCH set and MATCH statistics for the user. 
Once a MATCH set is obtained , several statistics can be derived 
from it , including: 
1. the probability that a given conflict can or will be settled peacefully 
can be derived by computing the fraction of cases in the MATCH 
set that were in fact settled peacefully ; 
2. the probability that a given conflict will be settled within some 
period, or with the expenditure of less than some amount of 
resource , can be derived similarly; and 
3. the expected lifetime and cost of a given case can be computed by 
taking a mean lifetime and cost over all members of the MATCH 
set. 
These and other MATCH statistics provide summary information in 
the form of pertinent expected values and probabilities. 
3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: NEGOTIATION AS 
DISCOVERY AND DESIGN 
Given the panoply of analytical methodologies and computer-based 
tools that are - or can be made - available, I believe that the use of 
computer models in the management of negotiation presents us with 
both a problem and an opportunity. 
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The problem is inherent in the way in which negotiations are often 
conducted. Typically, negotiators presented with computer tools ask 
first how the tools can help improve their own situation without giving 
anything away to others . Given this approach, the use of analysis and 
modeling is perceived to be inadequate because it is quickly co-opted 
into a 'create and claim' framework (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Lewicki 
and Litterer , 1985). In this framework , joint analysis and modeling are 
perceived to be appropriate for the 'create' phase , whereas distributive 
bargaining is seen as somehow more practical in the 'claim' phase. 
Negotiators are supposed to watch carefully the tension between 
creating and claiming value, lest they create value and someone else 
makes off with it. An 'us-and-them' orientation is perceived to be 
necessary, and is built into the framework . 
As long as we take literally the terms of the basic integrative-
distributive paradigm , the use of complex tools can be little more than 
distractions in the effort to resolve complex disputes: parties often 
have too much at stake to gamble on 'creation ' if the other side is 
going to do the 'claiming' . But , approached in a different way, the 
application of analysis and modeling offers us an invaluable oppor-
tunity to transform the processes of complex negotiation. 
An alternative model of complex negotiation - or at least an alterna-
tive metaphor - can be conceived on the basis of the collaborative use 
of computers and other information tools (Samarasan , 1990b). 
Negotiators and facilitator come to the table, each surrounded by a 
private collection of information: assumptions, facts, interests , and 
positions . They are collectively surrounded by even more information 
that is available or retrievable in some sense . Computers and related 
technology can provide them with tools to help them evaluate and 
manipulate the available information. Instead of placing negotiators 
within a framework where their task is to 'create and claim' value , one 
could provide them with tools meant to help them 'discover and 
design ' solutions or agreements. If complex negotiations can be 
reframed in this way , computer-based tools can engage the parties in 
dialogue and help develop trust through a process of joint analysis and 
modeling. 
Analysts use the word 'discovery' to refer primarily to the exposure 
of objective facts about the world through painstaking observation of 
the world . This usage can be modified to include explicitly discovery 
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through introspection and communication. In all but the most simple 
negotiations, the parties discover things - they learn from their interac-
tions with each other - over the course of their interactions, whether or 
not they finally reach an agreement. Discovery can take place when 
negotiators obtain insight into: 
1. other parties' understanding of the agenda and negotiation process; 
2. other parties' preferences; 
3. other parties' understanding of substantive issues; 
4. the interests underlying other parties' preferences; and 
5. their own understanding of underlying substantive and process 
issues. 
Thus, introspection, external observation, and communication are key 
to discovery. 
The notion of 'design' covers, in its broadest sense, any deliberate 
attempt to fill a need or solve a problem. I suggest, however, a more 
specific engineering-oriented sense of the term: the specification and 
production of devices and systems that use available resources in the 
most effective manner possible to satisfy a set of non-independent 
needs or requirements. Elaborating on this· definition, I suggest the 
following nine-phase model of the design process: 
1. identify the client and the need; 
2. define the design problem; 
3. search for relevant information; 
4. formulate criteria and constraints on acceptable solutions; 
5. list alternative solutions; 
6. perform analysis to specify, modify, and evaluate proposed solu-
tions; 
7. make a decision; 
8. formalize the specification of the selected solution; and 
9. communicate the solution to the client. 
Once the design process is reduced to these terms, I believe that it 
serves as a provocative (if not necessarily useful) metaphor for 
negotiation management: analyst as designer and negotiators as 
clients. 
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When negotiation is viewed as a process of discovery and design, the 
interests of all members of the negotiating group are arguably more 
likely to be seen as co-equal by each negotiator - or designer - and 
these interests can be treated as constraints in a joint design problem . 
In design problems, constraints are often weighted, and weighted 
unequally, but they are all acknowledged to be valid- this is, in fact , 
why it is useful to talk about design in our metaphor: it reflects the 
primus inter pares character of an enlightened negotiator. This view of 
negotiation does not simplistically prohibit distributive bargaining, nor 
does it ignore the 'claim' phase of earlier models. It comprehends the 
whole of negotiation. And if there is an 'us' or 'them' in this picture, it 
is less intrusive: the process of 'discover and design' is an inherently 
collaborative one. 
Given this outline of the 'discovery and design' model, it seems 
reasonable to ask about its potential prescriptive aspects. How can this 
model help us better understand and approach effective negotiation? 
Effectiveness is generally measured by the extent to which an objective 
is met. I suggest (i) that the objective of negotiation is to solve a set of 
underlying substantive problems as efficiently as possible while 
maintaining- if not improving - the relationship among the parties; (ii) 
that effective negotiation is characterized by three attributes: legitima-
cy, feasibility, and efficiency; and (iii) that both the process and 
outcome of negotiation can be evaluated in terms of each of these 
three attributes. 
Legitimacy has to do with the parties feeling or perceiving that their 
rights have been respected. Parties have expectations about the 
legitimacy of both the process and outcome of negotiation: relevant 
attributes include fairness and a sense of ownership. By definition, 
legitimacy is a subjective chara~teristic and can only be evaluated by 
the parties themselves. Nevertheless, we believe that the use of 
computer models can contribute to a sense of legitimacy in at least two 
ways . The collaborative use of computer models generally in negotia-
tion involves the parties in a joint learning process. If parties cooperate 
to build models and then use these models to investigate or develop 
settlements , they derive a better idea of each other's needs and a 
greater sense of ownership over the process of negotiation (Clements 
and Sossen, 1987; Kraemer, 1985). Legitimacy also requires that the 
means of arriving at a decision be acceptable to all parties. Fisher and 
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U ry ( 1981) emphasize the importance of agreeing on ground rules for 
negotiation. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) argue that the choice of 
decision process should be made with regard to the concerns and 
attitudes of the parties. When a group can step back from the heat of 
negotiation and focus on process issues, the question of legitimacy can 
more easily be addressed if negotiators have access to a computer 
modeling tool - e.g. SAM - that simulates and thus allows them to 
jointly design and select mutually acceptable negotiation and group 
decision-making rules or norms before they begin negotiation in 
earnest (Samarasan, 1987). 
Feasibility, the second attribute of effective negotiation, is a more 
practical concern, and has to do with the possibility of successful 
implementation. A feasible process is one that usually leads to 
settlement; whereas an infeasible process - using formal voting rules in 
a bilateral arms control negotiation, for example - is one that most 
often leads to stalemate. A feasible outcome or settlement is one that, 
when implemented, solves the underlying substantive problem without 
unravelling. How can the use of computer models contribute to 
feasibility? If negotiators have built valid computer simulation models 
pertaining to the substance of their negotiation, they can perform 
sensitivity analyses to test policies and settlements. Suggestions or 
proposals that do not produce the expected or desired effect when 
tested in the model will probably also fail if actually implemented. The 
negotiator's ability to make a judgment on this matter is what Wheeler 
(1987) refers to as 'prospective hindsight', and it is enhanced by the 
use of appropriately designed analytical tools; the use of both ISES 
and MATCH, for example, improves the chances that an agreement 
will endure over time. Clearly, the parties never actually know 
whether a negotiated outcome is going to turn out to be feasible or 
not, but they can approach feasibility by selecting outcomes that are 
more likely to be feasible. Enhancing negotiation in this way is 
particularly important when scientific or technological uncertainty 
threatens to dominate the agenda. 
Efficiency, the third and final attribute of effective negotiation 
considered here, has to do with reducing waste. A process is efficient if 
it minimizes the transaction cost of negotiation, measured in units of 
cost or time , whereas an outcome is efficient if it approaches Pareto-
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optimality. How can the use of computer models contribute to 
increasing the efficiency of negotiation? In complex negotiations, there 
are multiple sources of technical data that must be considered and 
managed. And because of changing technological and political options, 
many negotiations result in temporary solutions, and become continu-
ous or periodic institutions. Information technologies have the poten-
tial to greatly improve the cost-effectiveness of such negotiations . 
Furthermore, these technologies also make it possible for parties to 
quickly share information about underlying interests and priorities with 
each other and with third parties, steps that Susskind and Cruikshank 
(1987) argue are necessary if Pareto-optimal solutions are to be 
obtained. 
REFERENCES 
Bloomfield , L.P. and Beattie , R.: 1971 , 'Computers and policy-making: The CASCON 
experiment ', Journal of Conflict Resolution 25 , 1. 
Clements , C.M. and Sossen , D.H.: 1987, 'Computer-aided negotiation: The role of 
computer models in resolving offshore resources disputes '. Joint Master's Thesis, 
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management , Massachusetts Institute of Technology , 
Cambridge , MA . 
Ezrol , L.: 1987, 'External system specifications for a workstation-based negotiation 
environment for U.S. - Soviet arms control negotiations' . Bachelor's Thesis , Depart-
ment of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science , Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology , Cambridge , MA. 
Fisher, R. and Ury , R.: 1981 , Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. 
Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
Goltner, C.: 1988, 'ISES: An integrated simulation and evaluation system', Unpublished 
research memorandum , Department of Ocean Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology , Cambridge , MA. 
Goltner, C.: 1987, 'The computer as a third party: A decision support system for 
two-party single-issue and two-party multi-issue negotiations ', Working Paper 1958-
87 , Alfred P. Sloan School of Management , Massachusetts Institute of Technology , 
Cambridge , MA. 
Kraemer , K.L.: 1985 , 'Modeling as negotiating: The political dynamics of computer 
models in policy-making' , Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2. 
Lando, B.Z. and Tong , R.C.-Y.: 1988, 'Computer modeling in negotiation: Joint 
venture and financial applications'. Joint Master's Thesis , Alfred P. Sloan School of 
Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology , Cambridge , MA. 
Lax , D.A . and Sebenius, J .K. : 1986, The Manager as Negotiator. New York: Free Press. 
Lee , B.: 1988, 'Integrative bargaining in international cooperative agreements and 
computer model aids: developing a tool for analysis of cases '. Master's Thesis, Alfred 
290 DHANESH K. SAMARASAN 
P. Sloan School of Management , Massachusetts Institute of Technology , Cambridge , 
MA. 
Lewicki , R.J. and Litterer, J .A. : 1985, Negotiation . Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin. 
Nyhart , J.D. and Samarasan , D .K. : 1990, 'Generic computer tools as aids in negotiation: 
The issue of user adoption ', in Proceedings of the 1990 International System Dynamics 
Conference , Boston (July). 
Nyhart , J.D . and Samarasan , D.K.: 1989, 'The elements of negotiation management : 
Using computers to help resolve conflict', Negotiation Journal (January). 
Nyhart , J .D. and Samarasan, D .K.: 1988, 'Using computer models in international joint 
venture negotiations', Paper presented at the IIASA-IFAP Meeting on Negotiations 
for East-West Joint Ventures , Rome (April) . 
Raker , M.: 1987, 'The application of decision analysis and computer modeling to the 
settlement of complex litigation' . Paper presented at the ILP Symposium on Computer 
Models and Modeling for Negotiation Management , Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology , Cambridge , MA (November) . 
Rawls , J .: 1971, A Theory of Justice . Cambridge , MA: Harvard University Press . 
Roe , S.J.: 1988, 'Quick and dirty modeling systems for computer-aided negotiation: The 
application of state-space modeling to negotiation process and context '. Bachelor's 
Thesis , Department of Mechanical Engineering , Massachusetts Institute of Technolo-
gy , Cambridge , MA. 
Samarasan , D .K.: 1990a, 'Algorithms for use in the analysis of precedent', Working 
Paper 4315- 90-BPS, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management , Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology , Cambridge , MA . 
Samarasan , D.K.: 1990b, 'Negotiation as discovery and design', in Proceedings of the 
1990 International System Dynamics Conference , Boston (July). 
Samarasan , D.K.: 1989, 'MATCH: The use of precedent in negotiation ', Working Paper 
3073-89- BPS, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management , Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology , Cambridge , MA. 
Samarasan, D.K.: 1988, 'Collaborative modeling and negotiation ', in R. Allen (Ed.) , 
Office Information Systems . New York: Association for Computer Machinery-Institute 
for Electrical and Electronic Engineers. 
Samarasan , D.K.: 1987, 'Computer modeling and negotiation management ', Working 
Paper 1957-87, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management , Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology , Cambridge , MA. 
Samarasan , D.K.: 1986, 'Meta-modeling and integrative thinking: Improving the quality 
of negotiation ', Working Paper 1848-86, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management , 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, C~mbridge , MA. 
Samarasan , D.K. and Messina, A.J. : 1988, 'Negotiating US-USSR joint ventures: 
Enlisting computer models as aids in the process ', Working Paper 2089-88 , Alfred P. 
Sloan School of Management , Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge , 
MA. 
Shakun , M.F.: 1981, 'Formalizing conflict resolution in policy-making', International 
Journal of General Systems 7, 3. 
Steeb , R. and Johnston, S.C. : 1981, 'A computer-based interactive system for group 
decision making', IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man , and Cybernetics , SMC-11 (8) , 
544-552 (August). 
Stefik , M.J. , Foster, G ., Bobrow, D ., Kahn , K., Lanning, S. , and Suchman, L.: 1987, 
'Beyond the chalkboard: Computer support for collaboration and problem-solving in 
THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 291 
meetings' , Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 30, 1 
(January). 
Straus , D.B.: 1986, 'Holistic decision-making and modeling in negotiations ', Paper 
presented at the MIT Research Colloquium on Modeling for Negotiation Manage-
ment , Massachusetts Institute of Technology , Cambridge, MA (December). 
Straus , D.B., and Bazerman, M.: 1985 , 'New techniques and cognitions for effective 
dispute resolution', in J.D. Nyhart (Ed.) , Coastal Zone and Continental Shelf Conflict 
Resolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Sea Grant Publications , pp. 85-28. 
Susskind , L. and Cruikshank, E.: 1987, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches 
to Resolving Public Disputes. New York: Basic Books. 
Wheeler, M.: 1987, 'Prospective hindsight', Negotiation Journal 3, 7-10 (January). 
Project on Modeling for 
Negotiation Management, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, MA 02139, U.S.A. 

G. E. KERSTEN 
NEGOTIATION SUPPORT: DEVELOPMENT OF 
REPRESENTATIONS AND REASONING 
ABSTRACT. The general importance of negotiations and bargaining as means of 
decision making has given rise to considerable research within two broad paradigms. The 
behavioral paradigm has attempted to discover rationality in specific situations in order 
to generalize. The formal paradigm has assumed a general rationality which could be 
applied to specific problems. This strict dichotomy imposes unnecessary restrictions on 
the use of formal approaches to structure, represent, and support negotiators. Logic-
based approaches , such as rule-based formalism , make it possible to blend unique and 
specific aspects of a problem, with general reasoning mechanisms and rationality 
postulates. This paper introduces rule-based formalism and discusses its advantages and 
disadvantages. It attempts to present its ability to represent complex decision processes 
and to reason using formal structures. The approach is illustrated with several simple 
examples. 
Keywords: Negotiation modelling, rule-based formalism, logic , expert systems, structur-
ing, knowledge representation, negotiation support. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Toward a Qualitative Framework 
Negotiation is characterized by argumentation, persuasion , and inter-
action involving the comparison of goals and alternatives. These 
activities may cause a change of focus or preferences, shifts in strategy 
or the revision of negotiators beliefs. In many quantitative approaches, 
the arguments, beliefs and interactions disappear into functional 
relationships between goals and alternatives and into the probability 
distribution of the consequences. 
Until recently, formal approaches had focussed exclusively on the 
quantitative aspects of negotiation. Raiffa, in the first comprehensive 
qualitative interpretation of many quantitative aspects, underlined the 
need for formal qualitative analysis. As a scholar in game theory and 
decision theory who was heavily involved in negotiation , Raiffa (1982, 
p. 3) says that in negotiations: 
Theory and Decision 34: 293-311, 1993. 
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The concepts of decision analysis seemed to me much more applicable than those of 
game theory , but not in the way I had taught it. The qualitative framework of thought 
was repeatedly helpful- not its detailed , esoteric, quantitative aspects. 
1.2. Quantitative and Qualitative Modelling 
The quantitative view of human actions has an underlying assumption 
that very different phenomena may be represented in exactly the same 
manner, and thus different problems can be represented with the same 
model and solved with the same procedures. Application of a standard 
procedure to the problem representation produces the solution. The 
focus is then on the choice of a representation and the selection of a 
solution procedure, with the main effort directed toward the applica-
tion of the procedure, that is, on numerical manipulations. 
The qualitative viewpoint assumes that there are families of phe-
nomena which may be different in some specifics but which have 
enough similarities that they can be described with the same generic 
representation. The difference is that in the quantitative approach the 
phenomena are similar if they can be represented with the same 
model. From the qualitative viewpoint similarity is determined by the 
intrinsic meaning of different phenomena and their relationship to a 
concept earlier chosen by the decision maker, or to an established 
generic representation. For example, if the decision maker utilizes a 
concept of fairness then it can be applied equally to a negotiation 
about purchase of a house and in the analysis of trade negotiation 
between two countries. 
An important part of the problem solution process in the qualitative 
approach involves the successive reformulation of the representation 
which becomes more specific and appropriate to the particular prob-
lem. Often, such restructuring involves more effort than the applica-
tion of a solution procedure, which is used not only to determine a 
decision alternative , but also to analyze the appropriateness of the 
representation (Mayer, 1989). Representation and solution are interac-
tive processes and influence one another. A solution procedure may be 
applied to a small portion of a problem to provide information 
required to structure other parts of the problem. The structuring 
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process may even replace the solution process. The problem solution is 
obtained through manipulation of the problem representation such 
that it becomes very specific and from it one solution clearly follows 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976) . 
The basis for a qualitative framework may be found in logic which 
provides a rigorous approach to problem structuring and inference 
mechanisms . In this paper the use of formal logic is applied to the 
structuring of negotiation and determination of valid chains of reason-
ing, that is inference, from the structures obtained. The negotiation 
problem is represented with production rules that are an element of 
production systems (Barr and Feigenbaum , 1981) also referred to as 
rule-based systems (Luger and Stubblefield, 1989) . 
1.3. Modelling and Negotiation Support 
The focus of this paper is on the development of representations and 
making deductions or reasoning. The representations may describe 
human knowledge and expertise and thus, they may be used to provide 
support to problems where deductive inference is appropriate (see 
Andriole in this issue) . The support can be provided for negotiation 
planning to analyze the negotiation situation and the opponents. It can 
be used to simulate the negotiation process and reaction of the 
opponent to different negotiation tactics. The ability to model different 
situations and behaviours makes it suitable for training purposes. 
Knowledge-based support may also be used in on-line interactive 
systems, especially when immediate access to knowledge of many 
experts is often required but difficult to obtain. 
An important area of negotiation support is analysis and verification 
of text. We show that negotiation texts can be represented by rules and 
then manipulated and analyzed from different perspectives. This 
provides a new type of support. Different texts are compared, their 
consistency checked, and conclusions drawn based on available exper-
tise. This feature makes it possible to analyze opponents' responses, 
and compromise proposals in terms of their direct meaning and their 
relevance to the opponent's profile, behavior, or tactics. 
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2. RULE-BASED SYSTEMS 
2.1. Knowledge 
Predicate calculus provides the basis for the rule-based representation 
of knowledge and problem structuring, and allows reasoning to be 
performed on the developed structures. Production rules are of the 
form IF (action / antecedent) THEN (reaction / consequent) often de-
noted as 'act ion-? react ion'. Production rules are used to repre-
sent knowledge and a set of rules describing a particul_ar domain, type 
of problem or action is referred to as a knowledge base. Consider the 
following discussion about negotiation tactics (Wall, 1985, p. 49): 
Within the rational category lie most of the negotiation tactics , which can be grouped 
into two subcategories: debate and bargaining tactics. Debate tactics are those in which 
the parties engage in discussions, explications , interpretations, syntheses, and proposals 
to decide jointly upon an agreement that is acceptable to both sides. Bargaining tactics , 
in contrast , encompass negotiator (opponent) behaviors that is intended to move , direct, 
or constrain the opponent (negotiator). 
The bargaining tactics can be further divided into aggressive, nonaggressive, and 
posturing tactics. The aggressive tactics include announced intentions to harm the 
opponent if he or she does not engage in the desired behavior (threat tactics) and the 
specific attempts to inflict such harm (coercive tactics). The nonaggressive tactics include 
those that are conciliatory ... (and) those tactics that reward the opponent. 
Wall's knowledge about negotiation tactics formulated in English can 
be represented with eight rules, that is: 
Pl rational tactic or other tactic 
-?negotiation_tactic, 
P2 debate_tactic or bargaining_tactic 
-7 rational_ tac tic, 
P3 joint_decision and engagement_in(Engmnt_ 
Type)-? debate_tactic, 
P4 aggressive_tactic or nonaggressive_tactic 
or pos turing_tactic-7 bargaining_ tac tics, 
PS coercive_tactic or threat_tactics-? 
aggressive_tactic, 
P6 conciliatory_tactic or attempt_to_reward-7 
nonaggressive_tactic 
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P7 announced_intention_to_harm~ coercive 
tactic, 
PS attempts_to_harm~ threat_tactic. 
The above rules represent a hierarchical decomposition of negotiation 
tactics. It may be considered as a classification problem which is to 
determine if a particular action, attempt or tactic is a negotiation 
tactic. The top-down approach to the structuring of this problem can 
be easily seen in its graphical representation as the AND / OR tree 
given in Figure 1. 
At the very top is the principal goal which is called negotiation_ 
tactic. This goal is decomposed into two goals rational_tactic 
and irrational_tactic and to achieve the goal negotiation_ 
tactic , that is to obtain the value true for it, it is sufficient to obtain 
the value true for one of these goals. Then, the goal rational_ 
tactic is decomposed into two goals, and this decomposition is 
continued down to the lowest level which is often called the fact-
1 eve l. The decomposition process is top-down, but the data-driven 
reasoning process is bottom-up. Thus, to prove the top-level goal, facts 
at the bottom must be established. 
An important question is how rules are determined and verified. 
This is the domain of knowledge engineering and it is clearly a 
negotiation_tactic 
~t" 1 t rational_tactic irra iona _tac ic 
~debate_tactic bargaining_tactic 
joint_decision 
~ ~ 
~actic .. 
coercive tactic threat tactic conciliatory_tactic 
/
- - \ attempt to reward 
attempts_to_harm -
announced_intention_to_harm 
Fig. 1. Example of an and / or tree . 
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bottleneck in getting knowledge-based systems to their users. Because 
most human knowledge is not readily accessible and available for 
processing by a computer , it needs to be structured and appropriately 
presented. We presented here one example of how rules can be 
obtained - that is from analysis of texts. A complementary approach is 
to interview domain experts and researchers and present their thinking 
process using, for example , cognitive mapping (see Bonham in this 
issue) . 
Thus, obtained knowledge is fully portable and it can be used 
wherever it is applicable. If knowledge on environmental negotiation 
and possible negotiators' behavior is encoded then this knowledge can 
be used whenever a user conducts such negotiation. It is possible that 
multiple knowledge bases are accessed , for example a knowledge base 
describing international law and its interpretations may be used during 
environmental negotiations . Similarly, large quantitative models can 
be used to simulate possible consequences of compromise proposals 
determined with the use of 'environmental knowledge bases' . These 
consequences are then used to modify proposals and obtain new ones . 
2.2. Reasoning 
When a rule-based representation has been developed we may ask 
questions like : Is a request to make a decision jointly part of a 
negotiation tactic? Is a conciliatory approach a negotiation tactic? 
These questions can be answered by a repeated application of infer-
ence rules. For example , assume that we want to verify if a conciliatory 
approach is a negotiation tactic. We set 
conciliatory_approach: :=true 
(where:: = means ' is' or 'it is') 
and having rule P6 and applying modus ponens we obtain 
nonaggressive_tactic: :=true. 
Now, we can use rule P4 because it has nonaggressive_tactic as 
an antecedent , and by applying modus ponens we obtain 
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bargaining_tactic:: =true. 
Continuing this process we conclude that 
negotiation_tactic: :=true. 
Hence, we proved that the conciliatory approach is indeed a negotia-
tion tactic. This reasoning 'path' is depicted in Figure 1 in heavy lines. 
3. APPLICATIONS 
3.1. Expert Systems 
A rule-based system is the knowledge representation system of choice 
for most expert systems which may be viewed as repositories of an 
expert's knowledge and from which the end user takes knowledge 
(Collins, 1990). An expert system consists of a knowledge base and a 
shell , which has an interpreter, interface , editor, and other parts used 
to enter, manipulate and use rules. 
There are several important elements of expert systems which utilize 
rule-based formalism. Since the knowledge base is discrete, consists of 
separate rules, and the reasoning mechanisms are simple and link the 
rules in chains, it is possible to present the whole reasoning process to 
the user. Explanation is an important feature that distinguishes an 
expert system from a conventional computer-based system. While it is 
difficult to present how exactly a set of linear equations has been 
solved, it is easy to retract all the steps performed by the interpreter 
and present such a sequence to the user. 
Such rule-based systems may be used in prediction to infer con-
sequences in a given situation , for example , in determining the 
consequences of a compromise proposal. The power of such an expert 
system does not lie in its 'better-than-human' knowledge or reasoning 
capabilities, because the knowledge is obtained from specialists and 
experts. It is in the system's capability to access knowledge obtained 
from many experts, to access large databases in search of information , 
to verify the consistency of data and to reason on very large structures 
very rapidly. All these activities can be performed by humans, but in 
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many situations, the time and effort to do so is unavailable or 
prohibitive. 
The simplicity of reasoning and natural representation is sometimes 
considered as a drawback . Some researchers and experts say that they 
perform these activities with 'pen and paper'. While this may be the 
case, expert systems may be used by non-experts and provide them 
with tools that can analyze and evaluate qualitative data, formulate 
hypothesis and / or provide recommendations. 
Expert systems may be used to develop plans and scenarios, to 
monitor and evaluate the behavior of another system , to interpret and 
analyze data , and to train experts. From the negotiation perspective , 
they can be used in planning and verifying negotiation tactics, evaluat-
ing opponent's behavior , interpreting and evaluating the compromise 
proposals, their significance and impact, and in training negotiators. 
3.2. Structuring and Simulation 
Raiffa's comment about the usefulness of the decision analysis quali-
tative framework in conducting negotiations quoted at the beginning of 
this paper reflects the need " to think more systematically and con-
sciously, and in a more conceptually integrated fashion, about the 
dynamics of negotiation" (Raiffa, 1982, pp. 358-359). This requires 
advance planning which involves defining goals , priorities and pref-
erences , restrictions and uncertainties, as well as analysis of the 
opponent (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985). Systematic thinking and 
analysis leads to specifying the negotiation problem and the develop-
ment of representations of the problem, the opponent(s), and possibly 
other entities that are involved in the negotiations . As we said , 
rule-based formalism may be considered a natural way to develop such 
representations . 
There are several approaches to problem structuring and the 
development of representations which have their roots in system 
science (Eden, 1989; Checkland, 1988) . The attempt to extract mental 
perceptions of a problem and present them in a formal manner. The 
focus is on the process during which the person clarifies his / her 
perception and obtains a map of entities and relationships. 
Within artificial intelligence and expert systems, the development of 
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symbolic representations is often considered as the development of 
knowledge bases and it is known as knowledge engineering. It consists 
of the extraction of knowledge from sources of expertise , its formaliza-
tion , and transfer to a knowledge base. This knowledge is then 
considered as a generic representation for a family of problems. It 
becomes part of an expert system and is used to develop a representa-
tion of a specific problem. The specific representation is often equiva-
lent to a solution of this problem or a solution may be easily deduced 
from it. For example , the heavy lines in the AND / OR tree given in 
Figure 1 depict a specific representation of the problem 'What is a 
conciliatory approach to negotiation?' with the solution being a 
negotiation tactic. 
The knowledge engineering approach is based on extensive interac-
tions between a knowledge engineer and experts . Attempts have been 
made to develop systems which replace the knowledge engineer 
function and interact directly with expert decision makers . These 
systems aim "to help users to represent and manage the symbolic 
aspects of the decision making process - such as the alternatives being 
considered , the goals to satisfy, and the arguments evaluating alterna-
tives with respect to the goals" (Lee , 1990, p. 105). Some of them 
utilize rule-based formalism to develop and manipulate problem 
representation. This approach, in addition to its simplicity and expres-
siveness, provides access to the analysis and reasoning mechanisms 
acting on the structures developed. 
An important aspect of the structuring process is the analysis of the 
relationship between structures describing particular entities. In 
negotiation , for example , such analysis may include relationships 
between the representation of the negotiation problem and that of the 
opponent or the negotiator's constituency. This is an example of 
'What-If' analysis extended from numerical to symbol manipulation . 
Kersten et al. (1991) propose restructurable modelling which uses 
rule-based formalism to build consecutive representations of a negotia-
tion problem. 
Restructurable modelling is based on the application of certain 
operators to rule based structures. The concept is based on the 
assumption that all 'chunks of knowledge' are known a priori and that 
the main difficulty is to gather these chunks together and build a 
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structure which represents the current problem and can be used to 
determine its solution. 
To illustrate the restructurable modelling we consider a highly 
simplified example of labor-management negotiation described in 
Matwin et al. (1989). Assume that, we model and support a labor 
union which has developed a representation of its problem which is 
partially depicted in Figure 2. 
The union also developed several other representations. One de-
scribes management's possible behavior in terms of simple reactions to 
particular offers. For example, 
if management: phase(bargaining) ::E: true and 
management: overtime(lSO, percent, second_shift) : : = true and 
management: convert(overtime, timeoff) ::=false and 
union: overtime(200, percent, second_shift) : : = true and 
union: convert(overtime, timeoff) : := false 
then management: overtime(200, percent, second_shift) : : = true 
This statement (meta-rule) describes a concession made by manage-
ment during the bargaining phase, when the two sides agree on 
feasibility of conversion of the overtime into time off. More statements 
describing management's reactions may be prepared and then used to 
goals(union) 
benefits '\. vacati o n 
~ duration_of_ag~eement ~
~ ; "" 1', 
reduced/ork_week I health_1nsurance 1 vaca tion_~:~' 
work week(35, 40, hours) ~ t d I 
- vaca i on_ urat1 on 1 
r-, 
I 
' I 
' percen t ) 
percent) 
links t o ot her 
- - fac ts o r subgoa l s 
deductibles(lOO, percent) 
Fig. 2. Partial representation of union 's negotiation problem. 
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obtain comprehensive management offers. One of these statements 
may describe a situation when , because of the union's very high 
demands, management walks away from the table. This may require a 
change in the problem representation , as depicted in Figure 2, to a 
new one given in Figure 3. 
To move from the representation given in Figure 2 to the new one, 
rules with special operators are used. These operators modify repre-
sentations . The new representation was obtained with the following 
modification rule: 
if management: phase(stalemate) : := true and 
union: high_demands ::=true and 
management: present_during_negotiation ::=false and 
union: strike mandate ::=true and 
then modify initial_etrike -> goals(union), 
gatineau_on_strike and trois riv on strike - > 
initial_etrike }. 
The above rule drastically modifies union's principal goals goals ( un-
ion). It replaces three sub-goals benefits, vacation and 
duration_of_agreernent with one ini tial_strike , and intro-
duces a definition of what the initial strike means . 
Having prepared possible elementary reactions of management and 
rules that introduce changes into the union 's problem representation 
we may simulate negotiation. The simulation process is a sequence of 
union's offers obtained from the AND / OR tree and management 's 
counter-offers obtained from the management response meta-rules. 
When the situation changes so that the union is unable to prepare an 
offer, an attempt is made to develop new problem representation. For 
this purpose modification meta-rules are used . 
goals(union) 
I 
initial_strike 
~
gatineau_on_strike trois_riv_on_strike 
Fig . 3. New representation of the negotiation problem. 
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3.3. Examples 
Rule-based formalism has been used to model hostage-taking incidents 
for the purpose of collecting and evaluating knowledge about these 
incidents and to support police negotiators . Vedder and Mason (1987) 
developed a Hostage-taking Information and Tactics (HIT) expert 
system which consists of a number of production rules describing 
stages of the negotiation and providing recommendations . The system 
has been verified and is considered as a valuable tool for training 
responding officers, on-scene commanders, SWAT commanders and 
hostage negotiation unit commanders . HIT poses questions to which 
the user enters the truth values. He /she may also respond that the 
answer is unknown. 
An example of a dialog between the user and HIT is as follows 
(Vedder and Mason , 1987, p. 410) (user's answers are italicized): 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WITH Y (YES) , 
N (NO) , U (UNKNOWN ), OR W (WHY) . 
ARE YOU THE RESPONDING OFFICER? N 
ARE YOU THE HOST AGE NEGOTIATION UNIT 
COMMANDER? Y 
HAVE YOU RECEIVED A FULL BRIEFING? Y 
HAS THE NEGOTIATION POST BEEN 
ESTABLISHED? Y 
HAS COMMUNICATION BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH 
THE HOSTAGE TAKER(S)? Y 
IS THERE A DEMAND TO EXCHANGE HOSTAGES? 
y 
ACTION: REFUSE EXCHANGE 
1. DEMAND SHOULD BE PUT OFF 
2. ULTIMATUM SHOULD BE 
REFUSED 
3 .... 
The response unknown means that that particular rule cannot be used 
so the system attempts to use another rule. An important feature of 
HIT, which is present in most expert systems , is its ability to respond 
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when a user asks for the purpose of a particular question. When the 
user enters 'Why?', the system responds that the question is asked 
because it is a premise in a given rule which is being used in an attempt 
to provide a given conclusion. The explanation may involve not only 
the rule which at this point is being used, but also rules which lead to 
this rule. That is , the system may respond that 'Because you entered 
yes to question . . . and no to question ... it has been proven 
that .. . Then , because you entered ... (etc.)' . 
Other examples of the use of rule-based formalism to model and 
support negotiations are given in Roman and Ahamed (1984) for 
labor-management negotiations , Kersten and Michalowski (1989) for 
hostage-taking incidents, and Kersten et al. (1990) for contract 
negotiations. There are also approaches which explicitly do not use the 
rule-based formalism, but incorporate production and logical reason-
ing. Sycara (1990, 1991) introduces case-based reasoning to negotia-
tion planning and support. The focus of her research is on the 
development of formal representations of past cases of labor negotia-
tions, for example, and then manipulating and merging case elements 
to obtain a representation of a given negotiation problem. The cases 
are also used to obtain argumentation for particular proposals , to 
determine interrelationships between elements of representations, and 
options for problem restructuring. 
An example of the use of rule-based formalism and restructurable 
modelling to international negotiation is given in Kersten et al. (1988). 
The case considered is the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian negotiation at Camp 
David from the point of view of Israeli negotiators. A part of the initial 
problem representation is given in Figure 4. 
With the use of meta-rules describing both Israeli and Egyptian 
responses such as: 
if egypt: 
then israel: 
and 
if israel: 
egypt: 
then israel: 
and israel: 
recognition (israel, plo) : :=true 
withdrawal (israel, sinai) ::=false 
withdrawal (israel, ainai) ::=false and 
establish_dipl_relations (israel, soviet_union) ::=any 
establish_dipl_relations (israel, soviet_union) ::= 
false 
set_up {united_nation_buffer, sinai) ::= rrue, 
/ 
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successful_negotiat ion (israel) 
military_s~renght (israel) territorial_gains (israel) 
decrease_milit 
expenditure (israel) 
(israel, /\gaza) (israel, sinai) .--~--
reduce 
conscripts 
(israel) 
buffer zones 
( israel) 
" 
' '/ . \ I give_up_territory (israel, syria) 
rearm ( israel, 
air force) 
I \ 
u-nations_ buffer 
(s inai ) . I . withdrawal (1srae l, 
threaten 
( israel, syr 
~ 
/1 
I 
golan) 
Phased_withdrawal 
( i srae l , sinai) 
" I \ ~anatagonize (us) I 
1 establish_dipl_relations 
(israel, soviet_union) j-\.-- negation (not) 
Fig. 4. Partial representation of Israel 's negotiation problem at Camp David . (Adapted 
from Kersten et al., 'Representing the negotiation process with a rule-based formalism', 
Theory and Decision 25 , 1988, p. 231.) 
and modification meta-rules such as 
if egypt: 
israel: 
then modify 
withdrawal (israel, west_bank) ::= true and 
rearm (ierael, air_force) :: = true 
not withdrawal (israel, gaza) and not 
withdrawal (israel, sinai) and not 
territorial_gains (ierael, gaza) ). 
a sequence of Israel's negotiating pos1t1ons was obtained. Each 
position was determined on the basis of a particular set of demands of 
the two negotiating parties. The sequence of positions represented one 
possible scenario for the Camp David negotiations. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
4.1. Advantages and Disadvantages 
Rule-based modelling is a powerful and expressive approach to 
structuring and representing human knowledge and behavior. It can be 
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successfully applied to structure , represent and simulate negotiat10n 
processes , and to support the analysis of complex negotiation problems 
and negotiators' behavior. It does not imply that all that negotiators 
know and do can be reduced to a set of rules. 
We have already mentioned such advantages of rule-based systems 
as separation of knowledge and control, modularity, tracing and 
explanation of the execution and system's state. Other advantages of 
the rule-based systems are: ease of modification, readability, and 
uniformity. Ease of modification results from modularity. Since knowl-
edge is represented in chunks and it is independent from control 
change, deletion , or addition of a rule can be accomplished without 
having to worry about direct effects on the other rules. The system has 
different knowledge as a result of the change and this enables a 
continual increase of the system's body of knowledge. 
An important attribute of production systems is the uniform struc-
ture imposed on knowledge. The information is encoded within a rigid 
structure of production rules . Therefore, it can be understood by user , 
and this is closely related to readability, but it can be interpreted and 
processed by other systems. This feature is used in systems that 
automatically modify their own rules. 
We would also like to reiterate the naturalness of the production 
systems. Statements about 'What to do? ' or 'How to do?' in pre-
determined situations are naturally encoded into production rules. It is 
these kinds of statements that are often used by experts to explain how 
they do their job (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981) . 
We do not want to suggest that rule-based systems or expert systems 
are a panacea for complex problems in general or negotiation in 
particular. On the contrary, there is a number of limitations. Separa-
tion of knowledge and control makes it hard to follow the flow of 
control in problem solving. Although antecedant-consequent or 
situation-action knowledge can be expressed naturally in production 
systems , algorithmic and procedural knowledge is not expressed 
naturally. 
A related problem is that criteria for ordering of a rule or its part 
within a rule are only implicit in the rule set, but they may have critical 
importance on the system behavior. Consider the example we gave in 
Section 3.3 . The order of rules is such that the first question the system 
poses is about the user's profession . The system, however, may begin 
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with a question about communication, which for some users is not 
relevant or even may not be understood. The order in which the rules 
are written , and within the rules their parts, have great impact on the 
final outcome (Jackson, 1990) . 
Human experts have background and common-sense knowledge 
which stops them from asking obviously wrong questions. The knowl-
edge of expert systems is narrow and , therefore, it is heavily depen-
dent on the control structures. But control structures are opaque to the 
users . 
4.2. Benefits 
Production systems can provide several benefits to users. They can 
work faster than humans, access knowledge of many experts, and use 
knowledge of those who cannot be consulted at the given time . 
Production systems can increase quality of analysis, evaluation , predic-
tion or classification by providing consistent advice and reducing error 
rate. While they may not compete with highly qualified experts , their 
advice is often better than the advice of novices . The advice is always 
available ; that is the knowledge can be accessed at any time and under 
any circumstances, which is rare in case of human experts . 
Important benefits include reliability and the ability to capture 
scarce expertise. These systems do not have human fragility , and 
sometimes they are developed because an expertise may be lost , for 
example , due to retirement of the expert. They are reliable because 
they consider all input information. They are consistent and take into 
account all possible solutions (within given controls) . Also , they can be 
used many times to reason and explain the reasoning without getting 
bored , tired or upset. In this respect they can increase users' under-
standing through explanation. 
An important benefit is related not to the use of a system but to the 
development of a knowledge base, testing and experimentation. The 
uniform structure, very limited number of distinct operators and 
connectives, and simple inference mechanisms force experts or knowl-
edge engineers to develop simple representations. During the develop-
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ment process the domain knowledge is being revised, analyzed and 
evaluated. The strict representation also forces a particular viewpoint 
which may discover inconsistencies or loopholes. This benefit becomes 
especially apparent when a rule-based system is coupled with a 
decision support system. 
The practical importance for negotiation support is the ability to 
develop representations of negotiation situations, opponents (their 
needs, requirements and goals) , and of environment. The complexity, 
scope and detailness of the representation depends on the needs. It is 
possible to develop a specific system describing one unique negotiation 
problem (e.g., U.S.A.-Canada trade negotiation). The rule-based 
approach makes it possible to attempt to integrate different view-
points , search for inconsistencies , and verify if the assumptions are 
feasible and the goals are achievable. The support then may provide 
negotiators with possible scenarios and their consequences, with the 
analysis of the impact of the proposal of one side on the situation of 
the other side, and with simulation of the negotiation process. 
The use of knowledge-based systems to unique problems is presently 
justified only when these problems are very complex, require substan-
tial effort and are prolonged in time. Typically, knowledge-based 
systems are developed for repetitive problems which involve different 
decision makers at different times. These decision makers may need 
access to basic domain knowledge and to descriptions of past cases. 
They may use a knowledge-based system to enter information about 
the problem at hand. The system then may use the domain knowledge 
to analyze the problem, provide some basic recommendations and 
retrieve similar cases. 
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STEPHEN J. ANDRIOLE 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
ABSTRACT. This paper examines the information processing requirements that 
surround the international negotiations process. General problem-solving models and 
generic task taxonomies are explored to provide insight into this process, a process that 
can be characterized as iterative options analysis. The paper also identifies a set of 
existing and emerging information technologies that can support the negotiation process , 
technologies that range from electronic mail to group decision support systems. The 
premise of the paper is that cost-effective information technology can support many 
important negotiation tasks and that existing technology has been vastly under-exploited 
by negotiators and their staffs. A program for introducing and evaluating information 
technology is also proposed. 
Keywords: Negotiations, problem-solving models , task taxonomies, information technol-
ogy , information systems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the extent to which state-of-the-art and emerging 
information technology can satisfy the information management and 
analytical requirements that surround the international negotiations 
process. It examines these requirements in some detail and then 
matches available and emerging information technology-based 
systems , tools and methods to these requirements. The working 
premise of the analysis is that international negotiations can be 
supported productively by systems that permit the sharing of informa-
tion, instant local and remote communications, the organization of 
small and large data bases, and even group problem structuring and 
problem solving, among other activities and processes. This paper 
identifies the extent of this support and proposes an agenda for its 
application. 
Theory and Decision 34: 313-328, 1993. 
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2 . NEGOTIATION REQUIREMENTS 
The negotiation process, regardless of whether it involves two in-
dividuals or several nations, requires information , organization , analy-
sis , and management. At the heart of the process is the data , 
information and knowledge that helps negotiators assess situations , 
generate and evaluate options, and implement decisions. In fact, an 
argument can be made that information is the essence of the negotia-
tion process, since it is the basis for understanding, action and reaction. 
In order to systematically understand the negotiation process, it is 
helpful to first assess existing models of the problem-solving and 
decision-making process and then distill elements of these models into 
a model of the negotiation process . Such a model will then permit the 
matching of information technology and systems support to specific re-
quirements. One of the earliest models of the decision-making process 
belongs to Lasswell (1956), who identified the following seven steps: 
1. Intelligence Information , prediction , planning 
2. Recommendation Promotion of alternatives 
3. Prescription The enactment of general problem-solving rules 
4. Invocation Provisional characterization of conduct accord-
ing to prescriptions 
5. Application The final characterization of conduct according 
to prescriptions 
6. Appraisal The assessment of the success and failure 
7. Termination The ending of prescriptions 
Anderson (1976) suggests a slightly different process model: 
1. Problem formation 
2. Formulation 
3. Adoption 
4. Implementation 
5. Evaluation 
What is the problem? How does it get on the 
agenda? 
How are alternatives developed? 
How is an option adapted? 
What is done to carry a decision into effect? 
How is effectiveness measured? 
A somewhat different view of the process belongs to Wohl (1976) , 
whose stimulus-hypothesis-options-response - or SHOR - process 
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model has attracted a lot of attention particularly from those who see 
the problem-solving process as iterative and adversarial. Wohl 's SHOR 
model appears in Figure 1. These process models and taxonomies 
Generic Elements Functions Required 
Gather/Detect 
Stimulus Fi lier/Correlate 
(Data) 
Aggregate/Display s 
Store/Recall 
Create 
Hypothesis 
(Perception 
Evaluate Alternatives) 
H 
Select 
Create 
Option 
(Response 
Alternatives) Evaluate 
0 
Select 
Plan 
Response 
(Action) Organize 
R 
Execute 
Fig. 1. Wohl's stimulus- hypothesis-option- response (SHOR) model. 
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provide insight into the problem-solving, decision-making and negotia-
tion process , especially to the extent that negotiations share many of 
the steps and tasks of the above models . In fact, with the help of these 
models it is possible to construct a top level requirements specification 
for negotiation processes, a specification that, in turn, permits a 
matching of current and emerging information technology. 
3. A PROCESS-TASK MODEL OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
The above models suggest the steps that negotiators and their staffs 
execute as they navigate troubled negotiation waters and the tasks they 
must perform in order to do so successfully. The model which follows 
thus represents a synthesis of several process models and several 
generic task taxonomies. The process/task model also represents a 
high level requirements specification necessary to determine the form 
and substance of support. While the emphasis here is on information 
management support, the process / task model is readily adaptable to 
analytical support requirements specification as well: 
Process Steps 
• Problem / Opportunity Definition 
• Option Generation 
Tasks 
• Define the current negotia-
tion context and problem 
• Identify the range of accept-
able negotiation outcomes 
• Identify range of negotia-
tion constraints 
• Conference and communi-
cate definitions, constraints 
and outcomes 
• Local and distributed meet-
ings 
• Friendly option generation 
• Opponent (hypothetical) 
option generation 
• Categorize options 
• Conference and communi-
cate options 
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• Options Analysis 
• Option Proposal Development 
• Implementation 
• Feedback /Assessment 
• Option (Re-) Generation 
• Option (Re-) Analysis 
• Local and distributed meet-
ings 
• Friendly-opponent gaming 
• Forecast actions and re-
actions 
• Calculate options costs and 
benefits 
• Rank-order options 
• Communicate options 
• Local and distributed meet-
ings 
• Option refinement 
• Option packaging 
• Option communication 
• Local and distributed meet-
ings 
• Option communication 
• Option presentation 
• Local and distributed meet-
ings 
• Friendly Impact Assessment 
• Opponent Impact Assess-
ment 
• Local and distributed meet-
ings 
• Friendly option (re-) gener-
ation 
• Opponent (hypothetical) 
option (re-) generation 
• (Re-) categorize options 
• (Re-) conference and com-
municate options 
• Local and distributed meet-
ings 
• Friendly I opponent (re-) 
gaming 
• (Re-) forecast actions and 
reactions 
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• Nth Option Proposal Development 
• Nth Implementation 
• Nth Feedback Assessment 
• Nth Option (Re-)Analysis 
• (Re-) calculate options cost 
and benefits 
• (Re-) rank-order options 
• (Re-) communicate options 
• Local and distributed meet-
ings 
This synthesized model suggests a process and - more essential to the 
purpose here - a set of tasks that negotiators and their staffs must 
perform to achieve desired outcomes. These tasks permit a matching 
of information management tools, techniques and systems (from the 
range of options described below) . 
4 . INFORMATION MANAGEMENT TOOLS , TECHNIQUES , AND 
SYSTEMS 
There are many methods, tools , and techniques available to support 
the negotiation process. We are here interested primarily in informa-
tion management, while recognizing that other qualitative and quan-
titative methods certainly have major roles to play in the negotiation 
process . 
The kinds of tools, techniques, and systems that can be defined as 
data base management approaches include simple arrays of data in 
tabular and graphic form, systems capable of supporting analytical and 
realtime queries , data bases capable of directing searches of complex 
queries , and systems capable of organizing data , information and 
knowledge . 
The systems should also be capable of supporting various kinds of 
analyses of the contents of data / information / knowledge bases. Low 
level expert systems can help organize the data management systems as 
well as help with fast searches through them (see also Samarasan in 
this issue) . 
Natural language processing systems - systems that permit freeform 
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English interaction - will enhance negotiation support efficiency and 
contribute to a wider distribution of support systems of all kinds. This 
is especially important in negotiations since we cannot expect 
negotiators or their staffs to always be proficient with applications 
programs. In fact, natural language interface and query systems will 
permit inexperienced users to perform all sorts of analyses. 
Expert systems will also routinize many decision-making processes . 
It will be possible to teach systems about past and similar 'cases' and 
recall the cases during negotiations. Staffs unfamiliar with past negotia-
tions will thus be able to retrieve information pertinent to the 
problems at hand . 'Case-based reasoning' will support international 
negotiations in a variety of ways , just as 'low-level' expert systems -
systems that perform simple deductive tasks - could proliferate 
negotiation analyses. It is also possible to develop knowledge bases 
comprised of data, information and knowledge about specific coun-
tries , country-by-country problems and issues, and national interests. 
The kinds of problems that will benefit the most from knowledge-
based solutions and systems are well-bounded , deductive inference 
problems about which a great deal of accessible and articulate 
qualitative and quantitative problem-solving expertise exists. 
International negotiations occur in a virtual reality , simultaneously 
in host countries and in allied and unfriendly capitals ; negotiations 
occur around the globe , around the clock. When Russia negotiates 
with the United States about arms control, many other nations directly 
and indirectly participate in the process. The ability to communicate is 
critical to successful negotiations . Communications technology is 
capable of supporting local and remote communications and process-
ing. It is possible via satellite communications to link negotiators and 
their staffs with each other as well as with analytical computer 
programs that permit them to share data , models , and scenarios . 
Local and remote full-motion video teleconferencing is also now 
possible - and will become more affordable in the immediate future. It 
is possible for negotiators in different parts of the world to communi-
cate instantly and visually, to share ideas and concerns about issues 
and problems. 
International communications networks permit realtime large scale 
networking of data , information , knowledge and people . This , in turn , 
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will help to short-circuit problems and accelerate progress. The 
systems embedded in such networks can help negotiators and their 
staffs develop, propose and teleconference alternatives. 
Twenty years ago no one paid much attention to user interface 
technology. Since the revolution in microcomputing- and the emerg-
ing one in workstation-based computing - software designers have had 
to devote more attention to the process by which data, information 
and knowledge are exchanged between systems and operators. There 
are now millions of users who have absolutely no sense of how a 
computer actually works, but rely upon its capabilities for their very 
professional survival. A community of software vendors is sensitive to 
both the size of this market and its relatively new need for unambigu-
ous, self-paced , flexible computing. The 'desktop' metaphor, icon-
based navigational aids , direct manipulation interfaces, and user 
guided/controlled interactive graphics - among other innovations - are 
all part of this movement. 
Where did all these ideas come from? The field of cognitive science 
and now 'cognitive engineering' is now - justifiably - taking credit for 
the progress in user-computer interaction (UCI) technology , since its 
proponents were the (only) ones asking why the UCI process could not 
be modeled after some validated cognitive information processing 
processes. UCI models were built and tested , and concepts like 'spatial 
database management' (from MIT's Architecture Machine Group: 
Bolt, 1984 ), hierarchical data storage , and hypertext were developed. 
It is no accident that much UCI progress can be traced to findings in 
behavioral psychology and cognitive science ; it is indeed amazing that 
the cross-fertilization took so long. 
The most recent progress in UCI technology is multimedia, or the 
ability to store, display, manipulate and integrate sound, graphics , 
video and good old fashioned alphanumeric data (Ragland , 1989; 
Ambron and Hooper, 1988; Aiken, 1989). It is now possible to display 
photographic, textual, numerical, and video data on the same screen, 
as Figure 2 - from Aiken (1989) - suggests. It is possible to permit 
users to select (and deselect) different displays of the same data. It is 
possible to animate and simulate in realtime - and cost-effectively. 
Many of these capabilities were just too expensive a decade ago and 
much too computationally intensive for the hardware architectures of 
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Fig. 2. Analytical methods to support international negotiations. 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Progress has been made in the design and 
execution of applications software and in the use of storage devices 
(such as videodisks and compact disks [CDs]) . Apple Computer's 
Hypercard software actually provides drivers for CD players through a 
common UCI (the now famous 'stack ' ). Designers can exploit this 
progress to fashion systems that are consistent with the way future 
systems are designed and used . The gap between the way humans 'see' 
and structure problems will be narrowed considerably via the applica-
tion of multimedia technology. 
The use of graphical displays of all kinds will dominate future UCI 
applications . Growing evidence in visual cognition research (Pinker , 
1985) suggests how powerful the visual mind is. It is interesting that 
many problem-solvers - professionals who might otherwise use a 
support system - are trained graphically , not alphanumerically. Milit-
ary planners receive map-based training ; corporate strategists use 
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graphical trend data to extrapolate and devise graphic scenarios; and a 
variety of educators have taken to using case studies laden with 
pictures , icons, and graphics of all kinds. Complicated concepts are 
often easily communicated graphically , and it is possible to convert 
complex problems from alphanumeric to graphic form . There is no 
question that future support systems will exploit hypermedia, multi-
media , and interactive graphics of all kinds. 
Speech input and output should also emerge over the next five to ten 
years as a viable UCI technology . While predictions about the arrival 
of 'voice activated text processors' have been optimistic to date , 
progress toward even continuous speech input and output should be 
steady. Once the technology is perfected there are a number of special 
purpose applications that will benefit greatly from interaction using 
neither keyboard nor mouse . 
UCI technology will also permit the use of more methods and 
models, especially those driven by complex - yet often inexplicable -
analytical procedures. For example, the concept of optimization as 
manifest in a simplex program is difficult to communicate to the typical 
user. Advanced UCI technology can be used to illustrate the optimiza-
tion calculus graphically and permit users to understand the relation-
ships among variables in an optimization equation (see Wierzbicki, 
Krus, and Makowski in this issue). Similarly, probabilistic forecasting 
methods and models anchored in Bayes' Theorem of conditional 
probabilities, while computationally quite simple, are conceptually 
convoluted to the average analyst. Log-probability and other graphic 
charts can be used to illustrate how new evidence impacts prior 
probabilities. In fact, a creative cognitive engineer might use any 
number of impact metaphors (like thermometers and graphical 
weights) to present the impact of new evidence on the likelihood of 
events . 
Finally , advanced UCI technology will also permit the range of 
negotiations support to expand. Anytime communications bandwidth 
between systems and users is increased , the range of applied oppor-
tunities grows . UCI technology permits designers to attempt more 
complex system designs due to the natural transparency of complexity 
that good UCI design fosters . 
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5. REQUIREMENTS/TOOLS/SYSTEMS MATCHING 
All of this suggests it is possible to match information technology and 
systems to negotiation phases and tasks. Table I attempts to match a 
set of systems, tools, methods and techniques to the phases and tasks 
that comprise the international negotiation process. 
Process Steps 
Problem /Opportunity 
Definition 
Option Generation 
Options Analysis 
TABLE I 
Tasks 
Define the current negotiation context 
and problem 
Identify the range of acceptable 
negotiation outcomes 
Identify range of 
negotiations constraints 
Conference and communicate definitions, 
constraints and outcomes 
Local and distributed meetings 
Friendly option generation 
Opponent (hypothetical) option 
generation 
Categorize options 
Conference and communicate options 
Local and distributed meetings 
Friendly /opponent gaming 
Forecast actions and reactions 
Calculate options costs and benefits 
Rank·order options 
Communicate options 
Local and distributed meetings 
Tools and Systems 
Hierarchical decomposition tools 
Text /graphic retrieval systems 
Hypermedia and multimedia data base 
systems 
Interactive maps 
Electronic mail 
Full-motion color video 
teleconferencing 
Case-based deductive reasoning tools 
Natural language interfaces 
Case-based deductive reasoning tools 
Opponent data bases 
Data base management tools 
Electronic mail 
Group decision support systems 
Hypertext / multimedia systems 
Full-motion color video 
teleconferencing 
Geographic information systems 
Natural language interfaces 
Case-based inductive and deductive 
reasoning systems 
Simple extrapolation models 
Tradeoff analysis templates 
Criteria lists 
Decision logic tables 
Electronic mail 
Group decision support systems 
Hypertext / multimedia systems 
Geographic information systems 
Full motion color video 
teleconferencing 
Natural language interfaces 
Animated presentation tools 
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Process Steps 
Option Proposal 
Development 
Feedback /Assessment 
Option (Re-) Generation 
Options (Re-) Analysis 
Nth Option Proposal 
Development 
Nth Implementation 
Nth Feedback Assessment 
Nth Option (Re-) Analysis 
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TABLE I (cont.) 
Tasks 
Option refinement 
Option packaging 
Option communication 
Local and distributed meetings 
Friendly Impact Assessment 
Opponent Impact Assessment 
Local and distributed meetings 
Friendly option (re-) generation 
Opponent (hypothetical) option 
(re-) generation 
(Re-) categorize options 
(Re-) con ference and communicate 
options 
Local and distributed meeiings 
Friendly / Opponent (re-) gaming 
(Re-) forecast actions and 
reactions 
(Re-) calculate options costs 
and benefits 
(Re-) rank-order options 
(Re-) communicate options 
Local and distributed meetings 
6. USAGE PROFILE 
Tools and Systems 
Criteria lists 
Desktop publishing systems 
Electronic mail 
Large screen color display systems 
Full-motion color video 
teleconferencing 
Natural language interfaces 
Impact matrices 
Decision logic tables 
Electronic mail 
Full-motion color video 
teleconferencing 
Natural language interfaces 
(Same as for Option Generation) 
(Same as for Options Analysis) 
(Same as for Proposal Development) 
(Same as for Implementation) 
(Same as for Feedback Assessment) 
The above tools, techniques and systems are intended to support the 
negotiation process. They are also intended to be placed into the hands 
of negotiators and their staffs. The nature of the tools and systems is 
straightforward; little or no training is necessary to operate natural 
language front-ends to simple data base systems, for example; nor 
should it be necessary for sophisticated analysts to stand between 
negotiators and the somewhat less technical members of their staff. 
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7 . THE SHORT-TERM AGENDA 
There are any number of ways to determine the effectiveness of the 
above ideas. In effect, all of the information technology-based meth-
ods , tools and systems represent hypotheses about effectiveness. In 
order to determine the contribution that the tools and systems might 
make to the negotiation process, it is necessary to develop some 
measures of effectiveness and baseline performance data (for today's 
unaided negotiation teams) . Evaluation questions should be raised 
early in the design process; in fact , they should guide the selection of 
tools and systems to initially install. 
The emphasis here is on information technology and how it might 
enhance the international negotiations process. Identified above are 
candidate tools and systems that range from the very simple to the 
relatively complex . In order to determine the contribution that 
information technology might make to the international negotiation 
process a series of small steps should be taken . They include the 
introduction of the most basic, easy-to-use tools and systems now 
available . Such tools and systems would include electronic mail 
systems , teleconferencing systems, simple data base systems with 
natural language front-ends, and templates for organizing information , 
criteria, and options. More complex tools and systems, such as low-
level deductive inferential expert data base systems and interactive 
executive information and group decision support systems, should be 
phased into application only after assessments about the impact of the 
simpler tools and system have been made. 
In order to test the tools and systems , scenarios should be developed 
to support laboratory testing; in order to raise the fidelity of the 
evaluation perhaps an actual negotiation could be supported with a 
limited toolset to determine qualitative and quantitative impact (vis-
a-vis an explicit set of measures of effectiveness) . 
8. LONGER-TERM RE C OMMENDATIONS 
Longer-term recommendations include the introduction of increasingly 
sophisticated data, information and knowledge processing tools and 
systems in a way that would permit incremental impact assessments. It 
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should also be possible to integrate the information handling tools and 
systems with systems that incarnate analytical methods - such as game 
theory, linear programming, and decision analysis, among many 
others . Eventually , whole systems could be evaluated to determine the 
overall effectiveness of negotiations supported by tools and systems 
that range all the way from electronic mail to automated expert option 
generators. 
But perhaps more important is the perspective that needs to direct a 
long-term plan. Currently there are only pockets of technology 
supporting the negotiation process . The call here is for a systematic 
plan to introduce increasingly sophisticated tools and systems to -
ideally - an enthusiastic community. In order to stimulate enthusiasm -
and create a positive perspective on the applicability of the tools and 
systems - early successes will be necessary . 
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper argues that it is possible to decompose the negotiation 
process into a series of phases and tasks and then match a set of 
information technology-based tools and systems. The matches them-
selves actually constitute a set of hypotheses about performance 
impact: the paper argues that we have underexploited current and 
emerging information technology in the negotiation process and that 
significant performance enhancements are possible through the careful 
application of the technology. It is essential that measures of effective-
ness be developed so that baseline performance data can be collected 
and then compared with data collected after the introduction of 
selected tools and systems. 
Motivation for the matching process and subsequent testing is 
grounded in assumptions about the value of the tools and because 
negotiation requirements are growing in number, frequency and 
complexity. Just as the military has invested heavily in information 
management tools, decision aids and decision support systems in 
response to changing requirements , so too should the negotiation 
community begin to assess the contribution that current and emerging 
information technology might make to the negotiation process. 
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GERHARD HAFNER 
THE USE OF ANALYTICAL METHODS AND TOOLS 
IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS: 
A PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE 
ABSTRACT. This paper presents a practitioner's perspective on the use of systematic 
analytical techniques to improve the practice of international negotiations , primarily in a 
multilateral context. A generic model of the negotiation process is presented and the 
utility of various analytical methodologies is evaluated against the component functions 
described by the model. Overall, analytical tools for negotiation support are viewed as 
most useful in the prenegotiation phase. Conclusions are based primarily on practical 
experience, not on theories of negotiation. 
Keywords: Decision support systems , practitioner perspective, negotiation models. 
Various analytical methods that might be useful in supporting interna-
tional negotiations have been addressed in this issue. These descrip-
tions may lead one to ask why such tools are not being employed by all 
delegates to international negotiations, letting the tools perform the 
tasks of negotiating. They would certainly find Pareto-optimal solu-
tions. 
But real life is not quite so simple. Let me offer an example. During 
the biggest negotiating effort of this century, the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the less developed 
countries (LDCs) laid claim to a very broad national continental shelf, 
which they considered their national wealth, and from which they 
expected substantial benefits. In his statement, the United States 
representative offered evidence showing that natural resources in the 
continental shelves were very unequally distributed. In his view, most 
LDCs would not find any resources in their continental shelf. They 
would profit most, according to his argument, from a formula that 
identifies very narrow national continental shelves and designation of a 
broad international area where all states would have access to 
available resources. This line of thinking, which seems to be the most 
reasonable, maximizing benefit for the most number of countries, 
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encountered strong oppos1t1on from the LDCs which successfully 
defended the broad continental shelf doctrine . The United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention now indicates that the continental shelf can 
extend up to 350 nautical miles from the coast. The result is well 
known. Only a few , mostly industrialized states , benefit from the new 
regime. There are numerous examples of this type of suboptimal 
outcome. 
The actual outcome of international negotiations is very rarely an 
optimum or even a second-best solution . In this context , it may now be 
asked whether analytical methods and tools can possibly help to 
overcome these deficiencies . 
1. THE PRO C ESS OF NE GOTIATION 
Any evaluation of the use of systematic analytical methods requires a 
thorough examination of the negotiation process itself. Such an 
assessment can help in matching methods with practical requirements , 
satisfying the reasonable needs of the negotiation process. 
Figure 1 illustrates, in a simplified manner, a negotiation process 
modeled on an actual case of Austrian diplomacy. This process 
resulted in an international multilateral convention elaborated under 
the auspices of a specialized agency of the United Nations. 
The process was triggered by an event which convinced influential 
and competent officials that new standards were required to address a 
specific problem of international politics . A first draft text was drawn 
up by the Legal Division of the Ministry for foreign Affairs (MfA) 
after discussions with other departments (inter-departmental level) . 
The draft was then discussed with other ministries which presented 
their own evaluations and interests and proposed modifications (inter-
ministerial level). In the course of this process, a number of decisions 
had to be taken (D 1-D 4 in Figure 1; in practice these decisions are 
more numerous). 
After the national decisions were made , international negotiations 
were begun. To create a first coalition , contacts were established with 
other states regarded as supportive for various reasons; these varied 
from a general friendly attitude (resulting from close economic, 
cultural , and historic links) to a positive attitude concerning the issue 
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National State 
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Adoption of final text 
09 
Fig. 1. Generic international negotiation process. 
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itself. These states each underwent a similar decision-making pro-
cedure as described above . In discussions with these coalition partners, 
a new draft was drawn up, accommodating the views of these states (D 
5-D 6). 
State A States B - X 
Coalition building 
Pratt text 
mtrnductwn 
Revised position 
"' ., 
E 
·;:; 
c 
National position 8 - X 
Coalition building 
General discussion 
Modified draft text 
Revissd position 
Sttnlemont of next ranking issues 
Coalition building 
Amendments 
Settlement of next ranking issues 
Coalition bu ilding --1 r1 Revised position 
-= Modified draft text · / 
Arnondments 
Package deal 
Settlemt1nt of top ranking issues 
Adoption by simple majority 
Y/N 
Adoption of final text 
by 213 mejority 
Fig. 2. The formulation process. 
Coalition bu ild ing 
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The next step involved placing the matter on the agenda of the 
competent international organization. This step required the consent 
of the other member states of the organization (D 7). After agreement 
on the site, time, privileges, and immunities of the conference had 
been achieved (D 8), the true negotiations started (see Figure 2). They 
ended with the adoption of the final, but non-binding text (D 9). For 
this, a further domestic decision-making process had to be activated 
which led to signature (D 10) and , after approval by the parliament , to 
ratification by the head of state (D 11). However, in this multilateral 
case, the treaty became effective only after a certain number of states 
had ratified it; in the case of bilateral treaties , the ratification of both 
parties is required. 
Thus the entire negotiation process possesses - an extremely com-
plex structure - consists of hundreds of decisions, and sometimes, lasts 
for several years . The most striking example of this is UNCLOS III. 
The initiative to discuss the Law of the Sea was taken in 1966 with the 
request for including the relevant item in the agenda; the end of the 
negotiations (carried out in the Preparatory Committee) is not yet in 
sight. 
Two different phases of negotiations have been singled out in the 
literature: the prenegotiation and negotiation phase. As illustrated by 
Figure 1, it is also necessary to add the post-negotiation phase, since it 
is relevant to the legal effect of the outcome and is a necessary factor 
during the deliberations of the decision-makers (DM) . 
1.1. The Prenegotiation (Diagnostic) Phase 
This phase begins with the triggering event or evidence which prompts 
the competent civil servant to realize the need for a new regulation 
which is deemed to benefit the existing situation , or at least , not to 
damage it. The set of decisions necessary for the formulation of the 
first national draft has to be preceded by a process of harmonization of 
the positions of other departments , an evaluation of the goals to be 
pursued in accordance with the supreme values esteemed by the state 
(e.g. , respect of international law and democracy), and an assessment 
of feasibility in light of different alternatives . Feasibility also has to be 
decided with regard to the assumed reactions of other states and 
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historical precedents . Both factors are interlinked. The expected 
reaction of other states is derived from the history of past reactions 
and historical precedents, the geopolitical situation, economic ac-
tivities , and comparable attitudes of like-minded countries. 
Thus , during this phase , national interests concerning the case are 
established, the interests of the other states are forecasted, and , on this 
basis , the national decision is taken of how to proceed in the most 
effective and cost-avoiding manner. In the course of this process , the 
following issues have to be addressed : self-interests (in light of existing 
practice) ; the optimum outcome ; domestic restraints; the outcome 
respecting these constraints; the interest and reaction of other states ; 
the outcome adapted to these limits ; the most appropriate procedure ; 
and the most probable result , which could include various alternatives. 
The decision-making procedure incorporates various loops and itera-
tive stages. 
The evaluation carried out during this phase is mainly twofold . On 
the one hand , it deals with the assessment of options relating to the 
matter under discussion (option-analysis) and , on the other, it relates 
to the most appropriate procedure and strategy. For this purpose , most 
analytical methods can be applied - prescriptive tools , such as multi-
attribute utility analysis , cost-benefit analysis , and multi-criteria op-
timization (see Wierzbicki et al. and Spector in this issue) , as well as 
descriptive methods, such as cognitive mapping (see Bonham in this 
issue). These methods can facilitate the processing of information and 
can make them more accessible. 
1.2. The Negotiation (Formulation) Phase 
The negotiation phase is that part of the process during which the 
views of different states are expressed and then merged to form a 
common position , and the final text agreed upon. During this phase , 
national decisions and the assumptions upon which foreign decisions 
are based are tested and verified. During the verification process, 
national assessments have to be adapted continuously , depending on 
the position of each state , as illustrated in Figure 2. 
In a continuous and iterative process , these negotiations , whether 
bilateral or multilateral , seek to itemize the issues and then rank them. 
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Items of lesser importance are usually negotiated first, as an agreement 
on them is often easier to achieve. In multilateral negotiations , these 
rounds of adaptation , consisting of concessions and adapted claims, are 
accompanied by a constant search for alliances in order to obtain a 
majority and to impress the other side with sheer numbers. The most 
sensitive issues are left for the so-called package deal, which contains a 
bundle of proposals with payoffs for the states still involved in the 
negotiations . Such packages are often developed by a delegation that 
enjoys a free vote and is therefore able to act as mediator. Finally, the 
procedure of adoption can consist of various stages ; sometimes , a first 
vote is taken by simple majority in a committee and the final vote by 
two-thirds majority in the plenary. 
During this phase, certain analytical methods and tools could 
facilitate the negotiation process: conflict analysis methods (Fraser, 
1992) could be used to assess the significance of the conflict or of the 
intended result ; and decision-tree analysis, multi-attribute utility analy-
sis, and multiobjective optimization could assist in evaluating either 
the various options and preferences under discussion (Ulvila and 
Snider, 1980) or the strategy to be selected (situational diagnosis ; see 
Druckman in this issue) . 
1.3. Post-Negotiation Phase 
Very often, negotiations are not really terminated when a text has been 
agreed upon because the agreement can become effective only when it 
has gone through the domestic ratification procedure of each nation . 
The SALT II and the Vienna Convention on the Representation of 
States in their Relations to Universal International Organizations are 
examples of negotiations in which treaties have been adopted by the 
necessary majority, but have yet to enter into force because of 
obstacles encountered at the national level. Another striking case is 
the Law of the Sea Convention. The text was adopted in April 1982 
and signed by more than 150 states in December 1982. Nevertheless, 
genuine negotiations are still going on in various organs, such as in the 
Preparatory Committee and in smaller groups, as a result of which the 
text may be amended. 
This phase of negotiations does not exist when a text becomes 
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effective with the adoption of the agreement , as is the case with the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) docu-
ments or resolutions of the UN General Assembly. However, it may 
be argued that such documents are not effective in regulating or 
influencing state behavior as they lack a certain degree of legitimacy 
(see Samarsan in this issue) . 
2. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS 
Any attempt at finding the most appropriate analytical method to 
assist international negotiations has to take into account the specific 
features and needs of such negotiations. 
• There are many kinds of negotiations. A major distinction has to be 
made between negotiations solving high-pressure conflict and involv-
ing high-level politics of a small number of states from the negotia-
tions concerning the elaboration of a codification convention, for 
example. The structure underlying the first case comes close to a 
zero-sum scenario where the most decisive step toward a solution is 
establishing communication between the states involved and getting 
them to the negotiation table, rather than into the negotiation 
process itself. In this respect, analytical methods could be helpful 
only insofar as they could assist in working out proposals which 
might convince the relevant states that negotiation could provide a 
result which is preferable to the existing situation . Contrary to this , 
in the second case, the will of the states to negotiate , has already 
been established , as most participants are convinced that they would 
benefit from the negotiations . 
• Another distinction can be made between small and large negotia-
tions. A negotiation may be a bilateral event with only two decision 
makers, or a universal event , like a UN conference with 166 
delegations . 
• Negotiations also vary according to the kinds of states represented at 
the conference and the kinds of relations prevailing among them. 
Even the mood dominating the negotiations can be different as it 
can range from hostility to cordiality. A further distinction can be 
made between the different nature of the issues under discussion. 
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These could range between human rights, on the one hand, and 
disarmament , on the other, for example, both with totally different 
implementation procedures. The environment of negotiations or the 
conditions under which negotiations are held can also influence the 
progress of negotiations. 
• As a delegate must be able to communicate with officials in his own 
state , the negotiations are usually conducted at a place where 
communication to outside capitals is ensured. Sometimes however , a 
place is sought where no communication is possible for the same 
reason - namely, to ensure fruitful discussions. 
• An important factor of any negotiation is the time element. As a 
consequence of intolerably increased transaction costs , the length of 
a conference usually cannot be stretched. All decisions have to be 
taken within a given time. Hence , despite the so-called 24-hour rule, 
decisions are very often taken in great haste during negotiations so 
that no time is left to obtain the necessary information. A simple 
example of this point is when a delegate has to make a decision on 
which clause relating to reservations to a multilateral treaty is to be 
supported. This decision usually influences the number of possible 
parties to the treaty . The three options are no clause (ensuring the 
application of the regime as provided in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties , 1969 or customary international law) , a clause 
specifying the treaty provisions to which reservations may relate , 
and a clause excluding reservations. In evaluating these options, 
several factors and aspects have to be evaluated. As this matter is 
usually taken up toward the end of a conference , the time element is 
a crucial factor and frequently outweighs all others. Analytical 
methods aimed at finding an optimum agreement are, in this respect, 
of little value unless they are used by mediators selecting from 
various alternatives. 
• Very often , a delegation is unable to participate in decision making 
due to its small size ; this happens when several committees meet 
simultaneously. 
• Negotiations are frequently characterized by their openness. The 
subjects of the negotiations are not necessarily confined to the 
conference, so that new trade-offs or payments can be made during 
negotiations , even outside the terms of reference of a conference. 
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• Most negotiations are marked by competitive instead of cooperative 
strategies and are mostly based on a zero sum approach . What is 
deemed a gain by one side , is considered a loss by the other. One 
reason for this attitude may be the personal character ofthe actors: 
in order to enhance their career at home they try hard to derive the 
maximum benefit for their states . 
• Negotiations are pluridimensional. The decision maker often bases 
his decision on interests pertaining to different levels . Considera-
tions at a community level are merged with those of state interests 
and the personal intentions of the delegate. 
3 . POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES 
Taking into account the characteristics which govern international 
negotiations and the possible analytical methods, the following conclu-
sions concerning potential benefits can be drawn: 
(a) Some methods are able to rationalize the negotiating position at 
the outset by indicating the potential for cooperation and the 
potential for conflict. The method used, for instance , by Anderson 
(1991) to determine this potential in the case of the Euphrates and 
Tigris conflict rather convincingly establishes that the actual power 
distribution in that region would be very conducive to fruitful 
negotiations at the moment. Other methods could help in selecting 
the best solutions to an existing problem - subject, however, to 
reliance on historical precedents and experiences. Examples in-
clude decision-tree analysis or multi-attribute utility analysis . 
Statistical methods are needed for evaluating one 's own and the 
other's positions. Cognitive maps could clarify the various inter-
relationships among positions as well. Any accurate perception of 
a delegate's position requires a thorough cost-benefit analysis , 
including transaction costs. In practice , such an analysis is regularly 
performed, albeit in a relatively basic manner. 
(b) As already shown, any decision relating to negotiation positions 
requires an assessment of probable reactions from other particip-
ants. A prerequisite for this assessment is an evaluation of the 
foreign state's position concerning the issue at stake. Methods 
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which are able to derive the interests of a foreign state from certain 
factors, such as past behavior and geographical factors, are 
extremely helpful. These methods include foreign policy analysis in 
the sense described by Sprout and Sprout (1965). Statistical 
methods for comparing various states' indices related to their 
interests would also be of help. 
(c) During the negotiation process a continuous review of the op-
timum alternatives, by means of multi-attribute utility analysis, 
could be helpful in finding the best negotiating position and in 
classifying the various proposals. This type of analysis could also 
be of use to those serving in a mediating role. 
(d) The only method which truly takes into account the personal factor 
in negotiation and which is widely used in combination with other 
methods is simulation. Human nature often eludes the mathemati-
cal yardstick. Only in simulations are attempts made to anticipate 
the attitudes of participants in negotiations, relying on the percep-
tion of various actors and including historical precedents. 
(e) Multilateral negotiations require coalition-building. Insofar as 
coalitions are not predetermined but freely formed during the 
conference, it is important to anticipate their formation in order to 
find the best negotiating position. Various methods aimed at 
ascertaining the positions of other states could be used for this 
purpose. 
(f) The amount of time available to carry out analyses during 
negotiations is uncertain. Thus, it is more practicable to conduct 
these analyses during the prenegotiation phase than during the 
actual negotiations. 
4. LIMITS AND INADEQUACIES OF ANALYTICAL METHODS 
The analytical methods described in this issue are not free of draw-
backs. These can be summarized as follows: 
• These methods and tools are likely to increase the inequalities 
among the states simply because they require human resources, 
money, and time. Only a few states can expend such extra resources. 
A delegation would need personnel who are used to handling such 
methods. Even in a situation where a delegation wants to convince 
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another of the 'correct' result based on computerized analysis , the 
latter delegation must have confidence in such a method . 
• Even if analytical research has been carried out before the negotia-
tions, decisions have to be taken so hastily during the negotiations that 
appropriate reflection of the results of these methods can hardly be 
made . Moreover, positions of states in the course of negotiations are 
relatively immovable , as the delegates follow their instructions . 
• Many analytical methods proceed from the assumption that other 
states' attitudes are based on the REMM theorem (resourceful , 
evaluating, maximizing man) . Experience has shown that this is not 
always the case or, at least , that there are different views on what a 
REMM attitude could be . On the other hand , it is extremely difficult 
for an outsider to define the real position of a particular state ; 
sometimes, for instance , a state may attach more value to group 
solidarity than to some other more concrete interests . In this respect, 
the findings of Jervis (1976) on perception and misperception in 
international relations deserves attention. 
• No negotiation process can exclude the possibility of a delegation 
resorting to irrational behavior. An example of a miscalculation or 
misperception in this respect is the view of the International Court 
of Justice enunciated in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases -
that landlocked states are not interested in the law of the sea . At 
UNCLOS III, the group of landlocked and geographically disadvant-
ages states proved the contrary. Further, it is often hard to assess 
whether a state which shows firm resistance to a certain proposal 
would not, at the last minute, make a concession to avoid failure of the 
negotiations. 
• A problem exists in the selection of criterion factors for decision 
models. For instance, the criteria regarded as important for defining 
negotiation interests by Ulvila and Snider (1980) are certainly repre-
sentative , but not exhaustive. Decision analysts frequently derive their 
criteria from statements delivered by the relevant countries . For this 
reason, general statements are usually examined because they are first 
on the agenda. However, it is not certain that such general statements 
reveal the true interests of a country; on the contrary, they are 
frequently used to disguise genuine interests. 
• A major limit to the use of analytical methods is the need to code 
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the available information and to attach specific values to the various 
factors and alternatives in terms of criterion weights. It seems rather 
doubtful that a delegation would be able to indicate precisely the 
weight it attaches to different issues or even the preferences accorded 
to them. Nevertheless, many analytical methods, depend on such 
codes. Druckman and Hopmann (1991) quite rightly point to the time 
factor connected with performing such coding: a transcript of a three-
hour negotiation requires another three hours to assign codes. 
• An additional problem might be caused by the relative nature of 
national interests. A state may have interests of a given value in 
relation to one country , but interests of a different value in relation to 
another country. Which interests eventually will prevail are hard to 
forecast. 
• Finally, existing analytical models are relatively simple . They ad-
dress negotiations with only a few variables and very technical 
implications. For example, the identification of national interests in 
negotiations are often simply and unambiguously portrayed. In prac-
tice, however , such simple situations rarely exist ; usually, the problems 
posed during negotiations have complex ramifications. Likewise , the 
complexity of coalitions, as well as their identification with specific 
interests, sometimes escapes complete analysis in these models, in 
particular , where the interests are extremely diversified. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Finally, the questions raised in the Introduction to this issue call for a 
response . 
What type of support can analytical methods and tools provide that 
would be useful for negotiators? The diagnostic phase of negotiation 
has to be distinguished from the formulation phase. Most analytical 
methods are useful in the diagnostic phase (see Spector in this issue); 
their support is mainly threefold: 
(i) These methods are able to assist the decision maker in identifying 
his state 's interests . 
(ii) They can help in finding preferable solutions among alternatives 
in the process of decision making . 
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(iii) They can help in assessing the position and possible reaction of 
other states and, by that, to facilitate coalition building. 
It seems that little has been done to develop methods that help 
identify new alternatives; most methods proceed from existing alterna-
tives. 
How should these tools be presented and packaged to facilitate their 
utility? These tools must be presented and packaged so that diplomats 
who do not have access to a staff of technicians can use them, in 
addition to methodological analysts . If they are not, inequalities 
among states would only be emphasized. Overall , the methods of 
evaluation and coding must become more transparent and less time-
consuming. 
Who is likely to use such tools? The user will vary depending on the 
negotiation phase. During the prenegotiation phase, staff experts are 
most likely to use these tools in the domestic decision-making process. 
In the negotiation phase, the persons on national delegations are likely 
to use such tools. The average size of a delegation to international 
conferences is not more than two persons, sometimes consisting only 
of one. Therefore, a certain simplicity in the method is indispensable. 
How can system designers provide support on substantive issue 
development, as well as on the process of negotiation? Basically , there 
is a need for elaborating methods capable of generating new solutions 
to a given problem, not only for evaluating possible solutions which 
have already been developed . Such methods must certainly perform 
appropriate conflict analyses, as well as analysis of already existing 
solutions, to reveal their deficiencies and benefits. System designers 
should focus their efforts on the elaboration of simple and easily 
understandable evaluations of proposed alternatives and of the con-
sequences for the entire negotiation process ensuing therefrom. A 
practical way of using the analytical results in negotiations are in 
seminars held for delegations during the negotiation process. 
How can confidence and trust in such tools best be achieved? 
Confidence and trust in such tools can be developed over long periods 
of time by continuous exposure to them and by demonstration of 
reliable results . 
In summary , analytical methods for negotiation support can serve a 
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useful function in the negotiation process, in particular during the 
prenegotiation phase. However, we must not overlook the fact that 
there are limits to such use under actual conditions. Therefore, it is 
necessary to continue the exchange of views and information among 
those who have practical experience and those who are able to work 
with and improve the analytical methods, keeping in mind the overall 
objective of better solutions to international conflicts which meet the 
requirements of justice and fairness. 
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DECISION SUPPORT AND NEGOTIATION 
RESEARCH: A RESEARCHER'S PERSPECTIVE 
ABSTRACT. The intellectual interchange between methodologists interested in sup-
porting negotiation practice and negotiation researchers who have been developing 
conceptual frameworks of the process and outcome must be enlivened. Taking the 
perspective of a researcher concerned with understanding and explaining the process of 
negotiation, the author highlights several key theoretical concepts that DSS developers 
should consider in designing techniques for practitioners which will introduce dynamic 
and creative aspects and provide a firm theoretical underpinning for their DSS 
approaches. 
Keywords: Negotiation analysis, integrative bargaining, analytical methodologies , 
power. 
There are decision support systems and decision support systems, as a 
New Yorker would put it. Some of them can be very useful for 
developing a better and more informed conduct of negotiations. 
Others have a long way to go before they can meet negotiations. 
Although these methodologies talk much about negotiation, many of 
them are ill-tuned to the process. The nature of the analysis and its 
assumptions, both about itself and about negotiation , need much 
revision and updating before they can meet the reality of negotiation 
as it is portrayed in various analytical approaches. For the most part , 
the problem lies in the static nature of the situation as apprehended for 
analysis by decision support systems (DSS) and the assumption of fixed 
options that stifles the creativity necessary for effective negotiation. 
DSS writers, for the most part, are using old, mechanical models of 
negotiation that do not take into account much of the recent literature, 
particularly on integrative negotiation and negotiation analysis. To 
bridge the two methods of analysis, ways must be found to introduce 
dynamic open-ended aspects into DSS approaches. 
There are some DSS approaches, however, which have begun to 
break out of their static assumptions and reach out creatively to the 
practice and analysis of the negotiation process. Decision analysis 
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based on multi-attribute utilities (MAU), computer simulation model-
ling, statistical analysis, and cognitive mapping have already shown 
their usefulness to the diagnostic phase which precedes and accom-
panies the actual bargaining exchanges. MAU can indicate the highest 
payoffs available to a negotiator across issues and coalitions based on 
the negotiator's preference schedule, and computer modelling shows 
the outcomes based on multiparty issue coalitions. These two method-
ologies provide a sharp evaluation of outcomes so as to help 
negotiators produce optimal results. 
Statistical analysis can be applied to anything quantifiable, and it is 
presented here to test hypotheses against results gained from experi-
ments and from content analysis. There is no doubt that controlled 
experimentation has provided many insights into the negotiation 
process that have permitted a better understanding of the practice of 
negotiation in much messier circumstances (e.g., Rubin and Brown, 
1975), and that empirical data from content analysis has shown 
effects - such as the phenomenon of crisis and turning point (Druck-
man, 1986) - in sharp clarity. Cognitive mapping portrays the way 
parties think about the encounter and issues by showing both values 
and causal chains. The methodology allows parties to understand their 
adversaries better and construct winning arguments and analyses. 
These four methodologies provide a more explicit and precise 
evaluation of images, processes and outcomes than is otherwise 
available, and the input-output modelling removes some of the 
uncertainty that often has negotiators fighting over the the wrong 
thing. They also have been extended to serve as the basis for an 
analysis of the process itself, providing explanations for the outcomes 
and for the process by which they are achieved (Spector, 1993). Much 
of their explanation is based on 'as if' rationality, showing what would 
happen if the negotiators acted rationally, and then leaving it to ad hoc 
analysis to account for idiosyncratic deviations from that predicted 
baseline. 
Other DSS methodologies are at such a basic level in the chain of 
theoretical development as to be far away from application to negotia-
tion. Information management deals with classification of options, 
rule-based systems deal with logical linguistic structures, multi-objec-
tive optimization models assume a powerless process of discovery 
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rather than an interactive bargaining process, and game theory as 
presented here also deals with structures of choice in the absence of 
strategic interaction. The latter approach , of course, has been de-
veloped at the hands of many analysts to produce powerful insights 
into the manipulative process of negotiation, including the conceptuali-
zation and use of power , showing that even basic concepts can be 
carried to the point of analytical usefulness. On the other hand , 
rule-based systems and information management seem so broad-brush 
as not even to have arrived at the door of negotiation as yet. 
Once diagnosis has been established , negotiation proceeds through a 
process of establishing the general framework of principles or formula 
for an agreement and then the application of these principles to the 
settlement of details . The most important aspect of this two-fold 
process is creativity - actually the breaking away from fixed options 
and values that make the conflict irresolvable and that underlie much 
of DSS analysis. Thus the mutation of these approaches to a useful 
form involves first relaxing the assumption of fixed positions and 
second introducing ways in which the methodologies can be used to 
foster creativity. 
The other important aspect that removes the process from one of 
mere discovery is the Toughness or Negotiator's Dilemma (Zartman, 
1983 ; Lax and Sebenius , 1986) : the negotiator always has a range of 
choice between the one extreme of playing tough, thus increasing the 
chances of a favorable agreement but decreasing the chances of any 
agreement at all , and playing soft , thus increasing the chances of 
agreement by decreasing the chances of a favorable agreement. Thus , 
Wierzbicki , et al . 's assumption (see article in this issue) that 
negotiators are prepared to agree and prepared to accept a mediator's 
efforts to find an agreement define arbitration , not negotiation. The 
refinement of these approaches to allow for strategic interaction 
requires both a relaxation of the assumption of fixed optimality and 
also the introduction of ways in which the methodology can be used to 
enhance productive use of power. Some initial suggestions will be 
made. 
Creativity or reframing, by definition , eludes the possibility of 
portrayal by any kind of preference schedule. Reframing means not 
simply finding optimal ways of putting together known preferences , 
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including the addition of new items not yet on the schedule, but the 
recasting of known and yet unknown items in such ways as to bring out 
new natures and, therefore, new preferences. This takes the process 
back to diagnosis, in preparation for better formulas, in order to 
review precedents, similarities, alternative definitions, underlying 
goals, components, and so on. There is a methodological Catch-22 in 
this process: the potential outcomes cannot be portrayed precisely until 
the qualitative searching process has identified them, but outcomes 
cannot be checked for optimization until they are portrayed precisely. 
Preference analysis can therefore serve as an imperfect but useful 
support for the diagnosis of alternatives, but only if it recognizes that 
the preliminary identification of optimizing perspectives lies outside of 
its capabilities. 
Similarly, power can be used to try to force suboptimal agreements, 
but it can also be employed to expand thinking about optimality. 
Negotiation is a political encounter, with a number of implications that 
go beyond the capabilities of DSS. Negotiated outcomes must be 
fought over, so that the negotiators and the home audience see that a 
real effort was made. Negotiation is a surrogate for combat, and in the 
political psyches and processes of an entity - nation, organization, firm 
or person - satisfaction is as much a function of the process as of the 
outcome. Looking up an outcome on a preference schedule won't do. 
Issue items are not all part of a single negotiation front but belong to 
many of them. It is therefore often quite rational, for other than 
preference reasons, to exclude items from a bargain, just as it may be 
equally rational, in the search for optimal tradeoffs, to include those 
items. The use of pressure, influence, persuasion - in other words, 
power - to work out the size and composition of the front is a normal 
part of the process that schedules cannot portray. Once these elusive 
elements of the process are recognized, however, DSS can contribute 
useful assistance by presenting the new preferences and their combina-
tions so as to assure optimality and facilitate process (Friedheim, 
1993). 
It can also expand its own horizons beyond the fixed-position 
assumption. One way would be to work on methodologies to deal with 
reframing and develop alternative optimal outcomes as a baseline for 
analysis. DSS methods have the advantage of being able to provide 
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sound portrayals of optimality , for use not only prescriptively but also 
analytically. Despite some of the above-mentioned problems , it is true 
that real-life negotiators often neglect the expansion of their negotiat-
ing front to include items that would enhance the value of the 
agreement for all parties. DSS methods can focus attention on this 
possibility, illustratively if not exhaustively. These methods can also 
establish several optima as a basis for analyzing the process and 
reasons why they were (or were not) attained. More can thereby be 
learned about the real process, for both conducting and correcting it. 
Recent work in other areas of negotiation analysis (e .g., Young, 1992) 
has pushed relevant research on negotiation beyond the limitations of 
its initial methodology. 
Another needed methodological expansion would be to deal with 
power. Despite initial claims that power was outside its scope (Nash , 
1950; Rapoport, 1964), game theory has moved to take advantage of 
the obvious elements of power hidden within its matrices (Brams, 
1985 , 1990; Axelrod , 1984). By using the threat position of diversely 
acceptable deadlock and by rerunning trials on the same or varied 
arrays of payoffs , it has gone beyond its original assumptions of 
determinate outcomes into manipulable outcomes. Matrical portrayals 
are also used as baselines or snapshots , leading analysis into the 
periods outside and between the matrices, to find out how they are 
changed. Other methodologies , too, can be modified to take strategic 
interaction into account (Young, 1975). 
Experimental and content analyses have taken on the power ques-
tion in many ways , although the latter - a time consuming and perhaps 
overly cumbersome methodology - can be used more frequently than it 
has in either its quantitative or qualitative forms to identify various 
effects associated with power. In the 1960s and 1970s, experimental 
analysis in social psychology focused on many aspects of power, 
particularly power asymmetry, but thereafter turned to other things 
(Rubin and Brown, 1975; Rubin and Zartman, forthcoming). Inter-
vening variables need to be identified to compare the four ways of 
using power - threats, warnings, promises, predictions - as one exam-
ple . 
What could decision theory do with power? Decision theory com-
bined with content analysis has been used to show the flow of 
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consensus building at the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea with 
great effect (Friedheim, 1993; also Sebenius, 1984 ), but with multi-
party dynamics overriding the individual exercise of power. Power as 
an added value has been identified as a promising concept (Schelling, 
1960; Zartman, 1974), but only with decision analysis can it be 
employed and tested. There is much material here for both historical 
and experimental analysis. 
The dynamics of the negotiation process - multiparty or bilateral -
are the most important subject of inquiry and explanation, whether 
they move by their own mechanisms or are directed by the power of 
individual parties. Game theory has provided much insight into that 
process and its assumptions have been modified along the way. 
Simulation modelling has a similar potential, beginning inductively as 
it is now presented and then being used deductively as theories are 
developed. The use of computer simulations as teaching devices 
(Antrim and Zartman, 1991) can also be extended to the generation of 
experimental data on process. 
In conclusion, the challenge of usefulness still stands before DSS 
methodologies. Some are at a primitive level of abstraction with little 
promise of a greater grasp of reality. Others are able to continue a 
development that has already shown some practical insights and 
applications; game theory has made a major impact on negotiation 
analysis, and decision and content analysis have helped identify some 
important effects. In between lie a number of potentially useful 
support systems that purport to enhance creativity, but are locked in 
early and outmoded models of the negotiation process. These meth-
odological approaches need to come to terms with such basic com-
ponents of current negotiation analysis, such as variable values, 
integrative bargaining, problem-solving, multiple trade-offs, and 
others. They need to relate to questions that arise from the analysis of 
the process, informing research that is concept-driven rather than 
methodology-driven. Therein lies a serious potential for payoffs. 
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